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This study traces how the Treaty of Peace with Japan was negotiated between 1945 and 1951. 
Originally, the treaty was based on the principle of demilitarization and democratization to 
prevent Japan’s re-emergence as a threat. As tensions increased with the Soviet Union and the 
PRC, however, the US decided that the peace treaty must be geared towards containing 
communism, which entailed revitalizing Japan’s economic and military capacity and anchoring it 
to the West. For this purpose, the US sought to eradicate punitive elements from the treaty. 
However, the US often clashed with its friends in that process, as many countries had not 
forgotten Japan’s wartime atrocities and harbored suspicion that Japanese militarism could 
revive. Hence, the US had to make important concessions, such as obligating Japan to pay 
reparations and excluding the Chinese Nationalists from the treaty. Nevertheless, thanks to the 
widespread consensus among America’s friends of the need to combat communism, the US was 
able to steer the treaty in a way that was lenient and conformed to its containment policy. This 
study is significant in that it focuses on a number of aspects of the Japanese peace treaty and its 
negotiation that have hitherto been underappreciated, and thereby offers a fresh perspective. It 
also has contemporary significance as it seeks to better understand how today’s problems, such 
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The Question and Significance of the Study 
 
After years of fighting, the Pacific War ended with Japan’s defeat in August 1945. Shortly 
thereafter, with the signing of the “Instrument of Surrender” on 2 September 1945, all authority 
to control and supervise Japan was delegated to the Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces 
(SCAP), General Douglas MacArthur; the occupation of Japan had begun.1 This marked the de 
facto termination of the war. Now Japan and her former belligerents had to negotiate a peace 
treaty to terminate the war de jure.  
The negotiation process for the peace treaty is the focus of this study. Simply put: how 
was the treaty of peace with Japan made? By tracing the dialogue between the US and other 
concerned governments, it shows that the crafting of the treaty was a multilateral effort that 
involved more than thirteen different countries. At the same time, it highlights that the peace 
treaty was conceived more as an instrument to combat communism than as a postwar “settlement” 
with Japan, thus leaving many important questions about Japan’s wartime past unanswered as the 
US and its allies hastened to conclude the treaty. 
The reason for this research, meanwhile, is two-fold. To begin with, it has 
historiographical significance as it seeks to rekindle the debate on the Japanese peace settlement, 
a topic in the postwar history of Japan that has been comparatively neglected in recent years. As 
a result of this negligence, some aspects of the peace treaty that are important to understanding 
today’s Asia-Pacific remain underexplored, and at times completely overlooked. This study 
therefore seeks to tackle these shortcomings. Secondly, it has contemporary significance, as 
many of the on-going controversies in today’s Northeast Asia can be traced back to the Japanese 
peace treaty. For instance, some current territorial disputes – including the Liancourt Rocks 
between Korea and Japan, the Kurile Islands between Japan and Russia and the Senkaku Islands 
between Japan and China – spring from the fact that the ownership of these islands was never 
defined in the treaty. In order to have a fuller understanding of why these issues exist, one must 
examine how they originated in the first place, which this study attempts to do. The following 
 
1 Instrument of Surrender, 2 September 1945, accessed 11 October 2019 via the National Archives and Records 
Administration (NARA), https://www.archives.gov/exhibits/featured-documents/japanese-surrender-document. 
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section traces the scholarly findings more in detail and elaborates on the specific gaps that need 
to be filled. 
 
Review of the Existing Historiography 
 
The existing historiography can be largely divided into three categories: those produced before 
the opening of the archives; those produced after the opening of the archives; and those produced 
after the fall of the Soviet Union. One of the earliest works was written one year after the 
occupation ended by Baron Van Aduard, a former deputy representative with the Dutch mission 
in occupied Japan. This book is an impressive overview of what happened to Japan between 
1945 and 1952. Most notably, he depicts the Japanese peace settlement as having been a 
multilateral affair and examines the roles of the British Commonwealth (although mostly 
confined to Australia and Britain), Japan, the Soviet Union and the US. Also, perhaps because he 
was an insider who had a first-hand encounter with the realities of occupation, most of his 
recollections of the era are pertinent and still deserve to be read. However, because he lacked 
access to sensitive American and Japanese material, some of his arguments regarding the US and 
Japan were simply wrong or inaccurate. Interestingly, Van Aduard chose to narrate the story of 
postwar Japan from a very US-centric point of view rather than a European one. This is rather 
unfortunate, since the Japanese peace settlement was not simply an American affair and Van 
Aduard was ideally placed to contribute to the international angle by speaking more from a 
Dutch perspective.2  
Van Aduard’s work was quickly followed by two books by Princeton University scholars 
Bernard Cecil Cohen, a political scientist, and Frederick S. Dunn, an international law specialist. 
The former examines what happened within the US during the peace treaty negotiations and how 
these domestic factors affected the talks. Cohen’s book is valuable in that the author conducted 
extensive personal interviews with leading actors in the treaty-making process, including John 
Foster Dulles, John M. Allison, Dean Rusk, George F. Kennan, H. Alexander Smith (Republican, 
New Jersey) and Francis O. Wilcox (Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chief of Staff, 1947-
 
2 Baron E. J. Lewe Van Aduard, Japan: from surrender to peace (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1953). 
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1955). Cohen demonstrates that the Japanese peace treaty was a relatively smooth affair, as it did 
not provoke much public outrage in the US.3 
Dunn, on the other hand, focuses on the international aspect and traces how the US 
negotiated with other governments. He argues that the Japanese peace settlement was affected by 
two factors: US-Soviet rivalry, which led the US to craft the treaty in a way that conformed with 
its containment policy; and what could be termed a “de-Versailles” mentality, in that the US 
wished to avoid repeating the mistakes of 1919 by imposing a harsh peace on the vanquished. 
This has now become a classical narrative that is often taken for granted.4 
Another important book on the Japanese peace settlement – and perhaps the most 
significant work at the time of its publication – was written by Nishimura Kumao, the former 
leader of the Treaty Bureau of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who was in charge of 
formulating Japan’s position on the peace treaty. Based on his personal experience, Nishimura 
produced in the Japanese language an extensive narrative of what happened between 1945 and 
1952, covering both the peace treaty and the bilateral US-Japan security treaty that were signed 
simultaneously. This book is particularly valuable in that the author provides a rare glimpse of 
what was taking place within the Japanese government; most notably, the author shows how 
Tokyo tried its best to lobby the West in order to make the peace treaty more favorable to 
Japanese interests. This is perhaps the only work that was produced at the time that narrated the 
peace settlement from the Japanese point of view. In retrospect, his recollection of the treaty 
negotiations has been proven to be almost completely accurate. Unsurprisingly, Nishimura’s 
book has been cited by almost all scholars who examine the occupation period and the Japanese 
peace treaty. Yet, because his focus is on the US and Japan, the fact that other governments were 
also involved in formulating the postwar Japanese settlement is almost completely neglected. In 
addition, perhaps because of his identity as a former government officer, he is rather defensive 
about the decisions reached by the two governments.5  
It should be noted that other former members of the Allied occupation authority also left 
written accounts of their experiences. Yet, these are largely personal recollections of various 
 
3 Bernard Cecil Cohen, The Political Process and Foreign Policy: the making of the Japanese peace settlement 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957). 
4 Frederick S. Dunn, Peace-making and the Settlement with Japan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963). 
5 西村熊雄 [Nishimura Kumao], 日本外交史 27: サンフランシスコ平和条約 [The Diplomatic History of Japan 
Vol. 27: The San Francisco Peace Treaty] (東京 [Tōkyō]: 鹿島研究所出版会 [Kajima Institute of International 
Peace Press], 1971). 
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aspects of postwar Japan and not strictly books about the Japanese peace treaty. Hence, while 
recognizing their merit as useful references for understanding postwar Japan, they cannot be 
treated as scholarly works on the postwar Japanese peace settlement.6 
All of the works above were produced before the US government records became 
available and thus were handicapped by a lack of access to confidential material; in the case of 
Van Aduard and Nishimura – who most likely had access to government records – they were not 
able to cite any. They are also mostly centered around the role of the US. Rajendra Kumar Jain 
attempted to fill this gap by discussing what different governments – including Britain, Burma, 
the two Chinas, India, Indonesia, Korea, Philippines, the Soviet Union, Vietnam and the US – 
were looking for in the Japanese peace treaty. Yet, Jain’s attempt is rudimentary at best, as he too 
wrote it before any of the sensitive government material was disclosed.7 
Meanwhile, based on extensive interviews with former American and Japanese 
government officials who were involved in the treaty negotiation process, Michael Yoshitsu in 
1983 attempted to substantiate many of the points raised by Nishimura, especially the fact that 
the Japanese Foreign Ministry had sought to make the peace treaty more amenable for Japan, 
while strengthening its ties with the US. Unlike Nishimura, Yoshitsu had no qualms about 
arguing that the US-Japan relations were not equal, as Japan had been pressed to make important 
concessions in return for its independence. The biggest shortcoming of Yoshitsu’s work, 
however, is that, once again, the international aspect of the Japanese peace settlement is missing, 
as he focuses solely on the US and Japan. Equally surprising is the fact that Yoshitsu almost 
completely neglected the formerly classified government archives that were finally made 
available at the time; instead, he relied heavily on published material (the Foreign Relations of 
the United States series).8  
However, Yoshitsu’s work was quickly followed by three notable books written by 
Japanese academics that did draw on these de-classified American and British records. The most 
monumental work – and the most comprehensive work to date on the Japanese peace settlement 
– was written by Hosoya Chihiro, a specialist in Anglo-Japanese relations. While his book is 
 
6 Edwin M. Martin, The Allied Occupation of Japan (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1948); Robert A. Fearey, 
The Occupation of Japan, Second Phase: 1948-50 (New York: Macmillan, 1950); Russell Brines and William J. 
Sebald, With MacArthur in Japan: A Personal History of the Occupation (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 
1965); W. MacMahon Ball, Japan: Enemy or Ally? (New York: John Day, 1949); Yoshida Shigeru, The Yoshida 
Memoirs: the story of Japan in crisis (London: Heinemann, 1961). 
7 Rajendra Kumar Jain, Japan's Postwar Peace Settlements (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1978). 
8 Michael Yoshitsu, Japan and the San Francisco Peace Settlement (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983). 
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significant in a number of ways, what is most notable is the fact that he analyzed not only the 
role of the US, but also that of the British Commonwealth. By focusing on the two most 
powerful actors in the crafting of the peace treaty, Hosoya showed that, in addition to the US-
Soviet rivalry, the Japanese peace settlement was also affected by the efforts of the British 
Commonwealth states to convince the US to take over more responsibilities worldwide, 
especially in the field of security.9  
Nevertheless, there are certain aspects of the peace treaty that Hosoya does not 
sufficiently explore. For instance, the roles of France and Indochina are simply acknowledged 
without any detailed explanation of their roles in the making of the treaty. Also, while Hosoya 
goes a long way towards discussing the effects of the Korean War on the peace settlement, any 
analysis of the question of Korea’s participation in the treaty is curiously lacking. The debates 
upon postwar Japan’s high-seas fisheries and shipbuilding capacity are also not adequately 
elaborated. This owes to the fact that Hosoya’s work is about the overall peace “settlement” and 
not exclusively about the peace “treaty.” The peace settlement in his remit encompassed not only 
the peace treaty, but also the three accompanying security treaties that were signed concurrently: 
the US-Japan security treaty, US-Philippines security treaty and the trilateral US security treaty 
with Australia and New Zealand. The scope of Hosoya’s analysis is therefore very wide, and not 
surprisingly, he does not explain in depth the background and full significance of the actual 
terms of the peace treaty. 
An edited volume by Watanabe Akio and Miyasato Seigen, meanwhile, attempted to 
situate the Japanese peace settlement in a more international context. Here, the contributing 
authors examined the viewpoints of Australia, Britain, India, the Philippines, the Soviet Union 
and the US regarding the Japanese peace settlement.10 This book shows that the peace treaty was 
affected by a complex web of security, economic and ideological concerns, and that all of the 
individual countries had different ideas about what course postwar Japan should take. This work 
was a major addition to the early effort made by Jain and constituted a significant contribution to 
the international history of the Japanese peace treaty. Nevertheless, as is the case with Hosoya, 
 
9 細谷千博 [Hosoya Chihiro], サンフランシスコ講和への道 [The Road to San Francisco Peace Treaty] (東京: 
中央公論社, 1984). 
10 渡辺昭夫 [Watanabe Akio] and 宮里政玄 [Miyasato Seigen], サンフランシスコ講和 [The San Francisco 
Peace Treaty] (東京 [Tokyo]: 東京大学出版会 [University of Tokyo Press], 1986). 
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this book does not elucidate the French, Indochinese and Korean points of view and, moreover, 
how the individual terms of the treaty were made is not sufficiently explained. 
If Hosoya, Watanabe and Miyasato focused on the international aspects of the Japanese 
peace settlement, Igarashi Takeshi looked at the domestic story, examining what was happening 
in Japanese political circles as the Cold War intensified between 1945 and 1952, and how this 
affected the peace treaty. Igarashi explains how Japanese politics went through a significant 
transformation during the occupation, in which the socialists, who were originally in power, 
gradually gave way to the conservatives. This, he argued, ultimately contributed to the “partial” 
peace created by the US which excluded China and the Soviet Union from the peace treaty and 
left many controversial questions unresolved.11 This internal conflict among the Japanese had 
not, hitherto, been sufficiently addressed and thus Igarashi’s analysis was a welcome addition to 
the scholarly understanding of the Japanese peace settlement. Its merits notwithstanding, Igarashi 
narrates the issue of peace settlement almost exclusively through the lens of US-Japan relations, 
and thus largely neglects the viewpoints of other countries that were involved in the postwar 
Japanese settlement. At the same time, because his focus is more on the Japanese attitude 
towards the peace settlement, the evolution and significance of the specific treaty terms are not 
sufficiently discussed. Even more unfortunate is the fact that the Japanese peace settlement 
disappeared as a stand-alone topic thereafter, as nobody has followed up on these three works. 
Similarly, no notable monograph on the peace treaty has been produced outside of Japan 
after Yoshitsu. Instead, following the opening of the archives until the present, it has been 
subsumed as a subsidiary topic within other specialized themes, including the general American 
postwar occupation policy for Japan, the British Commonwealth policy for postwar Japan, 
Korea-Japan relations, Japan’s postwar economy and the US-Japan security alliance.12 In fact, 
 
11 五十嵐武士 [Igarashi Takeshi], 対日講和と冷戦: 戦後日米関係の形成 [The Japanese Peace Settlement and 
the Cold War and the Formation of US-Japan Relations] (東京 [Tokyo]: 東京大学出版会 [Tokyo University 
Press], 1986). 
12 Michael Schaller, The American Occupation of Japan: The Origins of the Cold War in Asia (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1985); Howard B. Schonberger, Aftermath of War: Americans and the remaking of Japan, 1945-
1952 (Kent: Kent State University Press, 1989); William S. Borden, The Pacific Alliance: United States foreign 
economic policy and Japanese trade recovery, 1947-1955 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1984); Roger 
Buckley, Occupation Diplomacy: Britain, the United States and Japan, 1945-1952 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1982); Ann Trotter, New Zealand and Japan 1945-1952: the occupation and the peace treaty 
(London: Athlone Press Ltd, 1990); Richard B. Finn, Winners in Peace: MacArthur, Yoshida and Postwar Japan 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992); John W. Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World 
War II (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1999); Aaron Forsberg, America and the Japanese Miracle: the Cold 
War context of Japan's postwar economic revival, 1950-1960 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
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the most recent study by Jennifer Miller, who situates postwar Japan within an American Cold 
War crucible to safeguard democracy, follows this pattern. While she convincingly argues that 
the overarching goal of the US in crafting the treaty was to anchor Japan to the West, there is 
relatively little analysis of how the treaty terms were developed as a whole or how the non-US 
governments contributed to the shaping of those terms.13 
This does not mean, however, that there has been no meaningful analysis of the peace 
treaty after Igarashi. On the contrary, as will be elaborated in pertinent chapters, certain terms of 
the treaty, most prominently the exclusion of China from the treaty and the ambiguous definition 
and ownership of the Kuril Islands, have been researched quite extensively. Nevertheless, these 
studies tend to use these cases to reinforce the notion that the overriding factor that determined 
the fate of postwar Japan was the Cold War rivalry between the communist and free world.14 
Certainly, containing communism was the most important concern at the time. However, it was 
not the only factor impacting Japan. One must also consider American grand strategy in the 
Pacific, conflict of interests within the Western camp – including internal dissent within the US 
between the government and domestic constituency – which took place independently from the 
Cold War. 
Scholars from Korea and Japan have made important contributions in this regard. They 
not only analyze numerous aspects of the treaty, including the exclusion of South Korea, 
reparations (Article 14), fisheries (Article 9), which are relatively unknown outside – since 
almost none of the relevant works have been translated into English – but also approach the 
issues from the viewpoint of decolonization.15 However, they focus near-exclusively on the roles 
 
2000); Robert D. Eldridge, The Origins of the Bilateral Okinawa Problem: Okinawa in postwar U.S.-Japan 
relations, 1945-1952 (New York: Routledge, 2001). 
13 Jennifer M. Miller, Cold War Democracy: The United States and Japan (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2019). 
14 Hosoya Chihiro, “Japan, China, the United States and the United Kingdom, 1951-2: the Case of the Yoshida 
Letter,” International Affairs 60-2 (1984): 247-259; Howard Schonberger, “Peacemaking in Asia: the United States, 
Great Britain and the Japanese decision to recognize Nationalist China, 1951-1952,” Diplomatic History 10-1 (1986): 
67-73; Kevin Ruane, “The Origins of the Eden–Dulles Antagonism: the Yoshida Letter and the Cold War in East 
Asia 1951–1952,” Contemporary British History 25-1 (2011): 141-156; John J. Stephan, The Kuril Islands: Russo-
Japanese frontier in the Pacific (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974); David Rees, The Soviet Seizure of the Kuriles 
(New York: Praeger, 1985); Hiroshi Kimura, The Kurillian Knot: a history of Japanese-Russian border negotiations, 
trans. by Mark Ealey (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008); Fiona Hill, “A Disagreement between Allies: the 
United Kingdom, the United States, and the Soviet-Japanese territorial dispute, 1945–1956,” Journal of Northeast 
Asian Studies 14-3 (1995): 3–49; Hara Kimie, Cold War frontiers in the Asia-Pacific: divided territories in the San 
Francisco system (New York: Routledge, 2007), 71-99. 
15 이원덕 [Yi Wondǒk], 한일 과거사 처리의 원점: 일본의 전후처리 외교와 한일회담 [Square One: settling the 
past – Postwar Japanese settlement and Korea-Japan normalization] (서울 [Seoul]: 서울대학교출판부 [Seoul 
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of Japan, Korea and the US with no in-depth analysis of the viewpoints of other governments. 
Furthermore, each work specializes in one specific question and its impact on Korea-Japan 
relations in the post-treaty era. Consequently, there is no comprehensive analysis that brings the 
various inter-related issues together, while the peace treaty is used as a subsidiary topic to 
explain the bigger postwar diplomatic issues between the two countries. Hence, while 
introducing these aspects of the treaty to audiences outside of Korea and Japan, this study also 
seeks to tackle these identifiable gaps.  
This study also introduces two new aspects of the treaty that have been overlooked in the 
existing works: the Indochinese representation and Japan’s postwar shipping and shipbuilding 
capacity. Close analysis of these two questions is justified in that they attest to the multilateral 
nature of the Japanese peace settlement. The case of Indochina is particularly interesting in that it 
shows how the peace treaty was also shaped by concerns that had little to do with Japan. 
In contrast to the neglect of the peace treaty, the history of the US-Japan security treaty 
has consistently been a popular topic over the years for historians and political scientists because 
of its central position in US-Japan relations and its significance within Japanese politics. In fact, 
even before the opening of the archive, George Packard, taking note of the fact that the security 
treaty aroused mass protest and the collapse of Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke’s cabinet in 1960, 
carefully traced the opinions of Diet members, intellectuals, newspapers and student groups to 
understand why this treaty caused such outrage in Japan and shows how the treaty terms were 
construed by many as dangerously compromising Japan’s security and independence.16 This was 
followed up by Martin Weinstein, who revisited the making of the security treaty to show that 
Japan was not a passive observer but an active participant, successfully guarding itself from 
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American pressure for a rapid remilitarization. Later, Frank Weinstein, in collaboration with 
numerous American and Japanese scholars, sought to assess how the security treaty might be 
adjusted to better fit into the new circumstances resulting from the end of the Vietnam War.17 
Taking advantage of the newly available records in the 1980s, Reinhard Drifte and John Welfield 
to varying degrees revisited the origins of the US-Japan security treaty and its legacy to 
substantiate the existing claims that its terms had compromised Japan’s sovereignty and that it 
strained US-Japan relations in later years. 18 A more recent study by John Swenson-Wright, 
meanwhile, challenges the traditional notion that an unequal security relationship was created 
between Japan and the US and stresses the mutual goals in the alliance, while Kuniyoshi Tomoki 
traces the British contribution to the making of the security treaty in order to show its multilateral 
origins. Nam Kijeong, meanwhile, examines the effects of the Korean War in expediting the 
security treaty and regimentation of Japan into a “base state.”19  
Although not strictly concerned with the security treaty itself, the books by Roger 
Buckley and Michael Schaller on postwar US-Japan relations are still premised on the 
assumption that it was the pillar of the US-Japan alliance and that it impacted the two countries 
in important ways. The peace treaty, on the other hand, is not given such recognition. Even 
though both authors devote one full chapter to outline the US efforts to craft a lenient peace 
treaty to restore Japan’s independence and anchor it to the West, they are interested in it as a 
process rather than looking at its specific terms and significance.20 Meanwhile, the centrality of 
security as an issue within Japanese politics is stressed not only by Jennifer Miller but also in a 
recent publication by Nick Kapur. The latter discusses how the crisis brought forth by the 1960 
renegotiation of the security treaty led to a merger of the conservative camp in Japanese politics, 
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which subsequently allowed the Liberal Democrats to maintain its position as the ruling party for 
decades.21  
Interest in the security treaty has also been generated by its significance to scholars of 
contemporary international politics. For them, the security treaty constitutes an important 
element of the so-called “hub-and-spokes” system, a form of regional security scheme consisting 
of multiple bilateral agreements between the US and concerned countries. This is rather unique 
as it differs from its European counterpart, which is characterized by one collective security 
treaty (North Atlantic Pact). Scholars, such as Victor Cha, Jae Jeok Park and Kent Calder have 
all sought to understand why the security scheme developed so differently for Asia-Pacific. In 
doing so, Cha believes that the US found bilateral form of agreement more advantageous in 
keeping Japan aligned to the West, while Calder believes that it served the respective Japanese 
and American interests of economic development and safeguarding of Western influence in 
Northeast Asia. Park goes further and argues that the hub-and-spokes system still survives 
because it helps prevent any unwanted regional order from emerging, such as a Sino-centric 
system led by the PRC.22 Meanwhile, Dennis Blair, John Hanley, Stuart Harris and Richard 
Cooper foresee the important role the security treaty (more specifically the US forces in Japan) 
will continue to play in Northeast Asia’s future.23 
In sum, the bilateral US-Japan security treaty has been analyzed extensively for the past 
half-century. Perhaps this is a foregone conclusion, considering the significance of the treaty. It 
has not only played a prominent role during the Cold War era as one of the cornerstones in the 
American containment policy in Asia-Pacific, but has also outlived the US-Soviet rivalry that 
begot it in the first place and continues to stand strong in the US-Japan relations. It also 
constituted the first of the series of bilateral (trilateral in the case of Australia and New Zealand) 
spokes that were established in the 1950s. Additionally, Japan’s rearmament and contribution to 
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regional defense, the principle on which the security treaty is premised, has been a constant 
source of irritation for both countries. Whereas the US since 1950 has been lobbying Japan to 
expand its armed forces and shoulder more of the burden for the region’s security, Tokyo has 
continued to remain reluctant. This led to a tremendous disappointment in the US, with certain 
segments openly attacking Japan for “free-riding” on security, that is relying on the US and 
refusing to make the level of military commitment commensurate to its economic affluence, 
especially with Japan’s spectacular economic growth since the 1970s. The perception that Japan 
was simultaneously exploiting the US market while imposing formidable trade barriers against 
American products further fueled an angry reaction in Washington. The Japanese, on the other 
hand, felt considerable unease throughout the Vietnam War, as the US troops used Okinawa as a 
staging area. Today, the treaty is also associated various tensions with local Japanese residents 
near the US base in Okinawa (Futenma). Not surprisingly, the security treaty has often led to the 
outburst of governmental and non-governmental debates and continually fascinated scholars. It 
will likely remain an important topic, especially as newly emerging problems, such as the rising 
Chinese military threat and the North Korean nuclear conundrum, are pushing Japan and the US 
to reconsider the former’s role in this volatile security environment. 
While, undoubtedly, the security treaty is an important topic and its scholars have made 
important intellectual achievements, it has come at the cost of overlooking the Japanese peace 
treaty. This is regrettable, as the nature of postwar Japan and regional order in Asia-Pacific rests 
on issues that extend beyond the US-Japan security alliance. The tensions between Japan and its 
neighbors involving territorial ownership, the controversy over the former’s past atrocities, and 
competition in regard to high-seas fisheries also constitute important parts of the history and 
present of postwar Asia-Pacific. Many of these issues were contained and suppressed during the 
Cold War years in the name of battling communism. However, after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union these issues came to the fore and have intensified over the years. A focus on the San 
Francisco security framework, its merits notwithstanding, cannot, by itself, provide a satisfactory 
insight into these controversies; only by examining the peace treaty and how its terms developed 
can one truly understand how these problems originated and how they could possibly be resolved. 
As explained above, scholars have made important progress in furthering the 
understanding the Japanese peace treaty. However, because the treaty has been comparatively 
neglected in the academic discourse as a stand-alone topic for so long, certain assumptions have 
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been taken for granted for decades without being seriously tested. This study therefore re-
examines certain classical arguments to either substantiate or dispel them. For instance, while all 
scholars agree that the treaty was initially punitive, nobody has proven this by analyzing the 
specific terms of the treaty; hence, Chapter 1 examines the nature and contents of the early peace 
treaty that was developed in 1947 to explain why that draft is considered punitive and to allow 
comparison with the terms that were eventually agreed upon. Also, while John Foster Dulles is 
often rightly credited for negotiating the treaty, too much is sometimes claimed in regard to the 
specifics of his contribution. This thesis emphasizes that he was not the originator of either 
shuttle diplomacy or a lenient peace treaty; on the contrary, they were developed prior to his 
advent. Dulles benefited tremendously from these pre-existing policies and refined them, but 
they were not his creations. 
Another shortcoming in the existing studies is that although scholars have been narrating 
the peace settlement process from an international point of view, they do not go far enough in 
two respects. As mentioned above, the degree to which developments in postwar Germany and 
Italy affected the Japanese peace treaty remains almost completely unexplored; the same applies 
to the role of France and Indochina in the Japanese peace treaty negotiations. In other words, the 
international history of the Japanese peace settlement is not complete. This study makes no 
pretense of writing a definitive account of the peace treaty; however, it does attempt to bring it 
closer to its completion. This is particularly important, as many of the present controversies in 
Northeast Asia have international origins; hence, as Hara Kimie points out, resolving those 
issues necessitates using an international lens.24 
It should be acknowledged that this study relies mostly on American and British sources. 
The reason is self-evident. Both American and British governments had commitments worldwide, 
and thus had to wrestle with multiple developments around the world while negotiating the 
Japanese peace treaty. Their experiences, therefore, allow one to construct a narrative from a 
more international angle. Additionally, due to the language barrier, the Chinese, French, Soviet 
and Indochinese viewpoints had to be examined indirectly via American and British records. 
 
Outline of the Chapters 
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This study is divided into two parts. The first part, consisting of Chapters 1, 2 and 3, gives a 
chronological overview of the Japanese peace treaty making from 1945 to 1951. Each chapter 
corresponds with the three stages of the treaty’s development. The first stage (Chapter 1), 
covering the years 1945 to 1947, is when the US first tried to convene a peace conference for 
Japan; however, this proved to be abortive, as procedural differences between the Allies and 
internal US disagreements hindered any meaningful progress. This was followed by a dormant 
phase (Chapter 2), which approximately covers the years 1948 and 1949. While no overt 
negotiations took place in this period, there were important developments within the US – such 
as the emergence of more lenient peace terms and the idea of engaging in “shuttle diplomacy” – 
that would have a profound effect on the eventual Japanese peace settlement. Chapter 3 covers 
the formative years (1950 to 1951), when the peace treaty was finally negotiated and signed. 
This chapter highlights the fact that in negotiating the Japanese peace treaty, the US not only 
talked to the Allies, but also to Congress and perhaps more notably Japan. Meanwhile, 
considering the scope, complexity and significance of the discussion between the US and the 
other governments, one chapter on 1950 to 1951 cannot possibly cover the various controversies 
that emerged among the former Allies during the negotiation process. Hence, these are dealt with 
in the second part. 
The second part, which consists of the remaining eight chapters, is arranged thematically 
and examines in depth some of the most controversial elements of the treaty; as explained above, 
the focus is the peace treaty and hence the security aspect is not analyzed in detail, as this has 
been amply dealt with by other scholars. Chapters 4, 5 and 6 address the question of Chinese, 
Korean and Indochinese representation at the conference, the latter two of which are relatively 
unknown topics in English-speaking academia. Simply put: why was neither of the Chinese 
governments able to sign the treaty? Why was Korea not able to sign the treaty? Why were the 
three Indochinese states – Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam – able to sign the treaty? This study 
shows that these questions were determined not simply by legal factors, but also (perhaps more 
so) by political considerations. 
The subsequent three chapters – Chapters 7, 8 and 9 – tackle economic questions. 
Chapter 7 traces the evolution of the reparations clause and attempts to understand how Article 
14 – which limited the recipients of reparations to Southeast Asian states and even then restricted 
them to “services” – was crafted. This chapter highlights Dulles’ obsession with wanting to 
22 
 
avoid a repeat of the problems associated with the Versailles peace settlement which figured 
prominently in his discussions with the Allies. Chapter 8 examines a topic that has been 
relatively neglected in the existing historiography of the Japanese peace settlement: Japan’s 
postwar shipping and shipbuilding capacity. It shows that there was a real possibility that the 
peace treaty might have permanently restricted Japan’s shipping and shipbuilding industries, if 
not for Dulles’ aggressive opposition. Chapter 9 examines a topic that is largely unknown 
outside of Japan and Korea: postwar Japanese fisheries. Again, if not for Dulles’ proactive 
lobbying on behalf of Japan, the Allies might have adopted a restrictive fisheries clause, which 
would have severely curtailed Japan’s deep-sea fishing activities and affected the country’s 
everyday diet.  
The issue of Most-Favored Nation treatment, although an important element in the treaty, 
is not discussed in detail as it warrants a separate analysis and has been thoroughly discussed 
elsewhere. It suffices to refer to Akaneya Tatsuo and Yokoi Noriko, who point out that whereas 
the US policy was to grant Japan the right to free trade, many of the Allies, especially Britain, 
were opposed to this because of the ongoing hostility towards Japanese commerce that had 
developed in the 1930s. The peace treaty reflected this discrepancy, as it adopted a mixture of 
rather peculiar – even contradictory – principles. As exemplified in Article 8-b of the treaty, 
Japan was expelled from various prewar commercial treaties, such as 1919 Congo Basin Treaty, 
which stripped it of certain commercial prerogatives and did not conform to the American desire 
to ensure non-discriminatory trade practices. On the other hand, Article 12 sought to 
provisionally bring Japan within the network of non-discriminatory trade arrangement by 
obligating Japan to extend MFN treatment to the Allies for four years, but “only to the extent” 
that the latter reciprocated by offering national treatment or MFN to the former. It was only in 
September 1955 that Japan was admitted to the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) 
and even then, it would take several more years before other countries withdrew their 
reservations in granting MFN to Japan.25  
Chapter 10 revisits the question of territorial disposition. It argues that the US sought, out 
of political expediency, to apply the formula of unspecified ownership to all of Japan’s 
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controversial island possessions; this was on the grounds that a change of sovereignty for one 
island would require equivalent changes to other islands, which the US wished to avoid. The last 
chapter (Chapter 11) re-examines another aspect of the Japanese peace settlement that has been 
largely forgotten in recent years: the San Francisco peace conference itself. It shows that the US 
adopted a shrewd diplomatic maneuver prior to the conference by introducing a very specific 
procedural rule that would block any Soviet attempts to sabotage the peace treaty; at the same 
time, it shows that the entire conference was united against the communist bloc, making the 




Chapter 1. The Early Attempt to Draft a Peace Settlement and Its Failure, 
1945-1947 
 
As explained in the previous chapter, the making of the Japanese peace treaty can be roughly 
divided into three phases. Although the most important and dynamic events took place during the 
third phase between 1950 and 1951, the history of Japanese peace settlement cannot be fully 
appreciated without understanding what transpired during the first phase between 1945 and 1947. 
Hence, this chapter elaborates on the first phase. It shows that while the US attempted to convene 
a peace conference for Japan in 1947, this effort ultimately disintegrated because of procedural 
issues with the other Allies and internal US disagreement. 
The early phase of the Japanese peace settlement remains under-explored and 
consequently has two critical historiographical shortcomings. To begin with, the reason why a 
peace conference in 1947 never took place is inadequately explained. Previous studies correctly 
point out that the Soviet-American disagreement over veto rights contributed to the failure of 
early attempt for the peace conference; however, the procedural issues involved other countries 
as well and the veto issue was only part of the problem. 
Secondly, while there is general agreement among scholars that the initial approach to the 
postwar Japanese peace settlement was harsh, almost nobody has analyzed the actual terms of 
the 1947 peace treaty to substantiate this.26 The only exception is Kimie Hara, who examines the 
evolution of the territorial terms of the treaty; however, her analysis focuses exclusively on this 
aspect and therefore does not sufficiently answer the general question of why the 1947 draft 
peace treaty is perceived as punitive. 27  Moreover, while Igarashi Takeshi gives a general 
overview of the peace treaty and argues that the 1947 draft was based on the principle of 
demilitarization, he does not back his argument by referring to any specific terms of the treaty 
and hence does not sufficiently demonstrate why the treaty was punitive. 28  The following 
sections seek to fill these gaps. 
 
26 Dunn, Peace-making and the Settlement with Japan, 60-74; Cohen, Political process and foreign policy, 11-2; 
Hosoya, San Francisco Peace Treaty, 10-1, 38; Hara, Cold War Frontiers, 27-8; Schaller, Occupation of Japan, 99; 
Nishimura, San Francisco Peace Treaty, 9-16; 原朗 [Hara Akira], 昭和財政史－終戦から講和まで (第１巻: 
総説, 賠償, 終戦処理) [Shōwa Financial History: from postwar to peace settlement (Vol. 1: Overview, Reparations 
and Postwar Settlement)] (東京 [Tokyo]: 東洋経済新報社 [Toyo Keizai Inc.], 1984), 439-48.  
27 Hara, Cold War Frontiers. 
28 Takeshi Igarashi, “MacArthur's Proposal for an Early Peace with Japan and the Redirection of Occupation Policy 




The Early Principles behind the Postwar Japanese Settlement 
 
Before discussing the Japanese peace treaty, it is necessary to briefly deal with certain policies 
that preceded it, as they would guide the peace talks between 1945 and 1947. Most notable is the 
Potsdam Declaration of 26 July 1945 – issued jointly by Britain, Soviet Union and the US – 
which defined demilitarization as the primary objective for postwar Japan. It stated that 
“militarism…must be eliminated for all time” in Japan and that the “revival and strengthening of 
democratic tendencies” had to be prioritized. Until there was convincing proof that Japan's war-
making power was destroyed, it would be occupied by the Allies.29  
A similar statement was incorporated into the “US Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan” 
(SWNCC150/4/A) that was handed to the US occupation forces on 22 September 1945 and 
released to the public on 24 September 1945. According to this document, the “ultimate 
objectives” of the US were to “insure that Japan will not again become a menace” and to bring 
about a “peaceful and responsible government” that was friendly to the US and conformed to 
democratic principles. 30  This was repeated in the “Basic Initial Post Surrender Directive” 
(JCS1380/15) of 3 November 1945. It is worth noting that this latter document also stated that 
the SCAP would “not assume any responsibility for the economic rehabilitation of Japan or the 
strengthening of the Japanese economy.”31      
In short, demilitarization and democratization of Japan were the most important and 
immediate goals for the Allies. Moreover, a Cold War mentality had not yet emerged among 
those American officials in charge of leading the Japanese peace settlement; instead, the wartime 
spirit of Allied cooperation – although, the mutual animosity between the Soviet Union and the 
US was quickly intensifying – dictated the initial postwar Japanese peace settlement. It was 
against this backdrop that the Japanese peace treaty was first developed. 
 
The Initial Attempt for a Peace Settlement 
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Peace efforts for Japan germinated early. Indeed, the State Department started drafting a peace 
treaty with Japan in October 1945, almost immediately after the surrender, and by October 1946 
a rough outline was produced.32 While this chapter cannot cover all the details of how the treaty 
draft evolved, it suffices to say that the State Department was constantly refining its terms 
thereafter. 
Meanwhile, MacArthur, as the head of the Occupation force, began to signal the need for 
an early peace. On 31 January 1946, for instance, he remarked that a peace treaty was the “most 
important matter” that required “early consideration.” Hence, he urged the Far Eastern Advisory 
Commission (FEAC) – a multilateral consultative organ for postwar Japan that had been created 
in October 1945– to “quickly get to work to consider the terms of such a peace treaty.”33 When 
informed on 12 February 1947 about the State Department's on-going progress with drafting the 
peace treaty, MacArthur, perhaps encouraged by this development, pressed the Army 
Department on 20 February 1947 on the need for a peace settlement with Japan.34 A similar 
message was also expressed to Congress.35 Nor was MacArthur the only person to entertain the 
idea of a peace settlement with Japan. Truman in his State of the Union Address in January 1947 
also stressed that the “early making of a peace” with Japan was one of the “basic interests” of the 
US, and that the Allies “must now get on with the peace settlements.”36 Additionally, on 11 
March 1947, George C. Marshall (Secretary of State) proposed a Japanese peace conference at 
the Moscow session of the Council of Foreign Ministers.37 
It was against this backdrop that MacArthur, at a press conference on 17 March 1947, 
publicly called for a peace settlement with Japan. While Van Aduard argues that the State 
Department had shelved all discussion of the Japanese peace treaty and that this statement was a 
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“complete surprise” to Washington, MacArthur’s proposal did not come out of a vacuum.38 
Indeed, judging from the statements made by Marshall and Truman, there seems to have been a 
growing consensus within the US of the need to work on the Japanese peace treaty.39 
MacArthur at this press conference claimed that demilitarization and democratization, the 
two most important occupation objectives, had been largely achieved. The only remaining task, 
he observed, was to allow Japan to resume international trade and rebuild its economy, for which 
a peace treaty was necessary.40 This recalled the terms of JCS1380/15, which had stated that the 
US would not be responsible for Japan’s economic rehabilitation; that was for Japan to resolve. 
MacArthur believed that time had now come for Japan to assume that responsibility and 
advocated that Japan’s rights to decide its own future needed to be restored for this purpose. 
Strictly speaking, an economic recovery program could have been carried out without a 
peace treaty. However, while under occupation, Japan was not able to make decisions on its own 
and thus the victorious powers would essentially need to do the job of reviving Japan’s economy. 
This was a problem, as certain Allied Powers – particularly Australia, the Philippines and the 
Soviet Union – still bitter about Japan’s aggressive past, were not amenable to rebuilding Japan’s 
economy and might therefore hinder this objective. Hence, many State Department officials 
believed that Japan’s economic reconstruction would be best facilitated by restoring the 
country’s independence.41 MacArthur seems to have shared this view. 
In response to MacArthur’s statement, the State Department on 19 April 1947 informed 
him that it would fully respect his intention.42 Subsequently, on 11 July 1947, the US proposed 
to the now renamed Far Eastern Commission (FEC) that a Japanese peace settlement should be 
negotiated “as soon as practicable.”43 The tentative date and venue for a peace conference was 
set for 19 August 1947 in San Francisco. 
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What kind of a peace conference was the US envisioning? Because this peace conference 
never materialized, hardly any existing studies pay attention to this question. Yet, in order to 
have a fuller understanding of the Japanese peace settlement, it is necessary to answer it. This 
section, thus, attempts to fill this gap. 
Procedurally, the forthcoming Japanese peace conference was envisaged as a two-stage 
process. First, the eleven member states of the FEC, as the “principal” parties to the treaty, would 
hammer out the core terms of the treaty with decisions being taken using a simple two-thirds 
majority voting system. During the second stage, all concerned countries, including the non-FEC 
states and most importantly Japan itself, would be invited to a “general peace conference” for 
final adjustments and signing.44  
It is quite possible that this formula was meant to avoid repeating mistakes from the past. 
To elaborate, the post-WWI German peace settlement had seen the victors negotiate a treaty and 
simply present it as an ultimatum for the Germans to sign. In other words, there was only a 
victor’s conference and no real peace talks with the vanquished. Not surprisingly, this had made 
the Germans bitter and adamantly opposed to the treaty.45 Perhaps aware of this, the US in 1947 
proposed that Japan would be invited to the “general peace conference” in order to ensure that 
the vanquished also had a chance to voice its concerns. This is significant because it 
demonstrates that John Foster Dulles, the mastermind behind the 1951 Japanese peace treaty, 
was neither the first nor the only person who sought to avoid the mistakes of the post-WWI 
German precedent. While existing studies credit Dulles for trying to do things differently from 
the 1919 Versailles peace treaty, this “de-Versailles” mentality was already in existence well 
before his advent on to the scene. 
Meanwhile, a draft treaty was produced on 1 August 1947 to be discussed at the proposed 
conference. Spanning more than eighty pages with fifty-six articles, as well as nine annexes and 
two maps, it starkly contrasts with the simple treaty that would eventually be signed in 1951.46 
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Most importantly, as scholars have unanimously pointed out, this draft treaty was punitive.47 
Interestingly, however, nobody has substantiated this claim. This section therefore analyzes the 
essential terms of the treaty to demonstrate in what ways this treaty sought to punish Japan. 
The 1947 treaty was premised on the principle of democratizing and demilitarizing Japan. 
To begin with, the political clauses dictated how Japan ought to behave in order to ensure its 
progress towards democracy. It also provided for a period of an “Allied supervision” for this 
purpose, during which Japan’s sovereignty “shall be limited.”48 Worse still, Article 21 (Interim 
Supervision and Assistance) stipulated that “inspections” and “supervision” of demilitarization 
and democratization would continue “for such time as may prove to be necessary.” Equally 
ominous was Article 27 (Disarmament and Demilitarization), which stipulated that Japan “shall 
be and shall remain demilitarized and shall not rearm.” This meant that “all Japanese armed 
forces” and “all para-military forces and organizations in any form” would be “completely 
disarmed.” It once again stressed that Japan would be “subject to the [Allied] system of 
inspection and control” in carrying out this demilitarization term. Simply put, the occupation 
would essentially continue indefinitely, and Japan’s sovereignty would continue to remain 
limited.49  
It should also be noted that the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (Tokyo 
Tribunal) was taking place around this time and the treaty was drafted to assist this effort. Article 
17, for instance, obligated Japan to surrender its nationals, who were guilty of “war crimes” and 
“crimes against peace or humanity.” Having to bow to external pressure and give up one’s own 
national was obviously humiliating, if not an infringement of sovereignty. Of course, Japan was 
also expected to “fully execute” the sentences imposed by the tribunal.50  
Meanwhile, Article 32 required Japan to make “equitable reparation” for the “damage 
caused by it to the Allied and Associated Powers” by transferring “capital equipment and 
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facilities” as well as “goods” out of current and future production. Annex J complemented this 
by outlining a range of industries to be earmarked for reparations, including weapons factories, 
the iron and steel industry, shipping and shipbuilding facilities. 51 Additionally, according to 
Article 51, Japanese “state and parastate property” within the ceded or liberated areas – such as 
Korea and Taiwan – would be given to those governments. As if to add insult to injury, Article 
38 obligated Japan to forgo “all claims” against the Allies, while in Article 45-2 Japan was 
expected to repay to the US “all” aid that had been furnished to assist it since the end of the war. 
Worse still, Article 45-3-a-2 sought to permanently cap Japan’s economic potential by 
stipulating that its economy would be limited to 1930-1934 production levels and could even be 
lowered “under special circumstances.”52  
Japan’s industrial capacity was further curtailed by the demilitarization clause (Article 
27). Most importantly, the importing or stockpiling of “strategic raw materials” that were “in 
excess” of peacetime requirements was prohibited.53 This meant that even those materials that 
could be used for peaceful purposes – such as iron, scrap steel, aluminum and petroleum 
products – would be restricted. Considering the fact that Japan was a resource-poor country that 
had to rely on mainland Asia for imports of these raw materials, this could have seriously 
handicapped Japan’s industrial capacity. 
In sum, the 1947 draft peace treaty constituted retributive justice. It is worth noting that 
this draft was linked to a separate five-power pact (Treaty on the Disarmament and 
Demilitarization of Japan) that was to be signed between Japan, Britain, China, the Soviet Union 
and the US for the purpose of overseeing the “total disarmament and demilitarization” of Japan. 
As the name suggests, this treaty was also premised on prohibiting Japanese military and 
provided for a “quadripartite inspection,” which would empower Britain, China, the Soviet 
Union and the US to supervise the implementation of Japan’s disarmament even after the 
termination of the occupation.54 As Hara Kimie, Hosoya Chihiro and Igarashi Takeshi point out, 
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the peace settlement envisioned in 1947, in other words, reflected the wartime Allied policy of 
preventing Japan’s future re-emergence as a threat.55  
Although any detailed account of what the non-US governments had in mind at this point 
cannot be addressed in full – as it deserves a separate analysis – it is worth acknowledging that 
the conclusion of a peace treaty based on the principles of demilitarization and democratization 
for Japan was shared by the other countries as well. Indeed, the British Commonwealth – 
especially Australia and Britain – agreed that Japan should remain completely demilitarized and 
sought to include strict industrial limitations and supervision thereof; it also advocated that the 
democratic principles outlined in the Potsdam Declaration and the Japanese constitution should 
be written into the treaty.56 The ROC also showed considerable interest in the post-treaty control 
measures, and even argued that the withdrawal of occupation troops from Japan was not the 
proper answer.57 It was precisely the punitive nature of the treaty that soon caused discord within 
the US government and led to the dissolution of the proposed peace conference. 
 
Dissolution of the 1947 Peace Conference 
 
The peace conference proposed by the US never materialized. Frederick Dunn and Howard 
Schonberger argue that the US proposal for a peace conference was an empty gesture that the US 
never intended to honor.58 This is an oversimplification. If the US truly had not meant to work 
on a peace settlement with Japan, it seems preposterous that it went through all the trouble to 
develop the treaty and engage in lively discussions both internally and internationally. There 
were two factors, procedural and substantial, that created obstacles. The former involved the 
question of which countries should be in charge of negotiating the peace treaty and what kind of 
voting procedure should be adopted. The latter involved the question of what kind of peace treaty 
the US wanted. This section elaborates on these issues. 
To reiterate, on 11 July 1947, the US proposed to the FEC that the Japanese peace treaty 
should be negotiated by the eleven FEC members with a two-thirds majority voting system. This 
differed from the normal FEC voting procedure in which veto rights were reserved to the Big 
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Five (Britain, China, France, the Soviet Union and the US).59 Moscow responded on 22 July 
1947, contending that the CFM – not the FEC – was the most appropriate platform and that the 
Big Four (Britain, China, the Soviet Union and the US) should be in charge of developing the 
treaty. The Soviet Union reasoned that the CFM had been organized “on the initiative of the 
US…for preparatory work of drawing up peace treaties.”60 It should be noted that the Soviet 
Union excluded France, which reflected the low opinion Stalin had towards Paris due to the past 
record of French capitulation and collaboration with Germany.61 In contrast to the Soviets, all of 
the other FEC member states by 2 August 1947 agreed to the idea of an eleven-power conference 
for the peace treaty.62 
The Soviet proposal involved limiting the negotiating powers to four specific countries, 
each with veto power. Strictly speaking, the US was opposed to the former, but not the latter. 
This is one aspect of the US-Soviet disagreement on the procedural issue that is not clear in the 
existing historiography. Stretching back to the classical studies by Dunn, Cohen and Van Aduard, 
scholars have simply acknowledged the existence of the procedural issue without elaborating on 
what exactly was at stake. This creates the impression that the US was opposed to the Soviet 
proposal, because of its concern that the latter would have veto power.63 However, this was not 
the case. Indeed, according to a memorandum prepared by the Office of Far Eastern Affairs 
(OFEA) – the State Department organ that was in charge of the Japanese peace treaty – and 
endorsed by Marshall on 14 May 1947, the US was “prepared to agree” to the idea of granting 
veto power to the Big Four. The US also agreed that France should be excluded from veto rights, 
considering its pro-Japanese collaborationist past in Indochina during the Pacific War (refer to 
Chapter 6). However, there was one principle that the US could not yield: the peace conference 
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“should not be confined to...the CFM powers” and that the US should “reject flatly” any such 
suggestion.64 
There were two rationales behind this. To begin with, if the CFM took charge of the 
treaty, there was a risk that the peace settlement would predominantly reflect North American-
European interests that did not sufficiently meet the views of the Asian-Pacific countries. In 
order to avoid this, the US wished to “broaden the representative basis” for the treaty and invite 
“all nations” with a “primary interest in Japan.” 65 Secondly, as claimed by Dunn and Van 
Aduard, the US was disillusioned with the CFM due to the complications it had already caused 
in Europe.66 As Charles Bohlen (State Department Counselor) remarked to Wang Shih-Chieh 
(ROC Minister of Foreign Affairs) on 17 September 1947, the Soviet member of the CFM in the 
past in regard to Germany and Austria had “frustrated” the postwar settlement in Europe. 
Likewise, if decisions were confined to the Big Four, then the Soviet Union might again cause 
trouble and cause possible delay in the Japanese peace settlement.67 Bohlen was most likely 
referring to the difficulties regarding the terms under which Germany should be re-unified; the 
Soviet Union advocated a weak Germany that did not pose threat to the Soviet Union, while the 
US proposed a stable Germany to prevent any implosion or threats to Western economic 
health.68 The Italian peace settlement was also complicated by the Soviet right to veto, especially 
over the territorial disposition of Trieste and reparations question.69 
Meanwhile, Charles Fahy (the State Department’s Legal Adviser) in his memorandum to 
Robert Lovett (who had recently replaced Dean Acheson as Under Secretary of State) on 7 
August 1947 pointed out that the idea of the CFM handling the Japanese peace settlement had 
never been codified into a written agreement. Hence, the US was under no legal obligation to 
comply with the Soviet demand for a CFM-form of Japanese peace conference. Fahy also argued 
that the US should have no compunction about moving forward with a Japanese peace treaty that 
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excluded the Soviet Union, if there continued to be a deadlock over procedural issues. 70 
Australia and Britain expressed similar opinions on 28 July and 14 August 1947, respectively.71  
On 13 August 1947, the US officially informed the Soviet Union of its disagreement. The 
US claimed that there had been no written agreement that the CFM alone would be authorized to 
develop the Japanese peace treaty. On the other hand, the FEC had been established, with the 
Soviet government’s consent, to formulate policies for postwar Japan. The US argued that this 
was an implicit recognition that all FEC member states should have a stake in the Japanese peace 
settlement. Besides, all of the other FEC governments had indicated their agreement to the US 
approach.72 The Soviet Union immediately protested and repeated its earlier demand that the Big 
Four should be responsible for the peace treaty.73 
Meanwhile, the Republic of China (ROC) on several occasions (17 July, 17 September, 
26 October and 20 November 1947) expressed reservations about a simple two-thirds majority 
voting procedure and instead sought veto rights. The ROC attitude was partly shaped by 
suspicion towards the West. At Yalta, China’s fate had been determined arbitrarily by Roosevelt 
and Stalin without consultation. China was also sidelined in the European peace settlement, even 
though it was a CFM member. Wang wished to avoid these scenarios, in which China was 
excluded from vital discussions that impacted on its interests. Moreover, a simple two-thirds 
majority voting system carried the risk of China being easily outvoted by the coalition of the 
British Commonwealth, the Philippines and the US. In other words, the West might develop the 
peace treaty in a way that was “objectionable” to China.74  
Furthermore, Wang was worried about the Soviet position regarding Manchuria, an area 
of vital “economic and political” significance. If the ROC supported the US proposal, the Soviet 
Union might retaliate by backing the Chinese Communist forces, which were waging intense 
resistance in that area against the ROC. Furthermore, in the case of the Soviet Union deciding 
not to partake in the peace conference while the ROC supported the US, Moscow might accuse it 
of bad faith, due to this being a violation of the Sino-Soviet treaty of 1945 which barred the two 
governments from entering into a separate peace agreement with Japan. Thus, the ROC proposed 
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(on 17 September and 9 October 1947) sticking with the normal FEC voting procedure that 
granted veto power to China.75  
The Chinese proposal was not far from what the US was willing to settle for. However, 
the US could not easily agree to the Chinese proposal due to the Australian and British 
viewpoints. This is another aspect that has not been sufficiently explained in the existing studies 
and therefore requires a brief overview. On multiple occasions (28 July, 16 October, 28 October 
and 21 November 1947), Australia emphasized the need for a “democratic” voting procedure, 
instead of according veto power to specific countries. Herbert V. Evatt (Australian Minister of 
External Affairs) stressed Australia’s “vital contribution” to the defeat of Japan and the postwar 
occupation, in which it had supplied the “main portion” of the British Commonwealth 
occupation force. Hence, it would be “intolerable” for Australia to be in an inferior position at 
the Japanese peace conference. If the veto were adopted, Evatt demanded that Australia should 
either be admitted as an additional member with a veto or replace Britain as the veto power.76 
Evatt also opined that the US should not be overly concerned about Soviet attendance (or 
exclusion).77  
Britain, meanwhile, was against the idea of Australia inheriting its veto power or being 
added as a veto power. Instead, Britain continued to adhere to the no-veto principle; in fact, this 
principle was agreed among the British Commonwealth members at the Canberra Conference 
that was held between 26 August and 2 September 1947 to discuss the Japanese peace 
settlement.78 Britain also urged Wang to drop his demand for veto, arguing that the Soviet Union 
would most likely use this power to damage China’s interests. Britain also argued that the Sino-
Soviet treaty of 1945 did not, in fact, bar China from signing a separate peace treaty with Japan. 
Britain noted that Article 2 of this treaty prohibited China and the Soviet Union from making 
peace with Japan that “does not clearly renounce all aggressive intentions,” but the latter was 
clearly (though not completely) demilitarized in 1947. Furthermore, Britain suggested that if the 
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Soviet Union used the voting issue as a pretext to retain influence in Manchuria, the ROC should 
bring this before the UN Security Council or the International Court of Justice.79 It should be 
noted that Britain was also willing to go ahead without the Soviet Union.80 
The US, thus, faced a conundrum. On the one hand, the ROC and the Soviet Union 
strongly demanded veto rights; on the other hand, Australia and Britain were strongly opposed to 
this and supported the US-proposed two-thirds majority voting system. The State Department’s 
response was to continue to stress its preference for a two-thirds majority voting system and to 
dissuade China from insisting on adopting the FEC voting procedure; MacArthur went further 
and tried to convince the ROC to proceed with the conference even without the Soviet Union.81 
One should be careful to note here that the US never completely rejected the possibility of 
adopting veto rights as a last resort.82 Fortunately for the US, when Molotov (Soviet Foreign 
Minister) on 27 November 1947 rejected the Chinese proposal and continued to insist on a Big 
Four conference, the ROC changed its position. Perhaps frustrated with the Soviet Union’s 
intransigence, the ROC confided to the US on 5 December 1947 that the Chinese were “not 
bound to await Soviet approval” to proceed with the Japanese peace settlement.83 
By the end of 1947, there was therefore a consensus among FEC members on the need 
for an early peace settlement with Japan. 84  Additionally, all FEC members, with the sole 
exception of the Soviet Union, agreed on convening an eleven-power conference to discuss the 
peace treaty. Meanwhile, in contrast, the Soviet Union remained adamant about only accepting a 
Big Four conference. In response, Australia, Britain and China – and the US by December 1947 
– entertained the idea of proceeding without the Soviet Union.85 The only real sticking point 
therefore was the Chinese demand for veto rights. However, as Ambassador Stuart pointed out in 
his letter to the State Department on 20 November 1947 and 5 February 1948 – and as Hosoya 
Chihiro highlights – this was not an insuperable obstacle as it is highly likely that the ROC 
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would have traded its veto rights for increased US military aid for fighting the Chinese 
Communists.86 In other words, the US could have pushed at this juncture for an eleven-power 
peace conference for Japan, regardless of Soviet opinion. However, it did not. Why? To 
understand this we need to look at developments within Washington. 
As pointed out by numerous scholars, the early attempts to convene a conference were 
unsuccessful, not only because of the procedural problems, but also because of internal US 
disagreement.87 Hosoya Chihiro even contends that the procedural issues were simply an excuse 
and that the real reason for the failure of 1947 peace conference was the lack of consensus in 
Washington on the postwar Japanese settlement.88 The core issue was: how should the US deal 
with the Soviet Union? 
To recall, the original drafters of the peace treaty in the OFEA adhered to the wartime 
spirit of cooperation with the Soviet Union, as exemplified in the five-power demilitarization 
treaty and the various inspection mechanisms adopted in the draft peace treaty.89 MacArthur at 
this time also supported the idea of cooperating with the Soviet Union.90 However, in late 1947, 
George F. Kennan (the leader of the Policy Planning Group, which acted as the State 
Department’s in-house advisory organ) and his deputy John P. Davies began to challenge this 
attitude. 
Unlike their OFEA colleagues, Kennan and Davies advocated a confrontational stance 
towards the Soviet Union. Both men had worked as diplomats in the US Embassy in Moscow 
and their experiences had led them to believe that there was a genuine danger of Soviet 
expansionism and that the Russian threat to Japan was real. Kennan’s philosophy is particularly 
important, as his advent signaled that the Japanese peace treaty would now be dictated by a Cold 
War mentality. As expressed in his well-known “long telegram” and Mr. X article of 1946 and 
1947 respectively, Kennan believed that the Soviet leadership harbored inherent distrust of the 
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outside world and sought the “total destruction” of any rival power. Consequently, there could be 
“no permanent modus vivendi” with the Soviet Union, thus leaving the US with no choice but to 
adopt a firm “containment” policy. Equally important, as indicated by his Naval War College 
lectures in September and October 1948, Kennan identified Japan as being one of the industrial 
and military “power centers” that was vital to US security.91 In other words, the US could not 
afford to leave Japan on the opposing side of the Cold War. Unsurprisingly, when Kennan and 
Davies discovered that the draft treaty was premised on continuing cooperation with the Soviet 
Union, they strongly opposed it and suggested delaying the peace conference until the terms of 
the treaty were rectified in conformity with Cold War realities. Kennan specifically advocated a 
paradigm shift away from demilitarization towards strengthening Japan’s economy, as he 
believed that the most effective weapon against communism was internal economic stability.92  
To elaborate, on 11 August 1947 Davies wrote to Kennan his concerns about the draft 
treaty. He observed that the “central American objective” should be to build a “stable Japan, 
integrated into the Pacific economy, friendly to the US.” However, contrary to these objectives, 
the draft treaty was preoccupied with “drastic disarmament and democratization,” which Davies 
thought was unnecessary, since Japan “could not in the foreseeable future resurrect itself as a 
first-class military power.” Even more concerning, in his view, was the fact that the draft 
settlement gave the Soviet Union a footing in Japan by giving it a chance to partake in post-
treaty “international supervision.” Moreover, the draft treaty only provided for the establishment 
of a “civil police force equipped with small arms” in Japan, which could do little to prevent 
Soviet penetration. Hence, Davies recommended that the draft treaty be re-examined. 93  In 
response, Kennan immediately contacted Lovett on 12 August 1947 and argued that the US did 
not seem to have a concrete objective for Japan and that this made it “highly dangerous” to talk 
about peace terms. Hence, Kennan suggested that the US should delay the Japanese peace 
settlement until specific goals, especially rebuilding Japan’s economy, had been agreed and the 
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draft peace treaty revised accordingly. Lovett agreed and rejected the draft treaty as being 
“wholly inadequate.”94  
The OFEA, for its part, had no qualms about seeking Japan’s economic recovery; in fact, 
it agreed with this goal. However, it believed that an early peace treaty was necessary precisely 
for this purpose. On 14 August 1947, Max W. Bishop (Chief of Division of Northeast Asian 
Affairs, OFEA) contacted Kennan and opined that the economic reconstruction of Japan and its 
neighbors required a peace settlement. Furthermore, Bishop contended that the occupation had 
now reached a “point of diminishing returns,” as the Japanese were becoming tired of having 
foreign overlords decide their fate. Hence, any delay in the peace settlement would incur “serious 
psychological repercussions” and a “disheartening effect on Japan,” which would be highly 
detrimental to US and only serve Soviet interests.95  
It is important to note here that the issue of Japan’s economic revival was becoming 
increasingly important for the US. In the absence of a peace treaty, the US, as the principal 
occupying power, had to carry the burden of sustaining Japan’s economy. This in turn, 
aggravated US taxpayers. Equally worrisome was the fact that the US stood to be blamed for any 
economic distress in Japan – for instance, if it failed to feed the population or prevent disease – 
and it was feared that this could damage US prestige and interests. Meanwhile, considering the 
general scarcity of finished goods worldwide, Japan was by 1947 seen as one of the more 
industrially advanced countries that could meet these needs. Hence, the OFEA was already 
stressing in that year how the US should try to stimulate Japan’s foreign trade. It also expressed 
its preference for ending the occupation soon by remarking that some Allies felt that the US was 
trying to monopolize the Japanese market through prolonged occupation.96  
The prospects of an early peace settlement became even dimmer when the military 
establishment added its voice of concerns about the draft peace treaty. To begin with, the Navy – 
which responded to the OFEA on two occasions (18 August and 25 August 1947) – echoed 
Davies’ worry that Chapter V (Demilitarization and Disarmament clause) of the draft treaty only 
provided for a “civil police” and “coast guard” with “small arms.” The Navy contended that this 
would leave Japan “completely unable to defend herself against outside aggression.” Mindful of 
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the increasing US-Soviet animosity, the Navy advised “continuing the military occupation” until 
the “UN has adequate forces for performing this function.” Furthermore, it noted that a 
demilitarized Japan would not be able to contribute to UN collective security, and thus 
recommended amending the treaty to allow Japan to have sufficient armed capability. The Navy 
also wished to secure its base rights at Yokosuka and other necessary airfields, which would later 
be revisited and eventually contribute to the bilateral security treaty with Japan.97  
The War Department (on 29 August 1947), meanwhile, contended that any peace treaty 
should ensure that Japan stayed “aligned with US interests” and that the US should safeguard its 
“dominant position.” To this end, it suggested discarding the interim control arrangement 
(Chapter IV: Interim Measures of Control and Inspection), as this would give other powers, 
especially the Soviet Union, a footing in Japan.98 The War Department further argued that the 
treaty should encourage “Japanese economic self-sufficiency,” as US economic assistance could 
not continue indefinitely. In light of this, “the treaty should permit full Japanese participation in 
international trade.” Additionally, reparations should not be allowed to hinder Japan’s 
“reasonable economic self-sufficiency.” In the meantime, the US should progressively “diminish 
the degree of control” to allow Japan greater discretion over its own political and economic 
affairs.99  
MacArthur also cabled the State Department on two occasions (21 March and 1 
September 1947) to express certain qualms about the draft treaty. To begin with, he suggested 
revising Article 1, which included Ryukyu as part of Japan. MacArthur stressed that the Ryukyu 
Islands “must be vested in the US,” as this island group was “absolutely essential” to US security 
interests in the Pacific. He also suggested removing the interim control arrangements and the 
demilitarization clause and discarding the five-power treaty on the demilitarization and 
disarmament of Japan. MacArthur denounced these items as being essentially a continuation of 
the occupation that would defeat the purpose of restoring Japan’s independence. He also agreed 
with the War Department that they provided an opportunity for the Soviet Union to acquire a 
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military foothold in Japan, which would threaten the US strategic position in the Pacific. 
Moreover, MacArthur stressed that Japan was already demilitarized and would not be able to 
rearm for the immediate future. He also contended that the peace treaty should enable Japan to 
earn money on its own initiative via international trade, lest the US have to continue aiding Japan 
indefinitely. Hence, MacArthur argued, the peace should be “simple” and “avoid arbitrary, 
oppressive, and unnecessary controls.”100 
Confronted with this opposition, William Walton Butterworth (Head of OFEA) sent his 
opinion to Marshall on 22 September 1947. While he argued that the peace conference should 
not be delayed, he did admit that the US should first “consolidate” its position and recommended 
that the US concretize its goals. Meanwhile, he adhered to the initial OFEA attitude that sought 
to continue cooperating with the Soviet Union, arguing that there could be a “serious legal 
obstacle” to making a separate peace.101 Since the occupation of Japan was theoretically an 
Allied effort, if the Soviet Union were excluded from the peace treaty – which meant continued 
state of belligerency against Japan – then the termination of the occupation might be seriously 
jeopardized. 
Around this time, Kennan sent his own analysis (PPS 10) to Marshall and Lovett on 14 
October 1947. As Frederick Dunn and Howard Schonberger argue, PPS 10 was a formal 
proposal for a paradigm shift away from wartime US-Soviet cooperation and towards Cold War 
confrontation.102 In this document Kennan once again questioned the wisdom of an early peace 
settlement. He argued that Japan was politically and economically unstable and that there was a 
“great risk” that early termination of the occupation might leave it vulnerable to communist 
penetration. Hence, until Japan could “stand on its own feet economically,” Kennan suggested 
“abandoning the idea of concluding a peace settlement.”103  
Of course, Kennan was aware that the US had already proposed a peace conference, and 
therefore noted that the US could not refuse to proceed with the negotiations so blatantly. The 
best option, therefore, was to continue the discussion on the peace treaty at an “exploratory” 
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level, but not hasten the pace in any way and hold open the possibility of postponement. In short, 
the US should discreetly delay the peace settlement.104  
Echoing the War Department’s suggestion, Kennan advised “gradual modification” of 
occupation policy in a way that would restore Japan to “normal peace-time status without any 
treaty at all.”105 In other words, de facto independence should be granted in lieu of de jure 
independence.106 This was a shrewd way to secure America’s diplomatic leverage. By relaxing 
the degree of American control, Japan’s position vis-à-vis other countries would be strengthened, 
since the latter would have less inducements to offer. At the same time, Japan would continue to 
depend on America’s goodwill, lest the US change its mind and tighten control again. In short, 
granting de facto independence to Japan would increase the bargaining position of the US, while 
weakening that of all others. While Van Aduard argues that it was MacArthur who adopted a 
piecemeal restoration of sovereignty for Japan as a stop-gap remedy for the continued occupation, 
the records make it clear that this was Kennan’s idea; MacArthur, in contrast, maintained the 
belief that the occupation should end soon.107  
Kennan was also opposed to post-treaty allied supervision of Japan’s political life, 
considering the adverse psychological effect this might have on the Japanese. He therefore 
opposed Chapter II: Political Clauses, which dictated how Japan should behave politically.108 
Meanwhile, in regard to Japan’s security, he argued that it must rest primarily on the “proximity” 
or “presence” of US forces. Hence, he agreed with MacArthur in suggesting revision of Article 1 
to allow the US to retain its military facilities in Okinawa. Kennan furthermore agreed with 
MacArthur that the five-power treaty on the demilitarization and disarmament of Japan must be 
discarded.109 
The OFEA, however, continued to insist on an early peace settlement. In the memo it sent 
to Lovett on 29 October 1947, the OFEA argued against indefinite delay of the Japanese peace 
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expectations in Japan and other governments that the occupation might end soon. Any delay 
would cause a “letdown” in Japan and lead to a “less cooperative attitude” among the British 
Commonwealth, which could damage America’s prestige and leadership worldwide. And while 
some argued that continued US occupation would help in “cranking up” Japan’s economy, the 
OFEA still contended that only a peace treaty would truly allow its economic revitalization.110  
Despite his reservations about certain terms of the treaty, MacArthur also urged 
Washington (on 28 October and 8 December 1947) to continue work on an early peace 
settlement. MacArthur argued that Japan’s economic and political stability depended on the 
revitalizing of foreign trade, which would not be possible without a peace treaty. Furthermore, 
the continued presence of large numbers of foreigners could provoke “xenophobia in Japan,” 
which the communists to take full advantage of; an early peace treaty would resolve this 
quandary. MacArthur also contended that an early peace would gradually wean Japan away from 
financial reliance on the United States, while cementing “closer ties, politically, economically, 
and culturally” between the two countries. MacArthur, therefore, recommended that the US 
should move forward with developing the peace treaty even without Soviet involvement; signing 
and ratifying it without the Soviet Union was another matter that could be considered at a later 
stage.111  
Yet, other sections of the US government continued to express concerns about the 
wisdom of proceeding with a peace conference. In December 1947, the US Embassy in Moscow 
cabled Washington and cautioned against “hastily proceeding” with a settlement, instead 
advising it to prolong the occupation. If the US insisted on a peace conference, then the treaty 
should “maximize stability of Japanese government and minimize Soviet influence.”112 The US 
Embassy in London also (on 16 December 1947) entertained the possibility of postponing the 
Japanese peace conference.113 Even Butterworth, the head of OFEA who had long argued for an 
early peace, by the end of 1947 started to doubt the wisdom of an early settlement.114 
In sum, throughout 1947, the US gravitated increasingly towards postponing the peace 
treaty with Japan. Unsurprisingly, the proposed peace conference never took place; instead, it 
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drifted into superficial discussions that continued well into 1948. The momentum for a peace 




To conclude, the peace conference proposed by the US failed to materialize because of two 
factors. Internationally, there were disagreements among the Allies regarding the voting method 
and the question of who should be responsible for negotiating the Japanese peace treaty. 
Meanwhile, domestically, the US began to transition from the spirit of wartime cooperation with 
the Soviet Union to the Cold War mentality of containing it. The latter raised doubts about the 
wisdom of moving forward with the peace settlement and the existing policy of crafting the 
treaty based on the principle of demilitarization. This eventually culminated in the US decision 
to suspend the peace talks, the subject for the following chapter.           
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Chapter 2. The Dormant Years, 1948-1949 
 
The disintegration of the 1947 peace conference initiative was followed by a dormant phase in 
which no official negotiations took place. Although, the peace efforts would only pick up pace 
again in late 1949, there were important developments during this period that would later impact 
the peace settlement. This chapter elaborates on those developments. 
This period has been researched quite extensively by numerous scholars. So why revisit a 
topic that has been studied quite exhaustively? One important shortcoming of the existing studies 
is that they focus overwhelmingly on the transformation of occupation policy and consequently 
overlook the fact that the Japanese peace treaty also went through a significant change. This is 
not to say that scholars have completely ignored the peace treaty in their analyses. The prominent 
historians of postwar Japan, including Hosoya Chihiro and Michael Schaller, have pointed out 
that disagreement between the Defense Department and the State Department hampered the 
treaty negotiations between 1948 and 1949. Furthermore, Dunn briefly assesses the treaty 
amendments that took place in late 1949.115 However, an overview of the exact changes made to 
the treaty contents and procedural questions is lacking.116 Perhaps the only exception to this rule 
is the work of Kimie Hara and Chŏng Pyŏngchun, who trace the evolution of the territorial terms 
of the treaty; nevertheless, they focus exclusively on that issue. This is a major gap in the history 
of postwar Japanese peace settlement. Without understanding the treaty’s transformation process 
during the dormant years, one cannot fully understand why Dulles was successful in negotiating 
the Japanese peace treaty in later years. This chapter, therefore, seeks to provide a 
comprehensive outline of how the peace treaty changed between 1948 and 1949.117  
 
Paradigm Shift, Postponement and Transformation of the Peace Treaty, 1948-1949 
 
The Japanese peace settlement entered into a dormant year in 1948, partly because the US was 
busy with Europe, particularly with the European recovery plan (Marshall Plan) and the postwar 
German settlement; in other words, Japan was not the top priority. Only after the establishment 
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and West Germany would the State 
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Department re-examine the Japanese peace settlement seriously.118 Equally important was the 
fact that the US, after much hesitation, formally decided to suspend the peace talks, the details to 
which we now turn to.       
As explained in the previous chapter, Kennan believed that the Japanese peace settlement 
had to be postponed until Japan was economically strengthened. He was by no means alone in 
stressing the importance of Japan’s economic health. Other influential figures shared this belief, 
including William H. Draper (Undersecretary of the Army), Kenneth Royall (Secretary of the 
Army), and James V. Forrestal (Secretary of the Navy and later Secretary of Defense). There 
also emerged at this point a pro-Japanese lobbying group, the American Council for Japan, under 
the leadership of Harry F. Kern. A conglomeration of powerful figures from academia, 
businesses, government and the media – Kennan and Draper were both associated with the 
Council – this lobby group sought to revitalize Japan’s business.119 This emphasis on Japan’s 
economic reconstruction would eventually culminate in the policy of so-called “reverse course,” 
which entailed moving away from the principles of demilitarization towards economic 
reconstruction and later rearmament. 
This policy shift must be understood as a reflection of the larger general transformation 
of US foreign policy taking place at this time. The escalating tension between the US and the 
Soviet Union since the end of WWII led to several crises in Europe (over Poland and Germany) 
and the Middle East (over Iran and Turkey).120 Against this backdrop, Truman in March 1947 
declared that the US had to help the “free peoples of the world,” who were being threatened by 
“totalitarian regimes,” an indirect reference to the Soviet Union and its satellites. This 
specifically meant tackling economic distress, which Truman described as the “seed of 
totalitarian regimes.”121 Conventionally known as the “Truman Doctrine,” Truman’s statement 
signaled a formal departure from wartime cooperation with the Soviet Union towards a 
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confrontational mode. In Europe and the Mediterranean, this paradigm shift manifested itself in 
the Marshall Plan; in Japan, it was the “reverse course.”122  
One of the earliest expressions of this major policy shift was SWNCC 381 (“Revival of 
the Japanese Economy”), which was produced on 22 July 1947, shortly after the declaration of 
the “Truman Doctrine.” This SWNCC paper pointed to the importance of revitalizing Japan’s 
production and export sector, lest the US have to continue to aid Japan indefinitely or leave it in 
a state of poverty.123 This portended the eventual transformation of the postwar peace with Japan. 
The ideas contained in SWNCC 381 were echoed by Kennan in his report of 25 March 1948 
(PPS 28: Recommendations with Respect to US Policy toward Japan).124 PPS 28 advocated that 
economic recovery, not the peace treaty, should be the “prime objective” in Japan. Kennan 
thought it best that the US “should not press” for a peace treaty, but instead focus on the “revival 
of Japanese foreign trade,” especially “Japan’s exports.” Kennan also advised that the peace 
treaty in its final form should be “as brief, as general, and as nonpunitive as possible.” These 
suggestions were later adopted verbatim as NSC 13/2 – with an added emphasis on the need to 
delay peace with Japan in light of the “Soviet Union’s aggressive policy of communist expansion” 
– which was approved by Truman on 9 October 1948.125 The US had thus formally suspended 
the Japanese peace treaty negotiations. 
This did not mean that there was no progress on the peace treaty. Indeed, there were on-
going discussions within the State Department regarding its terms. As already mentioned, 
Kennan advised that the treaty should be non-punitive. For this purpose, he wished to amend the 
reparations clause, as he believed that the existing reparations policy would hamper Japan’s 
economic recovery. He was convinced that Japan needed its industrial facilities – including those 
with war potential, such as shipyards – to attain self-sufficient economy; hence, he proposed 
terminating the current reparations removal policy and formalizing this in the peace treaty.126  
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Kennan had other practical reasons for wanting to stop reparations. Reparations removal 
involved physically dissembling the designated plants, packing them and transporting them to 
designated seaports or airports to be shipped to the recipient countries. This whole process not 
only incurred “enormous” costs, but also required a lot of time – twenty years in the case of 
China – to complete. This naturally meant a tremendous financial strain on Japan, since it would 
be expected to bear the bulk of these expenses. Kennan also worried that the closing down of 
these industries would result in mass unemployment and discourage banks from making 
investments.127 In addition, he doubted that the recipients had the ability to handle the machinery 
they received. Kennan noted that the ROC and the Philippines – the two main beneficiaries of 
the reparations program – lacked the skilled labor and infrastructure needed to operate the 
Japanese equipment. The ROC and the Philippines even admitted that they were more interested 
in the “packing materials” that were used for shipping the machinery. Hence, Kennan believed 
that it was better to retain the machinery in Japan, which had the ability to produce goods – such 
as textiles, spare parts and fishing vessels – for the wider region.128  
Kennan was not alone in wanting to revamp the existing reparations policy. Already on 2 
March 1948, Sherwood M. Fine, one of the economic advisers in SCAP, had raised the same 
concern. 129  MacArthur too thought that the existing reparations policy hampered Japan’s 
recovery, while also placing a tremendous burden on the US.130 Not surprisingly, Kennan’s idea 
was later adopted as part of NSC 13/3 on 6 May 1949, which committed the US to terminating 
the reparations program.131 This paved the way for a lenient reparations clause in the final treaty. 
Kennan also advocated a “relaxation of the purge,” which meant promptly concluding the 
war crimes trial process and delegating more decision-making power to Japan.132 Since these 
aspects have already been examined in detail by other scholars, it suffices to say that these ideas 
were adopted as part of NSC 13/2. This too had implications for the 1947 treaty draft as it meant 
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and “Chapter IV: Interim Measures of Supervision and Control” – could now be removed.133 
Furthermore, Kennan contended that the US forces should remain in Japan after the end of the 
occupation and that this should be discussed bilaterally with Japan during the peace negotiations. 
This portended the bilateral security treaty that would be signed between Japan and the US in 
1951. 
How else was the peace treaty amended? As noted above, while it is generally understood 
that it went through piecemeal changes, there is a lack of detailed explanation of the exact 
amendments that were made. The evolution of the treaty terms, however, warrants closer 
examination, as it helps to stress the point made by other historians that a lenient peace treaty 
was gradually but clearly taking shape. It is important to understand this, as otherwise it is easy 
to get the impression that Dulles simply discarded the existing treaty and drafted generous peace 
terms from scratch. Hence, this section traces how the terms of the treaty evolved between 1948 
and 1949. 
The first revision was circulated by the OFEA on 8 January 1948 in response to various 
demands made by different branches of the US government. Two important changes were made 
in this revision that would have a long-term effect. To begin with, the new draft no longer 
envisaged a separate five-power demilitarization treaty. This meant that Japan would voluntarily 
carry out the demilitarization program, rather than being forced to do so by outside powers.134 In 
addition, Article 45-3-a-2 of the 1947 draft peace treaty, which sought to permanently cap the 
Japanese economy, was removed.135  
Between September and December 1949, four further drafts were produced. The first 
draft, on 7 September 1949, saw the war-guilt clause disappear. Additionally, it no longer 
obligated Japan to pay for reparations; instead, it stated that the reparations claims of the Allies 
“shall be deemed to have been satisfied out of the Japanese assets subject to their respective 
jurisdictions” and “out of the assets received from Japan during the occupation” (Article 30). 
This reflected the principle adopted in NSC 13/2 that sought to prevent further reparations from 
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Japan. The post-treaty control mechanism was also deleted, thus permanently removing one of 
the items that could have limited Japan’s sovereignty. In addition, Article 6 now stipulated that 
the Ryukyu islands would be placed under a UN trusteeship with the US as the “administering 
authority.”136 This reflected the idea espoused earlier by MacArthur that had been adopted as 
part of NSC 13/3.137  
A second revised draft was prepared on 13 October 1949. What is most notable about this 
draft is the fact that Japan’s obligation to repay the advance occupation cost was now revived. 
This term had been removed in the September 1949 draft mentioned above, most likely because 
the US wanted to remove anything that might financially burden Japan. Dunn interprets its 
revival as evidence that the US had decided to adopt the principle of “repayment of occupation 
costs before reparations payment” for the purpose of inhibiting other governments from 
demanding further reparations.138 Although this version of the treaty never explicitly stated that 
the payment of advance occupation costs would be prioritized over reparations, this was 
precisely what the US had in mind as revealed in a confidential commentary later in November 
1949.139 In fact, Dulles would later use this logic to discourage the Philippines from demanding 
reparations (see Chapter 7). 
A third draft treaty was produced on 2 November 1949. The most notable change here 
was that the terms relating to demilitarization were now permanently removed.140 When the 
fourth draft was developed on 29 December 1949, Japan’s obligation to hand over its nationals 
for trials was eliminated; instead, the war criminals clause simply stated that Japan would 
execute the decision of the Tokyo tribunal and that the convicts could be pardoned upon the 
approval of “majority” of the tribunal governments.141 This reflected the fact that the tribunals 
were adjourned in November 1948. With the slight revision in the phrasing, it would be adopted 
in the final treaty in 1951. 
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Compared to the 1947 treaty, the contents of the treaty were now much more lenient. 
Indeed, John Allison (Deputy Director of Far Eastern Affairs) stressed that the “underlying 
concept” of the treaty was now to “restore Japan to a genuinely sovereign status with minimum 
restrictions.” Not only would this help align it with the US, but would also prevent the Soviet 
Union or the PRC from offering a better alternative.142  
Although gradual and piecemeal, the Japanese peace treaty was thus moving very clearly 
in a more lenient direction. While Dulles is often credited for negotiating a generous peace treaty 
– even the most recent work by Miller argues this – these drafts demonstrate that the policy of 
leniency predated his appointment.143 Hence, as Dunn argues, it is inaccurate to refer to Dulles as 
the “architect” of the treaty, as has often been done, but rather as the person who successfully 
carried out an existing blueprint.144 
It is important to note that the US also began to re-consider the procedural aspects, during 
which a major development took place: the advent of “shuttle diplomacy.” Its precise origins are 
unclear, but one of the earliest proponents was Allison, who on 19 May 1948 wrote to 
Butterworth that frequent use of the “diplomatic channel” would better facilitate the crafting the 
peace treaty than working through the FEC. In other words, the US should talk to concerned 
governments individually to hammer out the terms of the treaty, as opposed to discussing them at 
a multilateral platform.145 This idea was adopted in NSC 13/2 and consequently, as Hosoya 
points out, “shuttle diplomacy” became the official US policy.146 This was an early indication of 
how the Japanese peace treaty would not be negotiated through a traditional peace conference. 
Of course, the idea of a traditional peace conference had not yet been completely 
abandoned; this would only be decided in early 1950 (refer to Chapter 3). However, the prospect 
was becoming increasingly clear. Indeed, on 27 May 1949, James Webb (Under Secretary of 
State) once again stressed the importance of relying on individual consultations, as this would 
enable the US to circumvent the Soviet Union and the thorny issue of the voting procedure, 
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while also allowing it to clarify the requirements for the peace treaty and negotiate from a more 
advantageous position.147  
 
The Rekindling of Momentum, 1949 
 
As mentioned above, the Japanese peace settlement negotiations slowly regained momentum in 
1949, as the State Department had by the middle of the year tackled the major European 
questions – particularly the creation of the NATO and the establishment of West Germany – and 
thus now had the time to examine the situation in Japan. More importantly, though, the US did 
not want to lose the initiative to the Soviet Union.148 This problem became apparent when the 
Soviet Union at a Council of Foreign Ministers meeting on 23 May 1949 proposed to discuss the 
Japanese peace settlement.149 The Japanese had heretofore believed that the Soviet Union was 
delaying the peace efforts. The US, accordingly, feared that if it became known that the latter 
had recently proposed a peace settlement and that Acheson had rejected this overture, it could 
create the impression that Moscow was sincerely anxious for a treaty, while Washington was not. 
This could damage the American reputation in Japan, where there was strong yearning for a 
peace treaty.150  
The US was also being pressed internationally to proceed with the peace treaty. As 
already explained in Chapter 1, there was already a consensus among FEC members in 1947 on 
the need for an early peace settlement with Japan; this was re-affirmed on 29 July 1949 when the 
State Department noted that “all of the FEC countries, except India and possibly France, favor a 
Japanese peace settlement as soon as possible.”151 No matter how powerful the US had become, 
it was difficult to ignore this mounting pressure. Against this backdrop, the State Department 
proceeded to clarify its position and to try to iron out the remaining disagreements that existed 
within the government. 
However, when the State Department raised the possibility of a peace settlement with 
Japan in 1949, it confronted strong opposition from the Defense Department. With the exception 
of MacArthur, the American military establishment was against ending the occupation any time 
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soon. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) reasoned on 15 June 1949 that Japan, due to its geographic 
location, skilled manpower and industrial potential, was of “high strategic importance” to the US. 
It was therefore crucial to deny it to the Soviets. For this purpose, the JCS recommended that 
Japan’s democracy and pro-Western orientation “first be established” before embarking on a 
peace settlement. The JCS also suggested securing bases in mainland Japan and building up 
“Japanese armed forces for self-defense.”152  
The JCS also spoke of a “communistic trend” and “developing chaos on the Asiatic 
mainland.”153 It is likely that the JCS was alluding to developments in mainland China, where 
the fortunes of war had long turned in favor of the communists. The anti-communist Nationalist 
Chinese regime was on the verge of being driven out in June 1949. With the free world in East 
Asia seemingly hanging in the balance, the JCS wished to avoid any action that might weaken 
US influence over Japan. 
The State Department responded on 30 September 1949, expressing both agreement and 
disagreement. It agreed on the need to deny Japan to the Soviet Union and the idea of developing 
its self-defense capacity. The State Department added that Japan’s internal security force needed 
to be strengthened as well, in order to protect itself from Kremlin-inspired subversion. 154 
However, the State Department argued that these were precisely the reasons for insisting on an 
early peace treaty. It reasoned that, in addition to the military aspect, the US also had to consider 
the “political, economic and social” factors. The State Department was particularly concerned 
that the continued presence of American forces constituted an “irritating” influence on Japan and 
could adversely affect its willingness to align itself with the West. Hence, the best course of 
action was to promptly proceed with a peace treaty.155 Meanwhile, to better understand the 
military requirements of the Japanese peace treaty, Webb sent an inquiry to the Defense 
Department on 3 October 1949.156  
MacArthur supported the State Department in pursuing an early peace treaty. However, 
as expressed in his cables to Washington (delivered on 21 September 1949, 2 November 1949 
and 14 November 1949) he had his own ideas about the terms which both conformed and 
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conflicted with the ideas espoused by the State Department and Pentagon. In contrast to both the 
State Department and the Pentagon, MacArthur argued that “unarmed neutrality” was the “most 
desirable course” for Japan, especially considering the war renunciation clause in its constitution 
and the financial strain that rearmament would cause. Instead, he thought it was sufficient for the 
US forces to remain in Japan to prevent any Soviet take-over.157 It should also be noted that on 5 
March 1948 MacArthur had explained to Kennan that stationing American troops in Japanese 
home islands was not necessary as long he could secure Okinawa for air striking purposes.158 
Hence, contrary to Van Aduard’s argument that MacArthur advocated the stationing of US 
troops throughout Japan, while the JCS wanted them only on the outlying islands, the records 
indicate that it was the other way around.159 
MacArthur also strongly advocated securing Soviet participation in the treaty. This 
echoed the military’s opinion, as well as Kennan’s. Interesting to note is that MacArthur argued 
that any base agreement would have to be concluded through a separate agreement, which would 
be at Japan’s “request” and come into force “simultaneously” with the peace treaty; this was 
precisely the course that the US would take later.160 Furthermore, MacArthur stressed that the 
treaty should impose “no restrictions on industries” that were vital to developing Japan’s 
peaceful economy. 161  In response to MacArthur, the Defense Department expressed its 
agreement that the peace treaty should not preclude bilateral negotiations for base rights in Japan. 
However, it also stressed the need to develop Japan’s self-defense forces, not only to deny it to 
the Soviet Union, but, in addition, to allow US forces to be deployed elsewhere where they were 
“badly needed.”162  
On 23 December 1949, in response to the State Department’s inquiry about the defense 
requirements for the peace treaty, Louis Johnson (Secretary of Defense), outlined three minimum 
security requirements: the retention of the US military as the “only foreign power” in Japan with 
base rights, US trusteeship over the former Japanese Mandate Islands, and “exclusive long-term 
strategic control of the Ryukyu islands.” In terms of the timing of the peace treaty, he still 
opposed an early settlement. Considering the “political and military instability in the Far East” – 
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most likely alluding to the defeat and expulsion of the Chinese Nationalists from the mainland 
and the frequent border skirmishes between the two Koreas – he argued that a treaty concluded at 
this time could give an opening to Soviet “exploitation” of Japan and drive the latter further 
away from the West.163 While not explicitly acknowledged in this letter, it is likely that the 
Pentagon’s opinion was also affected by the fact that the US nuclear monopoly had been broken 
when the Soviet Union successfully detonated its first atomic bomb in August 1949. 
The Pentagon also insisted on securing the participation of the Soviet Union and the PRC 
in the peace settlement. The goal here was not simply to end the state of war between Japan and 
the communist bloc; more importantly, the Pentagon wanted the Soviet Union and the PRC to 
sign – and thus officially endorse – a pro-American peace treaty that contained all the essential 
requirements for the US. Securing Soviet agreement for a peace treaty that complied with the US 
military requirements was the best way to safeguard the latter’s security interests in Japan. Hence, 
as long as the Soviet Union declined to sign a US-led peace treaty, the Pentagon was loath to end 
the occupation.164  
Unlike the Pentagon, Truman took a bolder step. With the deepening of the Cold War, the 
State Department was becoming increasingly disillusioned about the prospect of being able to 
find any agreement with the Soviet Union. On 29 July 1949, for instance, the State Department 
noted that the US and the Soviet Union had “diametrically opposing objectives,” as both were 
trying to keep the other out of Japan. It was therefore “almost impossible” for the two countries 
to agree on treaty terms.165 Even MacArthur – despite the fact that he was pushing for Soviet 
participation in the peace – shared this thought.166 Hence, Truman on 29 December 1949 made a 
momentous decision that the Japanese peace treaty was largely a matter to be decided between 
Britain, ROC and the US, and that the treaty negotiations should proceed without the Soviet 
Union.167 The road was thus paved for a “separate peace” – meaning a peace treaty without the 
Soviet Union – as opposed to an “overall peace.” 
 
163 Johnson to Acheson, 23 December 1949, Ibid., 922-3; Christopher R. Lew, The Third Chinese Revolutionary 
Civil War, 1945-49: an analysis of Communist strategy and leadership (New York: Routledge, 2009); 정병준 
[Chŏng Pyŏngchun], 한국전쟁: 38선 충돌과 전쟁의 형성 [The Korean War: the border skirmishes and shaping 
of the war] (파주 [P’aju]: 돌베개 [Tolbegae], 2006), 192-477. 
164 JCS to Johnson, 29 December 1949, FRUS 1949, Vol. 7-2, 922-6. 
165 Views of Other Countries toward a Japanese Peace Settlement, 29 July 1949, Ibid., 820-5. 
166 Sebald to Acheson, 20 August 1949, Ibid., 831-40. 
167 FRUS 1950, Vol. 6, 1131. 
56 
 
It should be noted that, while Van Aduard credits MacArthur for pushing for a separate 
peace, the records indicate that he was not its proponent.168 On the contrary, MacArthur had been 
advocating Soviet participation; only belatedly on 8 January 1950, would he agree that the US 
should proceed with the peace treaty even without the Soviet Union.169 Van Aduard also argues 
that Dulles created a sense of urgency for the need to work on the peace treaty, which creates the 
mistaken impression that the US did not work on the Japanese peace treaty until June 1950.170 
While Van Aduard cannot be blamed – since he did not have access to confidential US records – 
it is important to appreciate that a sense of urgency predated Dulles; the State Department had 
been refining the treaty and urging the government to move forward with the peace settlement 
since 1949. 
While trying to bridge the gap with the Pentagon, the State Department also maintained 
informal contact with Britain regarding the Japanese peace settlement, through which emerged 
four important points that would affect the negotiations. To begin with, Britain on several 
occasions (20 February, 27 May and 3 September 1948) insisted that the US should take 
leadership.171 Without this support, it would have been difficult for the US to play a leading role 
in crafting the treaty between 1950 and 1951. Also, as Hosoya Chihiro argues, this pressure 
prompted Acheson to examine the Japanese peace settlement more seriously, in order not to lose 
the initiative to Britain.172  
Secondly, Britain agreed with the US that Japan’s demilitarization was substantially 
complete and that the West should start focusing on its economic reconstruction. As early as 11 
September 1947, the British Commonwealth had acknowledged that Japan should become 
“economically self-sustaining as soon as possible.” 173  In addition, throughout 1948 various 
British officials opined that Japan no longer posed a military threat and stressed the importance 
of rebuilding its economy.174 Of course, this did not mean unconditional support for Japan’s 
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economic revival; while Britain was generally against imposing economic restrictions, it was 
concerned about the revival of Japanese shipping and shipbuilding capacity (see Chapter 8).175  
Nevertheless, this meeting of minds between Britain and the US on the general idea that 
Japan’s economy had to be reconstructed constituted an important shift in perception of the 
peace treaty. Whereas in 1947 the peace settlement had been mainly a military issue, it was 
increasingly becoming an economic question. Of course, other countries – specifically Australia, 
New Zealand, the Philippines, ROC and the Soviet Union – continued to view Japan from the 
security angle and still insisted on the need to eradicate militarism.176 However, Britain’s support 
would greatly facilitate the US in relegating the significance of the demilitarization of Japan and 
emphasizing its economic recovery when the peace treaty was negotiated in 1950 and 1951. 
The third important development was the fact that the US confided in Britain regarding 
its intention to engage in shuttle diplomacy. On 27 May 1948, Lovett told Esler Dening 
(Assistant Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs, Far East) that the US wished to initiate 
discussions through “diplomatic channels” with Britain and other friendly FEC countries.177 In 
September 1949, France and the Netherlands were also informed. Acheson explained that this 
was the best way to ensure that the treaty would develop in a way that was agreeable to the 
West.178 It appears that Britain, France and the Netherlands endorsed the idea of relying on 
diplomatic channels, as there was no express opposition. One can also assume that these early 
consultations facilitated Dulles’ subsequent shuttle diplomacy in 1950 and 1951. 
Finally, Acheson found Britain amenable to the idea of framing the Soviet Union as the 
culprit for the delayed peace settlement with Japan. On 24 December 1949, Acheson confided in 
Oliver Franks (British Ambassador to Washington) that Japan should not be given the 
impression that “countries other than the Soviet Union” were responsible for the delay. Franks 
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“readily assented” to this argument. 179  Later on 27 December 1949, he instructed the US 
embassies in the British Commonwealth to tell their respective hosts that the Soviet Union was 
causing the continued delay in the peace settlement and that “everybody”, including Japan, 
should share this view. Acheson stressed that this was "psychologically of great importance."180 
Considering the fact that the Soviet Union is still cited as the reason for the delayed peace, it 
appears that this strategy was highly successful. 
Of course, there were disagreements between the US and Britain, such as over the timing 
of the peace treaty. To recall, Britain had been pushing for an early peace settlement since 1947; 
Britain maintained this position throughout 1948 and 1949, arguing that it was necessary in order 
to keep Japan oriented towards the West. However, as explained by Kennan to Dening on 28 
May 1948, the US believed that an early peace settlement entailed the risk of creating an opening 
for the Soviets influencing Japan.181 This would all change in 1950, as the US would work 




To conclude, while the US officially suspended the peace treaty negotiations effort amidst 
escalating tensions with the Soviet Union, a number of important developments took place 
during this period that would have a lasting effect on the Japanese peace settlement. Most 
notably, to borrow Kennan’s own words, the stage was set for an “inoffensive” peace treaty that 
would be “as brief, as general and as non-punitive as possible” and constitute a “pat on the back” 
to encourage Japan as it entered into a new period.182 The treaty terms were thus moving away 
from demilitarization and towards economic rehabilitation. The idea of “shuttle diplomacy” also 
germinated during this period. These developments would greatly facilitate Dulles’ peace 
negotiation efforts in later years. 
Van Aduard argues that this transition towards a non-punitive peace was inevitable.183 
While he does not back up this argument with any concrete evidence, it seems that this liberal 
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turn was indeed a forgone conclusion, as the Soviet Union and the US having diametrically 
opposing worldviews were bound to clash. In other words, as Gaddis and Narinskii argue, the 
Cold War rivalry was unavoidable, and as long as the Cold War was inevitable, it was very 
unlikely that the US would provide the Soviets with any opening to Japan by allowing the latter 
to languish in poverty.184 At the same time, as Schonberger argues, even without the US-Soviet 
rivalry, the prolonged occupation meant more expense for the US, and thus it was likely at some 
point that American taxpayers would call for some change in occupation policy in order to 
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Chapter 3. The Formative Years and the Japanese Peace Treaty, 1950-1951 
 
Unlike in 1947, the State Department’s decision in late 1949 to move forward with the Japanese 
peace settlement led to a vibrant discussion both within the US and with other governments. 
After almost a further twenty months of hard bargaining, a Japanese peace treaty was eventually 
completed and signed on 8 September 1951. This chapter examines the development of the treaty 
during this formative period.  
It should be remembered that the Japanese peace settlement was a two-pronged process, 
as the State Department had to negotiate not only with foreign governments, but also with 
Congress. Given the political system of the US, the government had to convince the Senate to 
support the treaty, lest it refuse to ratify it. This was no small task for the Truman Administration, 
whose Far Eastern policy had been discredited in the eyes of Republican senators for losing 
China to the communists. It is quite possible that the government could have experienced a major 
setback in its effort to conclude the peace treaty with Japan had it not been for John Foster Dulles, 
who was recruited for the purpose of bridging the gap between the government and the Senate. 
This chapter mainly focuses on this domestic aspect of the treaty negotiations. The international 
aspect, although briefly outlined here, will be discussed more in detail in the subsequent chapters, 
as their complexity warrants individual analysis of the various issues that emerged during the 
talks between the US and other Allies. 
 
Towards a Consolidated US Position, 1950-1951 
 
The State-Defense disagreement over the timing of the treaty continued well into 1950. The crux 
of the matter was whether or not an early peace settlement was the best way to secure US 
influence in Japan. In order to close the gap, the State Department began to entertain the idea of 
isolating the “security” issues from those concerned with “peace.” In other words, the peace 
treaty should be limited to political and economic questions, while those pertaining to security – 
such as securing base access in Japan – would be arranged via a separate agreement. 
The State Department believed that this approach would not only satisfy the JCS, but also 
help avoid possible accusations of American imperialism; to obligate Japan to provide bases 
through a peace treaty would be too blunt an expression of the US intention to use the former for 
its own security needs and certainly would have been exploited by the communists for 
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propaganda. The State Department also hoped that the peace treaty – by removing any 
controversial military terms – would be more acceptable to India and other neutralist Asian states 
that were loath to sign any agreements that could be construed as being overtly directed against 
the communists. 
On 9 March 1950, this policy was adopted as part of the official “Position of the 
Department of State on United States Policy toward a Japanese Peace and Security 
Settlement.” 186  Acheson officially forwarded this proposal to Johnson on 24 April 1950, 
stressing that Japan would be pressed to “grant whatever bases and rights might be determined as 
necessary” by the US.187 While this did not lead to an immediate meeting of minds, it certainly 
brought the two departments closer to agreement. 
The “Position of the Department of State” also further crystallized the idea of using 
“diplomatic channels” to obtain agreement with “friendly Allies” for the peace treaty and the 
security arrangement. Aware that the Soviet Union and PRC would oppose a peace arrangement 
that allowed a US troop presence in Japan, the State Department felt the need to secure 
endorsement from “as many as possible of its friendly allies” and thus give the peace treaty a 
“solid international backing” that would also “appeal to Japanese interest.” The best means to 
achieve this goal was by consulting individual governments directly, while also “discreetly” 
identifying Japanese views when negotiating the treaty. Of course, this did not mean that the 
Soviet Union would not be consulted; however, the State Department was determined craft peace 
treaty on its terms.188  
This was a brilliant maneuver. On the one hand, it allowed the US to steer the treaty in a 
way that conformed to Western (or anti-communist) interests. On the other hand, if the 
communists opposed such a treaty, it meant that that they would be opposing not simply the US, 
but also all those countries that supported it, including Japan; this in turn would place the 
communists in an awkward position. 
Equally important was the idea that, while a peace conference would be convened, its 
main purpose would for signing a treaty rather than negotiating its terms. As explained above, 
the substantial negotiations would take place through “diplomatic channels.” The conference 
itself would be “as brief as possible with most of the time devoted to [listening to] the views of” 
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the participants, after which the treaty would be signed. 189  This was exactly how the San 
Francisco peace conference would be run in September 1951. Although the State Department 
would continue to ruminate on the exact procedure for the conference, it can be assumed that the 
US had essentially abandoned the idea of a traditional peace conference by March 1950. 
These developments were followed by a series of other notable events in May 1950. To 
begin with, Yoshida sent his close ally Ikeda Hayato, the Minister of Finance, to the US on a 
discreet mission to explain Japan’s position regarding the peace settlement. 190  During his 
meeting with the American economic adviser to Japan, Joseph Dodge, on 2 May 1950, Ikeda 
explained that Yoshida wished to have a peace treaty as soon as possible and that if maintaining 
the US bases in Japan was the price to facilitate this, then Japan would “try to find a way to offer 
them.” Ikeda added that if the US felt reluctant to make an outright demand, then Japan could 
consider “volunteering” to provide bases. Furthermore, this arrangement could be incorporated 
into the peace treaty or into a separate agreement.191 In other words, Yoshida was willing to 
sacrifice Japan’s sovereignty in return for ending the occupation.192  
While Yoshida himself would publicly deny that he favored the stationing of foreign 
troops in Japan and often remained elusive when approached by Dulles on this topic, in truth the 
idea of relying on the US for security by maintaining the latter’s military presence in Japan 
actually formed the core of Yoshida’s defense policy. 193  Indeed, on 9 November 1949, 
Nishimura Kumao (Head of Treaty Bureau of the Japanese Foreign Ministry) had publicly stated 
that a peace treaty would likely be accompanied by a “military agreement” that would provide 
for the continued presence of Allied troops and bases in Japan.194 Also, considering the fact that 
the idea of allowing the US to maintain troops in Japan had been expressed as early as 
September 1947 during the Katayama cabinet, it is safe to assume that Yoshida’s proposal was 
neither totally unacceptable nor alien to many within the Japanese elite.195 Meanwhile, Japan’s 
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willingness to offer base rights to the US certainly assured the State Department that it was on 
the right track. 
Another notable development was Truman’s press statement of 18 May 1950, when he 
publicly sided with Acheson by stating that the Japanese peace treaty would be negotiated by the 
“Secretary of State.” This implied that the State Department’s opinion would now prevail over 
that of the Defense Department regarding the peace treaty.196 Linked to this, and perhaps even 
more importantly, he also announced that John Foster Dulles had been appointed to lead the 
treaty negotiations efforts. This appointment reflected the fact that the administration was 
seeking bipartisan support for its foreign policy in light of various problems concerning the Far 
East, especially Republican criticism of the loss of China.197 Dulles was chosen because he had 
been recommended enthusiastically by Senator Arthur Vandenberg, a powerful figure in the 
internationalist wing of the Republican Party and the former Chairman of the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, and by Dean Rusk, who was in good terms with the Republicans and had 
recently demoted himself to the level of Assistant Secretary in order to help the administration 
with its Far Eastern policy.198  
A brief overview of Dulles’s personality is necessary as his worldview had an important 
bearing on the shaping of the peace treaty. The son of a well-travelled Christian minister and the 
grandson and nephew of two of America’s former Secretaries of State (John W. Foster and 
Robert Lansing), Dulles had been exposed to an internationalist worldview from very early in 
life. Perhaps because of this, he remained an internationalist throughout his political career, 
supporting the UN and always prioritizing regional and international interests over state interests. 
Of course, he was convinced that what was good for the US must be good for the rest of the 
world, and hence had no qualms about defending American national interests. As a young man 
he took part in the 1919 Paris peace conference, which convinced him that punitive peace ought 
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to be avoided. Meanwhile, as a Wall Street lawyer by profession, he was extremely well-
connected with the business world. Not surprisingly, he was business friendly and did not 
approve of market restrictions. He was also a staunch anti-communist and would work rigorously 
to ensure that the peace treaty reflected his ideological convictions.199 It was these credentials 
that led Vandenberg to back Dulles when Truman went scouting for talent. 
But however well-placed Dulles was for the job, he first had to wait until the government 
resolved its internal differences before he could fully engage in negotiating the treaty. 
Fortunately, the US steadily closed the inter-departmental divide. Most importantly, on 23 June 
1950 MacArthur reconciled himself with the Pentagon and informed Washington that the “entire 
area of Japan” must be made available as a potential base for the US; he further argued that 
“despite Japan’s constitutional renunciation of war,” Japan should muster “all of its available 
human and material resources” to build its own defense force.200 As Miyasato explains in detail, 
this change in attitude owed much to the fact that Dulles was making subtle but consistent 
overtures to MacArthur.201 
MacArthur’s decision ultimately helped the State and Defense Departments resolve their 
differences and sustain the moment for the peace settlement.202 In fact, without it, the outbreak of 
the Korean War on 25 June 1950 could have seriously hampered the peace treaty negotiations, as 
the Defense Department’s reluctance hardened. While Mabon argues that the Korean War 
convinced the Defense Department to be more willing to begin talking about the peace treaty, the 
records prove otherwise.203 Indeed, while Dulles opined that the “Korean attack makes it more 
important, rather than less important” to proceed with the peace treaty negotiations, Johnson’s 
attitude was that he “didn’t have time to talk about that now.”204  
Fortunately, when MacArthur’s memorandum of 23 June 1950 was presented to Omar 
Bradley (JCS Chairman), he noted on 12 July 1950 that “the views of State and Defense were not 
now very far apart.” 205  Similarly, when Dulles presented Johnson with MacArthur’s 
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memorandum on 3 August 1950, stressing that the peace treaty would entitle the US to “maintain 
in Japan as much force as we wanted, anywhere we wanted, for as long as we wanted,” Johnson 
softened his attitude about the idea of an early peace treaty.206 On 22 August 1950, there was 
another meeting of minds, as the JCS reversed its earlier position and agreed to move forward 
with the peace treaty even without the Soviet Union and the PRC. However, since this might 
provoke the Soviet Union and the PRC to take hostile action against Japan and the West, the JCS 
recommended that the treaty “must not become effective” until the military situation in Korea 
became more favorable. 207 This view was endorsed by the State Department on 23 August 
1950.208  
Finally, after some minor technical discussions, “practically complete agreement was 
achieved” between the State Department and the Pentagon on 4 September 1950. 209 
Subsequently, on 7 September 1950, a joint memorandum (NSC 60/1) was submitted by 
Acheson and Johnson to Truman, outlining the basic security requirements agreed between the 
two Departments and recommending that the US “now proceed with preliminary negotiations for 
a Japanese peace treaty.” Truman approved the joint memorandum on 8 September 1950.210 
A week later, on 14 September 1950, Truman held a press conference stating that an 
“effort should again be made” for a Japanese peace settlement and that he had authorized the 
State Department to “initiate informal discussions.” At the same time, Truman hinted at his 
intention to proceed even without the Soviet Union. When asked by the press if he would move 
forward with the negotiations even if the Soviet Union resisted, Truman did not openly deny this. 
Truman had thus publicly committed the US to working on the peace treaty.211 Subsequently, 
Dulles began to consult the members of the FEC in September 1950, thus initiating inter-
government talks. 
The PRC intervention in Korea and the subsequent UN setback in late 1950 could have 
jeopardized the peace talks, as the JCS (on 28 December 1950) once again recommended that the 
US refrain from proceeding with the peace treaty negotiations. 212  Fortunately by this point 
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Marshall had replaced Johnson as the Secretary of Defense, and the former’s amicable relations 
with Acheson helped the State Department maintain the momentum for the peace talks.213 Indeed, 
Marshall facilitated the peace talks by submitting a joint memorandum with Acheson (dated 9 
January 1951), recommending that Truman promote Dulles as a special ambassador to expedite 
the peace treaty negotiations. On 10 January 1951, Truman approved this and authorized Dulles 
to “visit Japan and any other country and discuss with appropriate authorities and individuals” to 
develop the treaty regardless of the military situation in Korea.214 
In sum, the US was able to iron out its internal imbroglio by January 1951. Afterwards, 
peace treaty development proceeded with impressive speed and Dulles completed drafting the 
treaty within seven months. Of course, the multilateral discussions on the Japanese peace 
settlement were no simple matter, a subject that will be discussed thematically in the subsequent 
chapters. Here, the general discussion that Dulles had with the other governments and the 
Congress is explained. 
 
The International Discussion on the Japanese Peace Settlement  
 
Soon after his appointment to lead the Japanese peace treaty effort in May 1950, Dulles 
embarked on a fact-finding mission to Japan between 21 June and 27 June 1950. This visit was a 
clear signal of his intention to listen to its viewpoint. Indeed, on 14 June 1950, just prior to his 
departure, Dulles stated publicly that he planned to talk to “members of the Japanese government 
and with Japanese business, trade-union and religious leaders.”215 Hence, while Richard Finn 
argues that the US view before 1951 was that the peace treaty would be made “without any input 
from the Japanese,” the records suggest the exact opposite; from the onset, Dulles intended to 
craft the peace treaty with a degree of input from the Japanese.216 
Through his meetings with prominent Japanese leaders – including Yoshida Shigeru 
(Prime Minister, Liberal Party), Tomabechi Gizō (Chairman of Democratic Party), Asanuma 
Inejiro (Secretary General of Socialist Party) and Shidehara Kijūrō (President, House of 
Representatives) – Dulles was able to identify the strong yearning for independence, an increased 
acknowledgment, following the outbreak of the Korean War of the need to maintain American 
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troop presence in Japan, and a general reluctance to rearm and become embroiled in inter-bloc 
rivalry.217 One must be careful, though, not to interpret Japan’s reluctance to get involved in US-
Soviet rivalry as an indication of wanting an “overall peace.” While Van Aduard argues that 
Japan remained reluctant as late as June 1950 about entering into a “separate peace” this must be 
qualified.218 It is true that there were elements in Japan, especially the leftists, who did not want 
a separate peace. However, as Igarashi Takeshi points out, already by the end of 1949 Yoshida 
and the ruling conservative elements were clearly inclined to proceed with a separate peace. The 
fact that Yoshida was even thinking about maintaining US military presence in Japan, which was 
objectionable to the Soviet Union, is a clear indication that he had distanced himself from an 
overall peace.219 In short, it is safe to assume that Japan had already set itself on the path of a 
separate peace by the time of Dulles’ visit. 
The fact that Dulles was talking to the vanquished deserves close attention. For the victor 
to consult the former “enemy” and make the verdict more acceptable to the latter was a novel 
approach. It contrasted drastically from the 1919 Versailles precedent, when Germany was 
practically given an ultimatum with no opportunity to present its views.220 However, there was 
nothing surprising about the fact that Dulles was acting in this way. To recall, already on 9 
March 1950, the State Department had adopted the position that the treaty had to be acceptable 
to Japan.221 More importantly, Dulles was convinced that the best way to avoid another war was 
to prevent a punitive peace with the ex-enemy (see Chapter 7). Hence, Dulles negotiating with 
Japan was a foregone conclusion. 
From June 1950 onwards, Dulles also worked on amending the existing draft peace treaty. 
In doing so, he embraced various principles that had been propounded by US officials since 1947. 
Politically, Japan should be “part of the free world,” “friendly to the US” and able to contribute 
to the security of the Pacific against the communist threat. Economically, the treaty should 
provide a “full opportunity for peaceful economic development, without reparation and with a 
minimum of, or no, special economic restrictions.” Equally important, the treaty should avoid 
establishing any post-treaty control machinery. 222  Furthermore, Dulles adopted the idea of 
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relying on “diplomatic channels” instead of convening a formal peace conference to negotiate 
the treaty. 223  While Dulles cannot be credited as the originator of these principles, he 
nevertheless deserves recognition for further clarifying the State Department’s position on the 
peace treaty.224  
Based on these clarified principles, the treaty was updated on 7 August 1950. With just 
twenty-one articles, the new draft embraced the concept of a brief, non-punitive peace. The 
treaty simply concerned itself with the termination of a state of war with Japan and expressed 
hope that it would promote common welfare and maintain peace between “sovereign equals.” It 
contained no post-treaty economic or political controls. In regard to security, the draft peace 
treaty adopted the agreement between the State Department and JCS on the continued presence 
of the American troops in Japan. In addition, it tacitly paved the way for a rebuilding Japan’s 
defense force by removing any reference to Japan’s military capacity.225  
This draft was fine-tuned and updated on 11 September 1950. The new draft – which now 
had a total of twenty-six articles – contained several new terms that would prove to be 
controversial. This included a reparations clause, which stipulated that the Allies and Japan 
“reciprocally waive claims against each other” (Article 18), and territorial terms regarding 
Taiwan and the Kurile Islands (Article 5), which stipulated that their final dispositions would be 
determined by the UN if the Big Four (Britain, China, the Soviet Union and the US) could not 
reach agreement. While this draft peace treaty was kept confidential, an outline of the updated 
terms – conventionally known as Dulles’ “seven point memorandum” on the Japanese peace 
treaty – was distributed to the FEC member states and later released to the press on 24 November 
1950.226  
Dulles officially began his “shuttle diplomacy” in September 1950. In the first stage he 
conferred with the FEC member states until November 1950 in order to identify each 
government’s position on the Japanese peace settlement. Almost all the members expressed 
concerns, usually involving the commercial and security questions. Britain, while agreeing to a 
lenient peace and the idea of a separate security arrangement, expressed concern over “Japan’s 
re-emergence as a commercial power” and wanted some safeguarding of British economic 
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interests.227 Australia took a more hardline stance, stating that it was “politically impossible” to 
endorse a treaty that did not have firm guarantees against Japanese aggression.228 Similarly, it 
was “extremely difficult” for New Zealand to accept a re-armed Japan without a firm security 
guarantee from the US.229 Canada also expressed concern that certain Allies could not agree to 
terminating the occupation unless the US offered security guarantee against Japan’s possible re-
emergence as a threat. At the same time, Canada doubted the wisdom of delegating the question 
of territorial disposition of Taiwan and the Kuriles to the Big Four and the UNGA. Also notable 
is the fact that Canada demanded further examination of the question of fisheries. 230  The 
Netherlands and France, the other two Western members of the FEC, were perhaps the most 
amenable to Dulles’ plans. While the Dutch expressed concern that the communists would 
denounce the stationing of the US troops in Japan as “imperialism,” it endorsed almost all 
aspects of the seven points.231 The French, meanwhile, did not express any objections to the US 
plans for the peace treaty and security arrangement.232  
Among the Asian states, the ROC expressed concern about a “possible resurgence of 
Japanese militarism” and its hope for something “like” reparations. The ROC’s “principal 
objection,” however, concerned the fact that, as things stood, the future status of Formosa was to 
be settled by the UN; in other words, China was not pleased with the prospect that its future 
might be determined by outside powers again.233 Similarly, the Philippines demanded that the 
US give “proper weight to their fears of Japanese aggression,” while also demanding “due 
consideration” of its claim to reparations.234 Burma also expressed displeasure at the fact that the 
peace treaty sought to waiver reparations claims, while not adopting any military restrictions 
against Japan.235  
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India expressed a number of reservations. To begin with, it stated that the Soviet Union 
and the PRC should be treated as negotiating powers and signatories for the peace treaty.236 
Additionally, India demanded that, per the Cairo Declaration, Formosa and the Pescadores 
should be returned to China (by which it meant “Communist China”). With regards to South 
Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands, India argued that they should be “returned” to the Soviet Union 
“in accordance with the Yalta Agreement.” India’s “most serious concerns” were those 
associated with security. India argued that Japan should be demilitarized and that its security be 
guaranteed by the UN. It reasoned that Japanese rearmament would be opposed by not only the 
communist camp, but also Australia and the Philippines, and also noted that Japan itself did not 
favor rearmament. Furthermore, if foreign troops were stationed in Japan, this would “practically 
constitute military occupation,” limit its sovereignty, and potentially expose it to attack by 
hostile powers. Interestingly, India endorsed the idea of a US trusteeship over the Ryukyu 
Islands, provided that the peace treaty clearly guaranteed their eventual return to Japan.237  
India’s response echoed that of the Soviet Union almost exactly. The Soviet Union too 
disapproved of the idea of delegating the question of Formosa to the UN, arguing that the Cairo 
Declaration had already stipulated that it would be returned to China. The Soviet Union also 
believed that the stationing of US troops in Japan was simply a continuation of the occupation, 
and, of course, it was opposed to Japanese rearmament. Furthermore, the Soviet Union objected 
to the trusteeship scheme for the Ryukyus. Interestingly, the Soviet Union did not make a serious 
issue out of South Sakhalin and the Kurile islands.238  
In sum, a number of issues were brought to Dulles’ attention during his conversations 
with the FEC member states. With the exception of the Soviet Union, Dulles seems to have been 
optimistic about his ability to resolve the differences with the rest of the FEC members, as he 
implied in a letter to MacArthur of 15 November 1950.239 But as the subsequent chapters will 
show, Dulles would find that convincing friends would be no less trying.  
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Beginning in 1951, Dulles embarked on a number of trips overseas to confer again with 
the concerned governments. The first trip lasted between 19 January and 22 February 1951. 
During this time, Dulles visited Australia, Japan, New Zealand and the Philippines. This trip was 
significant as it led to the first internationally-negotiated draft peace treaty on 23 March 1951.240 
While the specific language of the treaty would be amended later, this draft reflected the basic 
contours of the peace treaty. 241 It should also be noted that it was during this trip that the 
ANZUS treaty took form. 
Dulles visited Tokyo again between 16-24 April 1951, conferring with Prime Minister 
Yoshida and various members of the Liberal Party and Democratic Party. In these meetings, he 
hammered out a number of important agreements with Japan, including a Japanese commitment 
to voluntarily restrain its fishing off the Alaskan and Canadian waters (see Chapter 9). Most 
important was that Dulles truly treated Japan as a negotiating partner – although not as an equal 
– summarizing his meetings with other governments, going over the detailed terms of the treaty 
and asking for Yoshida’s opinion.242  
Dulles’ third and last trip took place between 2-14 June 1951. This time, he visited 
London and Paris in the hope of finalizing the treaty. By the end of this trip, many of the 
controversial elements had been settled, including the questions of territorial disposition, Japan’s 
shipping and shipbuilding capacity, and the knotty problem of Chinese and South Korean 
representation. The last remaining issues – reparations, fisheries and the question of Indochinese 
participation – were resolved by early August 1951, allowing the final version of the Japanese 
peace treaty to appear on 13 August 1951.243 While all these issues will be examined in detail in 
the subsequent chapters, it is worth noting here that some of the most difficult negotiations for 
Dulles involved disagreements with friends, not the Soviet Union. This obviously demonstrates 
the multiplicity of conflicting interests among the non-communist countries. More importantly, 
however, the very fact that numerous countries were involved in the making of the treaty testifies 
to the international nature of the Japanese peace settlement. In other words, the Japanese peace 
treaty was not simply about Japan alone.  
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Bipartisan Foreign Policy 
 
While negotiating with foreign governments, Dulles also regularly consulted with Congress. This 
owed to the fact that the Truman administration was seeking bipartisan support for the Japanese 
peace settlement.244 The State Department had already noted in March 1950 the importance of 
“congressional consultation” for the peace treaty.245 Unfortunately, the Truman administration 
was being constantly attacked by the Republicans for losing China to the communists. Against 
this backdrop, it was difficult to muster Republican support for any major foreign policy 
initiative for Asia. Dulles’ job was in part to fulfill this role.246  
It is worth noting here that Dulles himself was a firm believer in keeping the Senate 
informed of the peace treaty progress.247 He had witnessed how Woodrow Wilson had failed to 
garner congressional support for the Versailles peace treaty and as a result the Senate had refused 
to ratify the treaty. In order to avoid this mistake, Dulles maintained close relations with the 
Senate, regularly updating the members of the Foreign Relations Committee throughout the 
peace negotiations process.248 Dulles even went public on 15 June 1950 to stress the importance 
of a bipartisan approach.249  
One of the first steps Dulles took was to shield the Japanese peace treaty effort from 
potential Republican assault. Almost immediately after his appointment to lead the treaty 
negotiations, Dulles consulted with a number of prominent Republicans on 23 May 1950 about 
the peace treaty. 250  At this meeting, Styles Bridges (Leader of the Senate Republican 
Conference), together with William Knowland and H. Alexander Smith (both members of the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee), said that they wanted to “break loose” and attack the 
Truman administration for not doing anything about China. Perhaps mindful that such an attack 
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would not augur well for the Japanese peace settlement, Dulles “hoped very much that there 
would not be any attacks” on Far Eastern policy until he had sufficiently discussed the situation 
with Acheson. The Senators “indicated that they were disposed” to follow Dulles’ advice.251  
Meanwhile, Eugene Millikin (Chairman of the Senate Republican Conference) expressed 
concern about Japan’s economic prospects, fearful that it might depend either on mainland China 
for trade – which could lead to “communist domination” – or on continued American support, 
which might be financially draining for the US. Dulles responded that Japan’s economic 
conundrum could best be solved by expanding its trade with the non-communist countries in 
Southeast Asia. It should be noted that the revival of such a trade link between Japan and 
Southeast Asia formed the backbone of America’s scheme to rebuilding Japan’s economy (see 
Chapters 6 and 7).252  
Dulles also hinted at this meeting at the prospects for a base agreement with Japan. In 
doing so, however, he warned that the US had to obtain Japan’s agreement. He argued that it 
would be “useless” to force a country to accept a foreign troop presence against its will, as this 
would only arouse hostility and push Japan away from the West. The record indicates that by the 
end of this meeting, Dulles was able to secure general agreement among these Republican 
Senators about the outline of the peace treaty.253  
Dulles met with the Republican Senators again on 13 July 1950. This time, in light of the 
outbreak of the Korean War, he stressed the need to rearm Japan to prevent communist take-over. 
It appears that the Senators also agreed with this view, since nobody indicated any objection.254 
On 28 July 1950, when Dulles again conferred with certain Republican Senators, there was 
“strong and virtually unanimous sentiment” in favor of Japanese rearmament if deemed 
necessary. 255  Subsequently, on 14 August 1950, the Republican Senators of the Foreign 
Relations Committee released a statement in the New York Times, publicly and “wholeheartedly” 
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pledging their “un-partisan cooperation” in foreign policy.256 It is difficult to imagine such a 
public declaration of support for bipartisan foreign policy had Dulles not engaged in regular 
dialogue with the Republicans. Dulles would continue to work hard to maintain this Republican 
support throughout the negotiation process. 
One should note that all these developments took place before September 1950, which 
was when the US officially began negotiating with other governments. Dulles, in other words, 
was able to secure Republican support for the Japanese peace settlement that Truman 
administration envisioned, even before the talks started. After Truman announced his intention to 
engage in preliminary negotiations, Dulles once again conferred with the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee on 13 September 1950 to brief them on the general terms governing the 
treaty, its security aspects, and the plans to consult FEC powers individually. All three Senators 
present expressed support.257  
Dulles also met with the Far Eastern Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs 
Committee on 14 September 1950. 258  At this meeting, he explained the background and 
procedural plan for the peace treaty and security arrangement. Aware of the existing isolationist 
sentiment against entanglements overseas, Dulles was careful to explain that the planned security 
agreement would allow the US broad rights “without incurring obligations.” Dulles also 
highlighted that the peace treaty would place “no limitation” on Japanese rearmament. Finally, 
he assured the Representatives that the peace treaty and security arrangement would be 
negotiated in a way that would prevent any possible Soviet take-over of Japan. After the meeting, 
Dulles reported to Acheson that the “entire committee was in accord” with the State 
Department.259       
 
256 This text was signed by Alexander Wiley (Wisconsin, Republican), H. Alexander Smith, Bourke B. Hickenlooper 
(Iowa, Republican) and Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. and retroactively agreed to by Arthur Vandenberg (Michigan, 
Republican). The original text can be accessed via: Text of GOP Senators’ Statement Charging Foreign Policy 
Bungling in Europe, Asia: III-THE FUTURE, 14 August 1950, NYT. 
257 Dulles conferred with Walter George (Georgia, Democrat), Alexander Wiley (Wisconsin, Republican) and the 
committee chairman, Senator Tom Connally (Texas, Democrat); FRUS 1950, Vol. 6, 1295. 
258 The House representatives present at the meeting included: John Kee (West Virginia, Democrat), Mike Mansfield 
(Montana, Democrat), Charles A. Eaton (New Jersey, Republican), John M. Vorys (Ohio, Republican), Frances P. 
Bolton (Ohio, Republican), Walter Judd (Minnesota, Republican), James G. Fulton (Pennsylvania, Republican) and 
George Smathers (Florida, Democrat). 
259 Memorandum of Conversation (Dulles and Subcommittee on the Far East, House Committee on Foreign Affairs), 




After his initial conferring with the FEC member states, Dulles again consulted with 
Senators Taft and Millikin on 30 November 1950. Regarding Taiwan, Dulles confided that the 
island could be used as a base for covert operations to stimulate “insurrectional activities” in 
mainland China. As will be discussed in Chapter 10, this portended the fact that the peace treaty 
would not specify the ownership of the island. Furthermore, Dulles commented that the US 
needed “some understanding” with Australia and New Zealand on regional security, portending 
the trilateral ANZUS treaty that would be signed simultaneously with the Japanese peace 
treaty.260  
In late January 1951, Dulles was due to visit Australia, Japan, New Zealand and the 
Philippines to discuss the terms of treaty. Before embarking on this trip, he (on 11 January and 
12 January 1951) explained before a joint meeting of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the “two chief questions” for Japan were “future 
security” and “economic stability.” This first meant that the peace settlement should not only 
protect Japan from external aggression, but also prevent it from re-emerging as a threat. For this 
purpose, a multilateral security arrangement was needed with Australia, New Zealand and the 
Philippines, while at the same time Japan should be made to share the burden of its own defense. 
Secondly, Dulles stressed that Japan was in a “precarious” position, alluding to the idea that 
unless some means was found allow it to rebuild itself, the US would need to sustain it, which 
would be very expensive; hence, restrictive economic clauses had to be avoided. Dulles also 
stressed once again the need to treat Japan as a negotiating partner. “All members of the House 
Committee expressed general approval of” Dulles’ plans and wished him success; the Senate, 
meanwhile, made no outright opposition.261  
Upon returning to Washington, Dulles again conferred with the Foreign Relations 
Committee on 9 March 1951 to report “fully” on the discussions that had taken place during his 
trip.262 More importantly, when the updated draft treaty was developed later, Dulles met with the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 19 March 1951 to explain the terms of the treaty and the 
rationales behind them – such as the territorial disposition of Taiwan, Ryukyu and Kurile islands 
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– prior to circulating it to foreign governments. One noteworthy conversation at this meeting 
took place between Dulles and Hickenlooper, wherein the latter asked if the Allies should have 
post-treaty rights to inspect Japan, in order to prevent it from secretly remilitarizing. Dulles 
responded that the most effective way to ensure against such secret remilitarization was “not to 
write prohibitions or inspection provisions into the treaty.” Dulles was “absolutely convinced 
that treaty restrictions would not work” and reiterated that this conviction was “basic to his 
whole approach to the treaty.” Sparkman, Alexander Smith and Hickenlooper, who were present 
at the meeting, thanked Dulles for keeping them up to date and no overt objection was raised.263 
By the end of March 1951, Dulles had thus secured broad congressional support for the 
overall peace initiative. Of course, two issues would later emerge – fisheries and the Chinese 
representation – that would worry the Senate and require delicate maneuvering by Dulles, the 
details of which are discussed in Chapter 9 and Conclusion. Nevertheless, by early 1951 the 
Senate and the House were happy with the general direction that Dulles was taking. 
Here, it might be worth re-visiting the question of Dulles’ contribution to the Japanese 
peace treaty negotiations. The popular understanding is that Dulles was primarily responsible for 
the treaty. However, this must be qualified, lest one overstress his role. As already noted, the 
governing principles for the peace treaty, such as the ideas of a lenient peace and “shuttle 
diplomacy” that are often associated with him predated his appointment. As such, it is a small 
wonder that a number of scholars argue that Dulles was not the architect of the treaty; Hosoya 
even argues that Dulles’ role was less about dictating the terms of the treaty than resolving 
internal US differences, especially the gap between the Democrats and Republicans.264 Igarashi 
takes a similar view.265 However, Miyasato challenges this view by arguing that Dulles clarified 
the State Department’s views on the peace treaty and that, as such, he should still be considered 
the primary architect. This interpretation therefore accepts the fact that the State Department had 
been constantly refining the treaty and that the essential concepts – a short and lenient peace that 
would firmly anchor Japan to the West – had already been established in that process prior to his 
appointment, but suggests that Dulles refined them further. 
 
263 Meeting with Far East Sub-Committee of Senate Foreign Relations Committee regarding a Japanese Peace 
Treaty, 19 March 1951, RG59, Entry A1 1252, Lot 54D423, Congressional (Miscellaneous), 1950-52, accessed via 
NIKH. 
264 Dunn, Peace-making and the Settlement with Japan, 85-6; Pruessen, John Foster Dulles, 494-5; Hosoya, San 
Francisco Peace Treaty, 110-1. 
265 Igarashi, Japanese Peace Settlement, 218. 
77 
 
Of course, while one must be careful not to over-credit Dulles, it would be equally 
unwise to undermine his contribution to the peacemaking effort. Bridging the gap between the 
Democratic government and the Republican Congress was a tremendous responsibility, and 
perhaps something that only Dulles was capable of. Acheson, who was technically in charge of 
the Japanese peace settlement, had long been discredited in eyes of Congress due to his handling 
of China, and the sheer personality flaw of not being able to suffer fools gladly. He was therefore 
not the most suitable character for sweet talking the Republicans.266 Dulles was recruited by 
Truman to remedy this situation. Once Dulles received his appointment, he did an outstanding 
job in convincing the Republicans to support the peace initiative. In addition to winning 
Republican support, Dulles also played an important role in mending fences between the State 
and Defense Departments, without which the peace treaty could not have proceeded.  
Yet, interdepartmental agreement and bipartisan support for the Japanese peace 
settlement would have been meaningless, unless other countries agreed to the peace envisioned 
by the US. It was up to Dulles to convince other governments and garner international support. 
This was no small task that required patience, wisdom and decisiveness, the details of which will 




To summarize, the US was finally able to iron out its own internal differences in September 1950, 
thus paving the way for the multilateral Japanese peace treaty negotiations. Afterwards, Dulles 
spent a year conversing with Congress and other governments to develop the peace treaty. The 
final draft was developed on 13 August 1951, and after some minor adjustments was signed on 8 
September 1951 in San Francisco. It became effective on 28 April 1952 with the ratification by 
the US Senate. 
It is important to remember that the peace treaty was negotiated and not simply imposed 
by the US. Also, in negotiating the treaty terms, the US confronted major disagreements with its 
friends. The question of security was particularly contentious, as many countries were still bitter 
about Japan’s past aggression and therefore had qualms about not placing any military 
restrictions on that country. Dulles deemed that these were legitimate concerns and was willing 
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make concessions, in order to placate the Pacific allies – Australia, New Zealand and the 
Philippines – in return for a non-punitive peace. This culminated in three concurrent security 
treaties: a bilateral US-Japan security treaty, the US-Philippines security treaty and the ANZUS 
Pact. Since the Japanese peace settlement cannot be fully appreciated without accounting for 
these security arrangements, it is necessary to briefly examine how they came about. 
Australia and New Zealand, having confronted Japan’s aggression during the Pacific War, 
desired a security guarantee from the US. Both countries, thus, went public in January and May 
1949 respectively to express interest in a “Pacific Pact” paralleling the NATO that included 
Britain and the US as members.267 The Philippines also proposed on 24 March 1949 a “Pacific 
Pact”, with the US as a member that would prevent Japan’s resurgence as a threat.268 Meanwhile, 
the State Department on 9 March 1950 brought up the possibility of a collective security 
framework with Australia, Canada, Japan, the Philippines, New Zealand and the US as 
members. 269 Unfortunately, this multilateral “Pacific Pact” never materialized; Australia and 
New Zealand were not fond of having the Philippines as a partner, while Britain protested 
against any regional pact from which it was excluded.270  
While the idea of a collective security arrangement was shelved, the security needs of 
Australia, New Zealand and the Philippines were shrewdly capitalized upon by Dulles. When 
Australia and New Zealand opposed the lenient peace treaty during Dulles’ visit in early 1951, 
the latter raised the idea of a security guarantee as a possible trade-off. Both Australia and New 
Zealand had real security concerns, not simply because of past Japanese aggression, but also due 
to their commitments elsewhere – specifically Malaya and the Middle East – to defend the 
British Commonwealth, thus creating a security gap in their own countries. Against this 
backdrop, Dulles assessed that the US could induce Australia and New Zealand to support a 
lenient peace treaty if their security needs were met.271 Consequently a trilateral ANZUS Pact 
was signed on 1 September 1951, on the condition that Australia and New Zealand signed the 
US-led peace treaty.272 As will be explained in Chapter 7, the same formula was applied to the 
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Philippines. As Van Aduard correctly notes, Australia, New Zealand and the Philippines were 
essentially bought off to support the lenient peace treaty by being offered a security guarantee in 
return.273 Of course, the idea of a “security guarantee in return for agreeing to the US-led lenient 
peace treaty” was carefully nurtured by Australia and New Zealand as well. Hence, it would be 
wrong to assume that the US simply imposed its will on them.274 
With regards to Japan, Dulles was eager to re-arm the country. He stressed that Japan 
could not expect a free ride and had to be willing to take up the burden of its own defense. As 
noted above, however, the Japanese in general, including Yoshida, were against rearmament. 
The solution eventually adopted by the US – which was also strongly advocated by Britain and 
supported by Japan – was to station the US troops in Japan through a bilateral agreement with 
Tokyo.275 
By signing this security treaty, Yoshida was able to postpone any major build-up of 
Japan’s armed forces, while finally making the country independent. However, the treaty 
compromised Japan’s sovereignty in several ways. To begin with, foreign troops would remain 
in Japan in the name of protecting it from outside threat. Ironically this increased the risk of 
external attack by making clear that the aim of American troops was to ensure peace and security 
for not only Japan, but also the “Far East.” In other words, Japan could theoretically be used as 
an offensive forward base to project US military power to the Asian mainland, which meant that 
Japan could be entangled in a hot war with the PRC and the Soviet Union. The treaty also 
empowered the US to interfere in Japan’s domestic affairs by recognizing that the US troops 
could, upon the Japanese government’s request, “put down largescale internal riots and 
disturbances.” 276  Furthermore, the subsequent “administrative agreement,” signed on 28 
February 1952, gave diplomatic immunity to all US service members, which however temporary 
essentially amounted to extra-territoriality. 277  Of course, as Nishimura and Swenson-Wright 
point out, the security treaty was a negotiated agreement, in which both countries made genuine 
efforts to listen to each other. Hence, it would be an oversimplification to frame this treaty as 
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being an American diktat. Nevertheless, the terms make it clear that this was not an equal 
alliance. Fortunately, the peace treaty would be crafted in a way that was much more favorable 
for Japan, the subject to which we now turn to.  
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Chapter 4. The Question of Chinese Representation 
 
This chapter examines why the Chinese Nationalist government was not able to sign the 
Japanese peace treaty. This question was one of the most controversial issues at the time of the 
negotiations. Even though the Republic of China (ROC) was one of the Allied Powers that 
fought against Japan during the war – and while it was consistently treated as one of the 
negotiating members and a potential signing power – it was ultimately excluded from the treaty 
and had to negotiate a separate bilateral peace treaty with Japan at a later date. 
While the question of Chinese representation in the Japanese peace treaty is not a new 
topic – and many scholars have already produced excellent analysis – revisiting this question is 
important, as two important gaps still exist in the literature: the roles of the British 
Commonwealth and that of the Chinese Nationalist government itself. The classical narrative 
asserts that the ROC could not sign the Japanese peace treaty because of Anglo-American 
disagreement. While the US wanted the Nationalist China to sign the treaty, Britain wanted the 
Communist China to do so; because they could not agree, the Anglo-American governments 
decided to exclude both Chinas.278 Even the most recently published works frame the Chinese 
representation issue in this way.279  
The Anglo-American disagreement did, of course, contribute to the exclusion of the ROC 
from the Japanese peace settlement. However, over-concentration on the American and British 
roles overlooks the fact that other members of the FEC also played an important role in 
excluding the Chinese Nationalists. This is not to say that the existing studies are ignorant of this 
aspect of the ROC’s exclusion. Indeed, a number of studies acknowledge the fact that the British 
Commonwealth, the Philippines and Indonesia were involved. 280  However, none of them 
demonstrate how this process worked, and by overlooking this they fail to explain why the US in 
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this case compromised instead of forcing its will on others, which is in contrast to its handling of 
other issues, such as Japan’s postwar fisheries and shipbuilding capacity, where it refused to 
buckle. Equally important is the fact that hardly any of the existing studies examines the Chinese 
Nationalist government’s point of view, thus giving the incorrect impression that it had no voice 
in this issue. However, the fact is that the ROC did contribute to its own exclusion. Taking this 
into account, this chapter attempts give a fuller explanation of why the ROC was not able to sign 
the treaty. 
 
The Emergence of the Question of Chinese Representation 
 
The question of whether or not the ROC should be invited to sign the Japanese peace treaty only 
became a serious issue because of the communization of mainland China in 1949. Up until this 
time, there was no question that the ROC was the legitimate representation of China and one of 
the Allied Powers. The Chinese Nationalists not only signed important wartime international 
agreements – such as the 1943 Cairo Declaration and 1945 Potsdam Declaration – but also was 
represented on the UN Security Council as a permanent member with a veto. After the war, the 
Chinese Nationalists also partook in the occupation of Japan as a member of the Allied Council 
for Japan and the Far Eastern Commission. In other words, nobody before 1949 doubted that the 
ROC had to be a party to the peace treaty. 
However, the situation changed when the ROC was driven off the mainland in late 
1949.281 The great majority of the China was now under the control of the Chinese Communists, 
while the Nationalists were confined to Taiwan. Moreover, the indigenous Formosans did not 
even consider themselves ethnic Chinese. Consequently, this raised the question of whether or 
not the ROC was the legitimate representative of China. Furthermore, the fact that the Chinese 
Nationalists had been defeated despite US support, led many people to doubt if the ROC was 
even a capable government. 
Against this backdrop, four FEC member states began to break ties with the ROC and 
instead opted for the normalization of relations with the PRC, beginning with the Soviet Union 
(2 October 1949), India (30 December 1949), Britain (6 January 1950) and finally the 
Netherlands (27 March 1950). While other FEC members – Australia, Canada, France, New 
Zealand, the Philippines and the US – continued to recognize the ROC, they all shared some 
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reservations. Meanwhile, four Asian countries that would later be invited to sign the Japanese 
peace treaty also recognized the PRC: Burma (17 December 1949), Ceylon, Indonesia (5 
December 1949) and Pakistan (5 January 1950).282  
Within the US, the State Department also considered coming to terms with the PRC, 
believing that the Chinese Nationalists were doomed. With the defeat of the ROC imminent, 
Acheson on 4 August 1949 opined to the NSC his belief that Taiwan would “sooner or later 
come under Communist control.”283 Acheson made this public when on 13 January 1950, he 
stated at a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing that Taiwan’s “fall to the Communists” 
was “inevitable.”284 
Instead of salvaging this doomed regime, Acheson and a number of State Department 
officials explored the possibility of recognizing the PRC and establishing trade links with it. In 
justifying this approach, the State Department officers argued that trade relations would help 
create a rift between the Soviet Union and PRC, an idea that Acheson submitted to the NSC for 
review as early as 28 February 1949 (NSC 41).285 Other advantages of having formal diplomatic 
ties with the PRC included the reduction of Anglo-American tension, which had arisen due to 
Britain’s insistence on recognizing the PRC; protecting American business interests in mainland 
China; helping Japan economically, as the country depended on raw materials from the Chinese 
mainland; and keeping in touch with a country that contained one-fourth of humanity. The State 
Department’s intelligence estimate before the outbreak of the Korean War also stated that any 
communist conquest of Taiwan would not significantly damage American strategic interests, 
since the PRC lacked both the naval capacity and economic wherewithal to pose a meaningful 
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threat.286 Many journalists, businesses and missionaries were also supportive of the PRC and 
certain Democratic Senators rallied behind Acheson.287 
Of course, the Truman administration had to be discreet. A powerful “China Lobby” 
consisting of politicians, journalists, missionaries and businessmen, was busy avidly defending 
the interests of the ROC and assaulting Truman for losing China to the communists.288 Hence, 
while Acheson made ominous statements about the future of the ROC, he could not be too 
upfront about his preferred strategy of rapprochement with the PRC. Accordingly, NSC 48/2, 
approved by Truman on 30 December 1949, stipulated that the US would continue to recognize 
the ROC, until it was “clearly in the US interest” to recognize the PRC.289 While maintaining the 
façade of supporting the ROC, the US also began to take piecemeal steps to weaken it. For 
instance, Acheson discouraged military aid to the Chinese Nationalists to expedite its downfall 
and prevent any unnecessary provocation against the CCP.290 This was made public on 5 January 
1950, when both Truman and Acheson announced that the US would not furnish military aid or 
advice to the ROC.291 In response to the China Lobby’s pressure to protect the ROC, Acheson 
patiently waited for the regime’s eventual downfall in order to present it as a fait accompli.292  
For Acheson, then, “China” would mean the PRC alone. This implied that the PRC 
would be represented at the Japanese peace settlement and the draft peace treaty was developed 
accordingly. Indeed, the treaty was updated on 2 November 1949 and again on 29 December 
1949 “so as to permit presentations to the USSR and communist China.” The PRC – and not the 
ROC – was now assumed to be a partner in negotiating and signing the peace treaty. It should 
also be noted that the State Department took into account the possibility of the PRC refusing to 
sign the treaty, which essentially would have amounted to no Chinese representation at all.293  
Meanwhile, the British Commonwealth, regardless of its members’ individual attitudes 
towards the PRC, was united in its dislike of the ROC and reluctance to support its presence at 
the peace conference. Indeed, as evidenced in the Commonwealth working conference on the 
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Japanese peace treaty that was convened between 1 and 18 May 1950, its members agreed that 
the PRC should represent “China”. Britain was especially vocal in insisting that the PRC should 
sign the Japanese peace treaty. It believed that the normalization of PRC-Japan relations – and 
the consequent revitalization of trade – would encourage the former’s increased contact with the 
free world, through which the PRC could eventually be allured away from the Soviet Union. 
Britain had also never been fond of Chiang Kaishek, as evidenced in Churchill’s reluctance to 
agree to the ROC being one of the four “policemen” in the postwar world when suggested by 
Roosevelt. Furthermore, Britain had important commercial interests in mainland China and was 
thus reluctant to antagonize the PRC. However, the British Commonwealth also agreed that the 
PRC should be excluded if its approach to the peace settlement were “unacceptable to the 
democratic powers.”294 In other words, either the PRC would sign the peace treaty or no “China” 
would sign at all. 
Hence, even before the Japanese peace treaty negotiations entered the substantive phase, 
the question of Chinese representation was emerging as a major question with various opinions 
being offered, including limited support for the ROC, the idea of PRC participation in the peace 
settlement, and even the possibility of no Chinese representation at all. As such, while Van 
Aduard believes that Dulles was responsible for the idea of excluding both Chinas, this does not 
seem to have been the case. Indeed, as explained below, Dulles continued to entertain the idea of 
inviting both Chinas until the PRC intervened in the Korean War.295  
 
The Chinese Nationalist Representation during the Early Stages of Negotiation 
 
The appointment of Dulles in May 1950 further complicated the Chinese representation question, 
as he had a very different view of the Chinese Nationalists from that of Acheson. In a 
memorandum drafted on 21 April 1950, Dulles highlighted that the ROC was an important 
partner in the anti-communist struggle and a significant military force to be reckoned with. He 
praised the Chinese Nationalists for improving lives in Taiwan, while deterring further 
communist expansion from the mainland. He also appealed for continued aid to be given to the 
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ROC, both military and economic, while arguing that its representation in the UN must be 
defended.296 
In addition, Dulles, as early as January 1949, had ruled out any prospect of recognizing 
the PRC as a government and instead sought ways to overthrow it.297 Dulles repeated his belief 
on the need to contain the PRC in a radio interview with the Columbia Broadcasting System on 
29 June 1949 and a public statement on 5 August 1949.298 Again on 18 May 1950, Dulles 
advocated taking a “strong stand” to prevent communist spillover to Taiwan. 299 Dulles was 
supported in this line by a number of Republican Senators (Taft, Millikin, Wherry, Bridges, 
Wiley, Smith and Knowland), who expressed the “unanimous view that the US should not 
recognize the Communist Government of China,” lest communist prestige in Asia be 
redoubled.300 
Dulles was thus supportive of the ROC and opposed to the PRC, which naturally meant 
that he wanted the ROC representation in the Japanese peace treaty. However, when Dulles first 
outlined his plans for the treaty on 6 June 1950, both the PRC and ROC were treated as potential 
negotiating members, thus continuing the existing State Department approach.301 This was most 
likely in response to the Defense Department’s early insistence on Chinese Communist 
representation; as pointed out in Chapter 3, it was not until 22 August 1950 that the Pentagon 
formally rescinded this demand. Hence, it appears that Dulles at this point avoided any overt 
rejection of PRC representation. As Hosoya points out, only later, following the PRC 
intervention in Korea, would Dulles harden his attitude and clearly shift towards excluding it 
from the treaty.302  
The question of Chinese representation became even more complicated when Dulles 
began consulting other governments in late 1950. To begin with, both the Soviet Union and India 
demanded the PRC’s participation. The PRC, perhaps informed by the Soviet Union, also 
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demanded its own representation through a radio announcement.303 Dulles’ position, however, 
was that the PRC could not be consulted, as the US had no official relations with the PRC.304    
There was nothing surprising about the fact that the communist and neutralist states 
demanded Chinese communist representation. But the lack of any enthusiasm among the 
Western powers for the ROC certainly surprised Dulles. Canada, for instance, argued in 
November 1950 that “China” was now represented “only by” the PRC and thus the latter should 
be invited to sign the peace treaty; in case it refused to participate, then the door should be left 
open for its later accession.305 In addition, its exclusion from the treaty would be unacceptable to 
certain Asian states and Japan which had natural economic interests in mainland China. 306 
Canada’s proposal essentially echoed the British Commonwealth agreement of May 1950: either 
invite the PRC or exclude both Chinas from the peace treaty. This was certainly not a pleasing 
prospect for either Dulles or the ROC. 
Canada’s response must have been particularly irksome for the US, considering recent 
developments in Korea. In late November 1950, while Dulles was conferring with the foreign 
governments to explain the US position on the peace treaty, the PRC decisively intervened in the 
Korean War by unleashing a military offensive that pushed the UN forces south of the 38th 
parallel. This military reversal killed any prospect of US accommodation with the PRC. Instead, 
the US sought to undermine the Chinese communists, lobbying within the UN to brand the PRC 
as an aggressor. At the same time, inviting the PRC to sign the peace treaty became virtually 
impossible. Indeed, on 11 April 1951, when Dulles conferred with H. Alexander Smith, Taft, 
Millikin and Wiley before embarking on his third trip to Tokyo, the Republican Senators stressed 
that the Chinese communists should not be a party to the peace treaty.307 
Unfortunately for the US, other governments reacted differently to the Chinese intervention. 
Most notably, the British sensed an added urgency to the need for a negotiated settlement in 
Korea, which in turn necessitated enticing the Chinese to the negotiating table through 
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concessions, one of which was to recognize the legitimacy of the PRC.308 Britain thus lobbied 
rigorously for the PRC to replace the ROC as the true representative of “China” at the UN. In the 
Attlee-Truman talks in Washington on 7 December 1950, for instance, the British questioned the 
wisdom of the continued American recognition of the ROC. Attlee stated that the Korean War 
had to be settled via the UN and that giving the UN seat to PRC could convince the Chinese 
communists to facilitate a settlement in Korea.309 This naturally meant that Britain would also 
support the Chinese communist representation in the Japanese peace settlement.  
Of course, at the same time Britain was aware of the depth of US opposition to its 
reasoning. It was therefore resigned to the idea that the PRC may in the end be excluded from the 
peace treaty, but it wished to make its case and, by doing so, hopefully bar the ROC On 2 
January 1951, Britain informed other Commonwealth members that communism was the greatest 
danger in Asia and that, accordingly, as part of the anti-communist struggle Britain was prepared 
to see a partial peace that excluded the Soviet Union and the PRC.310 Later, on 26 February 1951, 
Walter Gifford (US Ambassador to London) informed Acheson that Britain did not wish the 
China issue to delay the peace and that an accession clause should be entertained that would 
facilitate the temporary exclusion of both Chinas from the peace treaty.311 However, this was 
devised as a last resort; it did not mean that Britain had given up on the idea of inviting the PRC 
to negotiate and sign the treaty. As a matter of fact, Britain continued to express its preference 
for involving the PRC until late in the day; in the words of the diplomat, C.H. Johnston, it was 
best to invite the PRC, so that in case it declined the offer, then it would receive all the blame.312 
In sum, by early 1951, the idea of excluding both Chinas from the Japanese peace treaty – 
as well as the idea of a separate peace settlement between China and Japan – had emerged as a 
potential outcome. In this context, it is interesting to note that the ROC informed Dulles on 22 
January 1951 that if a multilateral peace treaty could not be signed, then a series of bilateral 
peace treaties could be considered, an idea shared by the Philippines; Dulles also acknowledged 
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this as a distant possibility.313 This was a fateful statement, as the ROC would eventually end up 
signing a separate bilateral agreement with Japan, although it would take a few more months 
before Britain and the US settled on this approach. 
 
The Continuing Multilateral Opposition to the Chinese Nationalist Representation 
 
When Dulles put together a draft treaty in March 1951 following his early talks with other 
governments, the China question became a heated issue with multiple countries expressing 
disapproval of the ROC’s participation. Most importantly, Britain continued to insist on the 
PRC’s participation. Oliver Franks (British Ambassador to Washington) at his meeting with 
Dulles on 30 March 1951 stressed the need to invite the PRC to sign the treaty, citing the 
importance of creating trade links between Japan and mainland China. However, Dulles objected, 
as the US did not recognize the PRC and its participation would cause “many difficulties.” On 12 
April 1951, Dulles once again conferred with Franks and remarked that while Britain was free to 
consult the PRC, he was going to move forward with the treaty negotiations regardless of 
Beijing’s reaction; Dulles was neither willing to wait for the PRC response nor to take its views 
seriously.314  
However, other than the Philippines, the US was alone in the FEC in its support for the 
ROC. India was as vocal as Britain in its support for the PRC’s participation. In response to the 
March 1951 draft, India argued that the treaty should not be offensive to the PRC and that it was 
“essential” to invite the latter to express its views for a “stable and enduring peace with Japan.” 
Interestingly, however, India did not explicitly demand that the PRC be treated as a signatory. 
Instead, India remarked that a “non-signatory Allied Power” should be able to sign a separate 
peace treaty with Japan.315 It is unclear why India made this statement, but it is possible that it 
foresaw the difficulty of inviting the PRC to sign the peace treaty in light of US attitude. What is 
clear is that by expressing this view, India contributed to the increased possibility of a separate 
bilateral Sino-Japanese peace settlement. 
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Two other Asian states, Burma and Indonesia, were also opposed to the ROC’s 
participation, as they did not recognize that government; they were afraid that co-signing the 
treaty with the ROC would imply recognition.316 In addition, Burma was antagonistic to the 
ROC because at this time the Chinese Nationalist general Li Mi was launching anti-communist 
guerrilla raids from north Burma into Yunnan. Supporting the ROC in the peace settlement 
might have suggested Burmese support for these activities and consequently aroused a hostile 
reaction from the PRC.317 For Indonesia, the Sukarno government was pursuing a neutralist 
policy and did not wish side with the ROC against the PRC.318 
The State Department also noted on 21 March 1951 that Australia, Canada and New 
Zealand – although they continued to recognize the ROC – were all reluctant to cosign the peace 
treaty with the Chinese Nationalists.319 Indeed, Lester Pearson (Canadian Secretary for External 
Affairs) suggested in April 1951 that neither China be invited as a signatory. Unsurprisingly, this 
caused outrage when it became known to the ROC, which “strongly” opposed Canada’s 
proposal.320 Unfortunately for the ROC, however, it was clear that majority of the “principal” 
negotiating powers were opposed to its representation.  
In response, the ROC employed various political and legal arguments to secure American 
support for its representation in the peace treaty. For instance, the former ROC Foreign Minister 
Wu Teh-cheng emphasized that peace between ROC and Japan was necessary for deterring the 
communist threat in the Far East, while Wang Chung-hui (Judicial Yuan President) even 
expressed willingness to waive China’s reparations claims. Wang’s statement was significant 
considering the local public sentiment, which demanded “satisfactory” reparations; indeed, there 
was a “wave of protest” in Taiwan against the March 1951 draft treaty for adopting a no-
reparations formula.321 Meanwhile, Foreign Minister Yeh highlighted that the ROC was making 
an “all-out effort” to resist Communist aggression and was receptive to the US-led peace treaty. 
Yeh added that it was the “Republic of China” that had fought the war against Japan and was 
recognized by the “overwhelming majority” of its co-belligerents and that after the war the ROC 
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had represented China at the UN and FEC. Yeh also argued that the exclusion of the ROC from 
the treaty could contribute to instability in the Far East. Hence, it deserved the “firm support” of 
the US in negotiating and signing the treaty. 322  Again both Wang and Yeh indicated the 
possibility of Japan signing a series of bilateral peace treaties with various countries rather than 
one multilateral peace treaty should this be necessary.323 This was the second time that the ROC 
raised the idea of a bilateral peace with Japan. 
Amidst the continuing Chinese conundrum, George Bernard Noble of the State 
Department’s Division of Research and Publication identified a significant parallel between the 
current Chinese situation and the Russian experience after WWI. To elaborate, Russia had been 
badly fragmented during the Paris peace negotiations in 1919, as the civil war between the 
Bolsheviks and the anti-Bolshevik “White” Russians was ravaging the country with both regimes 
contending to be recognized as the legitimate government. As such, while the provisional 
Russian government that was led by Alexander Kerensky had been recognized by the US and 
other Allies, the Russians were ultimately excluded from the Versailles peace treaty.324 In much 
the same way, China was in a state of civil war between the communists and anti-communists, 
with the US and some Allies recognizing the non-communists.325 While this document contained 
no specific conclusion, it subtly hinted at the possibility of excluding China from the peace 
settlement.   
In sum, between March and April 1951 numerous countries, including those that 
recognized the ROC, were opposed to the Chinese Nationalists signing the peace treaty. Hence, 
the prospect of excluding the ROC was becoming more real. The Philippines was perhaps the 
only exception, aside from the US, as it adamantly opposed PRC representation in the treaty and 
expressed support for the ROC.326 However, the Filipino support was not enough to warrant 
ROC representation in the treaty. The only reason that the ROC could maintain its tenuous 
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position as a negotiating power and a potential signing member for the treaty was because of the 
US support. Unfortunately for the ROC, the US position would soon change. 
 
The Exclusion of Both Chinas and Paving the Way for a ROC-Japan Peace Treaty 
 
On 16 May 1951, Dulles cabled Sebald and indicated three possibilities for the ROC: accession, 
a separate bilateral peace arrangement with Japan, or indefinite delay of the Chinese signature.327 
Dulles, of course, still saw ROC signature of the multilateral peace treaty as his preferred option. 
However, he was aware that this would be “seriously” opposed by “probably” all British 
Commonwealth members – including those recognizing the ROC – as well as Indonesia and 
even the Western European countries. Dulles also noted the Russian precedent in the 1919 
Versailles peace settlement which suggested that even a recognized government could be 
excluded from signing a peace treaty. He concluded by referring to a separate peace arrangement 
between the ROC and Japan as being an “acceptable” alternative.328 In short, Dulles had started 
to entertain the ROC’s exclusion as a real possibility. He shared this prospect with Franks on the 
same day (16 May 1951).329 
Of course, Dulles ruled out any PRC signature on the peace treaty. 330  Dulles was 
supported by Jack Tate (Deputy Legal Advisor of the State Department), who on 22 May 1951 
opined that as far as the US was concerned the PRC was neither a state nor a government, since 
the US had never recognized it.331 Hence, it did not make sense to invite a non-entity to sign an 
international instrument. That same day, Dulles conferred with Christopher E. Steel (Minister at 
the British Embassy), who suggested that Japan should be allowed to decide which China it 
wished to make peace with and how to do so. Steel stressed that neither the US nor Britain 
should meddle in Japan’s future relations with China. When Dulles asked how this could be 
accomplished, Steel responded that a provision could be made in the treaty that authorized Japan 
to sign a peace treaty with other governments at a later date, provided that this separate treaty 
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was not substantially different from the multilateral one.332 This was later adopted as Article 26 
and would act as an enabling clause for the 1952 bilateral ROC-Japan peace treaty.333  
When Sebald on 19 May 1951 presented Dulles’ telegram to Iguchi Sadao (Vice Foreign 
Minister) and inquired about Japan’s views, the latter responded that Japan wanted the ROC to 
sign the treaty “concurrently and at the same ceremony with the other Allied Powers.” When 
Sebald remarked that this might not be possible due to Allied opposition, Iguchi responded that 
Japan was “of the definite opinion that Chinese Nationalist participation in some form was 
desirable” and was open to either a separate peace arrangement or accession. Iguchi added that 
indefinite delay on the China question should be considered “only as a last resort,” if absolutely 
necessary for achieving an early peace treaty. Iguchi also stressed that Japan “under no 
circumstances desired to sign the treaty” with PRC.334 Hence, as Nishimura Kumao reminisces, 
Japan was open to the idea of excluding both Chinas from the treaty.335  
With regards to what Japan really had in mind, scholars are divided. Chen Zhaobin and 
Jennifer Miller argue that Yoshida did not wish to choose one China over the other due to 
commercial concerns. In other words, because of his desire to uphold Japanese business interests 
in mainland China, Yoshida was reluctant to enter into peace with the ROC alone. Inoue Masaya 
believes otherwise. He accepts the view that Yoshida was interested in trade relations with the 
mainland and would later try to seek ties with both Chinas. However, he argues that this was not 
the case at the time of the Japanese peace treaty negotiations. Based on Japan’s internal records, 
Inoue argues that Yoshida at this point was clearly against making peace with the PRC.336 The 
American records corroborate Inoue’s argument. His argument becomes all the more convincing, 
considering the fact that Yoshida since early 1950 had been advocating a “partial peace” instead 
of an “overall peace,” as the latter entailed making peace with the communist bloc, which 
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Yoshida considered “outrageous.”337 Yoshida’s China policy was therefore closely aligned with 
that of Dulles. 
Meanwhile, the PRC and ROC continued to demand representation in the Japanese peace 
treaty. According to a note sent by Zhou Enlai to the Soviet Ambassador N.V. Roschin on 26 
May 1951, the PRC argued that “all the states concerned” should take part in the Japanese peace 
treaty negotiation. Zhou added that China had engaged in a “heroic war” to defeat Japan, and 
thus it was “absolutely proper and just” that the PRC participate in the treaty. Zhou also accused 
the US of trying to exclude the PRC from negotiating the treaty.338  
Likewise, Wellington Koo (ROC Ambassador to Washington) on 29 May 1951 defended 
the right of the ROC to sign the treaty. He emphasized that the ROC had fought the war against 
Japan, that it effectively controlled Formosa, and that the PRC would demand treaty terms 
unacceptable to the US. Dulles, however, responded that the “great majority” of the FEC 
members declined to be co-signers with the ROC and that it was “impossible” to embark on a 
course that would satisfy the ROC and the US but at the expense of ostracizing the other FEC 
countries. Dulles further explained that there was a valid question over whether or not the 
Chinese Nationalist government could effectively represent mainland China. This question of 
jurisdictional authority led certain countries – referring to Australia, Canada and New Zealand – 
to question the wisdom of inviting the ROC to sign the peace treaty, even though they 
recognized the Chinese Nationalist government. Amid such negative opinions about the ROC, 
Dulles also worried that insisting on inviting the ROC could delay the peace settlement.339 While 
this meeting ended without any conclusion, it was clear that Dulles was now inclined to exclude 
the ROC, which essentially meant that no “China” would be represented in the treaty. 
Certain British Commonwealth members were also increasingly inclined to exclude both 
Chinas. On 23 May 1951, Britain expressed agreement with Canada that both Chinas should be 
excluded; instead the treaty should allow China – with which one still to be determined – to 
either sign or accede at a later date.340 Australia echoed this suggestion.341 Ceylon also indicated 
 
337 Igarashi, Japanese Peace Settlement, 190, 213-5; Extracts from “Summary of World Broadcasts,” RG25, 1940 
Central Registry, General Registry, Peace treaty with Japan, Part 9, 1950/11/01-1951/02/14, accessed via NIKH. 
338 Chou addresses note to Roschin stating China’s support for Russia on peace pace, 26 May 1951, RG59, Entry A1 
1252, Lot 54D423, China [January 6 - November 29, 1951], accessed via NIKH; Chou supports USSR on Japanese 
peace, 29 May 1951, RG59, Ibid.; 1679: Chinese communist statement regarding Japanese peace treaty, 1 June 1951, 
Ibid. 
339 Memorandum of Conversation: Japanese peace treaty, 29 May 1951, Ibid. 
340 Japanese Peace Treaty, 23 May 1951, CP(51)137, CAB129/45, NA. 
95 
 
its willingness to exclude both Chinas from the peace treaty when Allison conferred with Sir 
Claude Corea (Ceylonese Ambassador to Washington) on 23 May 1951.342  
The exclusion of both Chinas from the Japanese peace settlement was finally agreed upon 
when Dulles travelled to London in early June 1951 in an attempt to finalize the treaty. On 4 
June 1951, Dulles proposed inviting both Chinas to sign the treaty, since the Congress would not 
allow the exclusion of the ROC. It is likely that Dulles did not mind inviting communist China 
along with the Nationalists, as it was certain that the former would not sign a treaty that was 
intended to combat communism. What Dulles could not afford was to invite the PRC at the 
expense of the ROC. On 5 June 1951, however, Britain opposed Dulles’ proposal, arguing that 
this amounted to recognizing both regimes and thus acknowledging the existence of two separate 
Chinese governments. Also, if the ROC signed the treaty, this would legitimize Chinese 
Nationalist ownership of Taiwan and give the Chiang regime “greater status,” which Britain 
thought was unacceptable. Finally, it contended that, while both Britain and the US were trying 
to get as many countries as possible to sign the peace treaty, inviting the ROC to sign the treaty 
would eliminate “most, if not all, of Asian states and probably others” as well. Instead, Britain 
suggested adding a provision for the FEC powers to decide later through a two-thirds majority 
voting system which of the two Chinas would adhere to the treaty.343  
On 7 June 1951, the State Department, while agreeing to the exclusion of the two Chinas, 
developed a different proposal. Instead of having the FEC decide, Japan should be able to choose 
with which China it wished to conclude a peace treaty.344 The British Cabinet on 8 June 1951 
rejected the US suggestion, arguing that there was no sufficient guarantee that Japan would not 
conclude a bilateral peace treaty with the ROC. Dulles, however, insisted that Japan should be 
given full decision-making power in determining its future relations with China. Dulles added 
that if the British proposal were adopted, then the FEC member states would again be divided. 
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He also expressed his displeasure at Britain seeming to distrust the US. With Dulles unyielding, 
Britain ultimately acquiesced.345  
Dulles’ arguments were rather specious. While he argued that no foreign power should 
impose its will on Japan, he himself was determined to prevent Japan from entering into any 
peace arrangement with the PRC. He would later come back to Tokyo in December 1951 with 
his entourage of two Senators from the Foreign Relations Committee (Smith and Sparkman) to 
obtain a written pledge from Yoshida that Japan would not sign a peace treaty with the PRC.346 
With regards to the FEC, more than half of the members were against the ROC, which meant 
that if a two-thirds majority voting system had been adopted, there was a good chance that Japan 
might have ended up signing a peace treaty with the PRC. It was precisely because of this 
prospect that Dulles took an uncompromising stance and opposed the British proposal. Of course, 
Dulles could also confidently insist on Japan’s free will, because he knew Yoshida was strongly 
opposed to signing a peace treaty with the PRC. 
Swenson-Wright points to the fact that Dulles insisted on Japan’s free will to choose the 
China of its own choice as evidence that he genuinely made an effort to treat Japan as an equal 
and was not as heavy-handed in his approach as hitherto thought.347 While this is true, it should 
be noted that Dulles did not have to be heavy-handed, because Yoshida’s China policy at this 
time dove-tailed with his own. Had Japan ever insisted on establishing formal ties with the PRC, 
it is doubtful that Dulles would have agreed to Japan’s free will to proceed with official dialogue 
with the Chinese communists. In this sense, Dulles’ insistence on Japan’s free will was 
motivated less by respect for Japan’s freedom to choose, and more by his determination to 
prevent the FEC from opening the door to a Japan-PRC peace treaty. 
What is interesting is that while the discussion was still on-going between Dulles and the 
British delegates, Yeh on 7 June 1951 informed Karl Rankin (US Ambassador to Taipei) that he 
wanted to explore the possibility of signing a separate bilateral peace treaty with Japan that 
would be signed “at the same time” as the multilateral one to be signed by the other Allies. 
Although a “less satisfactory alternative” to the multilateral one, he stated that a separate peace 
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treaty was still “much preferable” to accession at a later date.348 Although Dulles did not agree 
with the idea of the simultaneous signing of the two treaties, the ROC’s willingness to negotiate 
a separate peace treaty with Japan must have been a tremendous relief for him. 
On 14 June 1951, a revised joint US-UK draft treaty was developed, and China was 
officially removed from the list of signatories. Dulles remarked that this was necessary in light of 
Allied disagreement and the urgency of concluding a Japanese peace treaty.349 When Dulles 
informed Taipei of the Anglo-American agreement to exclude both Chinas on 18 June 1951, Yeh 
decried the decision as being “discriminatory and unacceptable,” denounced the fact that foreign 
governments were dictating the fate of China, and once again demanded that the ROC be invited 
to sign the multilateral treaty. 350  Chiang Kaishek and local newspapers also criticized the 
exclusion of ROC from the peace treaty as constituting a “vicious betrayal” that could only work 
favorably for the communists.351  
Regardless, the joint US-UK decision to exclude both Chinas was made public on 19 
June 1951.352 The State Department defended its decision to exclude the ROC as being necessary 
due to the lack of agreement among FEC members over which regime, lawfully and practically, 
represented the “whole Chinese nation.” Even when Senator Harry P. Cain (Republican, 
Washington) protested in August 1951 against the exclusion of the ROC, Dulles defended his 
decision as being necessary, explaining that only two of the FEC member states – the Philippines 




To conclude, the ROC was not able to sign the Japanese peace treaty, largely because of its own 
failure, as it had lost the Chinese Civil War, leaving the bulk of Chinese territory and population 
under communist control. This led to the question of who legitimately represented “China.” Also 
important, however, was the international factor. By the time of the Japanese peace treaty 
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negotiations between 1950 and 1951, both the PRC and the ROC demanded to be invited to sign 
the treaty in an effort to enhance their own prestige and legitimacy while undermining that of the 
other. The principal negotiating powers were divided in their response. Whereas the US and the 
Philippines supported the ROC, all the other members of the FEC were against it, with some – 
Britain, India and the Soviet Union – advocating PRC representation. Because of this united 
opposition against the ROC, the US was technically isolated. Thankfully for the US, Japan 
indicated that it would not sign a peace treaty with the PRC but that it was open to negotiating a 
separate bilateral arrangement with the ROC. Equally important was the fact that the ROC was 
also resigned to the idea of negotiating a separate peace treaty with Japan. Meanwhile, a number 
of countries argued that both Chinese regimes had to be excluded for the sake of an early peace 
settlement. Against this backdrop, Britain and the US as co-sponsors of the peace treaty agreed 
to exclude both Chinas. However, the US left the door open for Japan and the ROC to sign a 
separate peace treaty at a later date by insisting that the Japanese be allowed to freely choose 
which China they wanted peace with. 
Perhaps worth noting here is that while scholars have attributed Congressional pressure 
as being the driving force behind Dulles’ sustained opposition to any peace settlement between 
Japan and the PRC, one must remember that Dulles himself was a firm supporter of the ROC.354 
In other words, even without the China Lobby, it is highly likely that Dulles, driven by his own 
anti-communist conviction, would have proactively sought ways to ensure the Chinese 
Nationalist participation in the peace treaty. Certainly, the Senatorial opposition to the exclusion 
of the ROC provided a powerful momentum and bargaining chip for Dulles to ward off any 
suggestions of inviting the PRC and excluding the ROC. But Dulles never needed anybody to tell 
him that the PRC should not be allowed to enter into a formal relationship with Japan at the 
expense of the ROC.  
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Chapter 5. The Question of South Korean Participation 
 
This chapter examines why South Korea was not able to sign the Japanese peace treaty. There 
was a glimmer of hope in Seoul between late 1949 and early 1951 that the US would support the 
southern-based Republic of Korea’s participation in the peace settlement. However, these hopes 
were dashed in June 1951, when Britain and the US agreed to exclude South Korea from the 
treaty. This resulted from a complex interplay between the big power interests – specifically 
Britain, Japan and the US – and South Korea’s own diplomatic blunder. 
South Korea’s exclusion from the Japanese peace settlement is significant in many 
respects. Not only was it one of the most contentious issues at the time of the treaty negotiations, 
but also it was a contributory factor to the postwar animosity between Korea and Japan involving 
the so-called “history issues.” Since South Korea could not sign the peace treaty, it was not 
recognized as a belligerent in the Pacific War, which deprived it of an opportunity to demand 
war reparations. This generated a feeling in Korea that the wrongful past had never been properly 
settled. This is today expressed most prominently in Korea’s efforts to press Japan to compensate 
the “comfort women” victims and those conscripted as labor force. Taking these into account, 
one cannot avoid asking the question: why was South Korea excluded from the list of signatory 
states to the Japanese peace treaty? 
The case of South Korea’s exclusion from the Japanese peace settlement is a topic that 
has been amply dealt with in Korea and Japan but is almost unknown outside. Hence, this 
chapter introduces an important piece of postwar history of Northeast Asian to audiences outside 
of Korea and Japan. Also, it seeks to build on the existing findings. While Tsukamoto Takashi, 
Kim Minsoo, Chŏng Pyŏngchun, Pak Chinhŭi and Kang Seungmo have all examined this 
question, none of these works sufficiently elaborate the effects that the post-WWI peace 
settlement and the post-WWII Italian peace treaty had on the Korean question.355 This chapter 
therefore seeks to fill this gap and suggests that South Korea’s postwar fate was tied up with the 
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wider world, and not simply Northeast Asia’s regional dynamics. Furthermore, while Chŏng and 
Pak argue that South Korea brought forth its own exclusion by making punitive demands, this 
chapter argues that South Korea’s blunder lay elsewhere, namely in raising the possibility of a 
separate bilateral dialogue with Japan. 
 
The Emergence of the South Korean Question and Initial Uncertainty 
 
Here, it is necessary to provide a brief overview of the history of Korea’s annexation and 
independence. Korea was turned into part of the Japanese Empire through a series of agreements, 
recognized by the other Great Powers, in the early twentieth century, beginning with a treaty in 
1905 that relegated Korea into being a protectorate and ending with the annexation treaty of 
1910, in which Korea relinquished its sovereignty to Japan. Thereafter, Korea was ruled by 
Japan, both factually and legally, until August 1945. While there were resistance movements, 
both peaceful and militant, the Korean people unfortunately were not able to regain their 
independence. Although there was a government in exile based in China, it was never accorded 
any recognition by outside powers. Also, while the 1943 Cairo Declaration promised Korea 
independence in “due course” when and how exactly this would be achieved was never specified. 
Furthermore, while the US and the Soviet Union agreed on the need for a trusteeship for Korea at 
the Yalta Conference, no concrete plans were developed. Only when Japan surrendered on 15 
August 1945 was Korea finally liberated. Sadly, the liberation was accompanied by the 
peninsula’s division into two competing blocs, which became formal in 1948 with the founding 
of the Republic of Korea (ROK) in the south and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 
(DPRK) in the north, each under the respective auspices of the US and the Soviet Union. 
Thereafter, the US sought not only to ensure South Korea’s survival, but also to build up its 
legitimacy. It was against this backdrop that Korea’s representation in the Japanese peace treaty 
was discussed. 
The US first contemplated the question of Korean representation in 1947, when it 
proposed a peace conference. At the time, the US and the Soviet Union were working to reunify 
Korea, which was still divided into two temporary occupation zones. 356  When the interim 
legislative assembly of southern Korea demanded that it be invited to negotiate the peace treaty 
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on 29 August 1947, the US feared that, if it accepted this request, the Soviet Union might insist 
on inviting the northern half, which could adversely affect the reunification effort. Hence, the 
State Department argued that Korea should potentially be invited “only in the capacity of an 
observer.”357 Of course, the proposed peace conference never took place and consequently the 
Korean question was shelved. 
The question of Korean participation was revisited by the State Department in 1949, 
when the momentum for negotiations began to revive. On 2 November 1949, the initial State 
Department position was that “Korea should not participate in a peace treaty with Japan.”358 
However, throughout 1949, Rhee – together with Yi Pǒmsǒk (ROK Prime Minister) and Yi 
Siyǒng (ROK Vice President) – expressed strong interest before the Korean press in partaking in 
the peace settlement.359 Accordingly, John J. Muccio (US Ambassador to South Korea) cabled 
Washington on 3 December 1949, recommending that Korea should participate “in consultative 
capacity.” He observed that the Koreans believed that they had been a “belligerent” in that they 
had fought in the anti-Japanese resistance war in China and therefore naturally expected to be 
invited to the peace settlement. Furthermore, if South Korea were “entirely excluded,” its 
prestige would be “seriously impaired,” which would not only disappoint Koreans, but also 
constitute a “backward step” in fostering the country. Muccio also argued that problems between 
Korea and Japan could be better resolved through a multilateral peace treaty than through 
“bilateral [Korean-Japanese] negotiation.”360  
On 12 December 1949, the State Department responded that there were strong arguments 
under international law for not inviting South Korea to sign the treaty. To begin with, Japan’s 
annexation of Korea was “recognized by almost all countries, including the US, and no general 
recognition was given [to] any Korean state or government until 1948.” Secondly, the “Korean 
nationalist organizations outside Korea,” such as the Korean Provisional Government (KPG) 
founded in 1919, “were not given any formal international recognition.” Third, the legal status of 
Korea had “not been established definitely since World War II.”361 In other words, it was unclear 
if Korea was an independent state. Of course, South Korea was a de facto independent country at 
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the time. Not only had the UN recognized it as a government on 12 December 1948, but also 
South Korea had already exchanged ambassadors with China (ROC), the Philippines and the 
US. 362  However, from a legal point of view, the 1910 annexation treaty had neither been 
rescinded nor superseded by another treaty. Hence, it was questionable under international law if 
Korea was no longer Japan’s colony. In turn, whether or not South Korea could be 
acknowledged as a former belligerent of Japan and entitled to sign the peace treaty was unclear. 
Equally important was that there was a prevalent feeling in Korea that Japan should pay 
for the damage done during the colonial period. In March and September 1949, for instance, the 
South Korean National Assembly published a summary of reparations claim that amounted to 
over 2 billion US dollars.363 Hence, there was a fear that South Korea might take a “strong stand” 
on indemnification rights and go against the existing US policy of terminating all reparations 
(see Chapter 2).364  
The State Department was also concerned that agreeing to South Korean participation 
would “draw demands for similar participation” from North Korea. Moreover, if the US declined 
North Korean participation but invited the regime in Seoul, the communist bloc would engage in 
vicious propaganda against South Korea, denouncing it as “pro-Japanese” and placing it in 
“embarrassing positions.” This was not an empty concern, as the Rhee government had recruited 
a lot of former pro-Japanese collaborators, especially the police who had suppressed the anti-
Japanese resistance movement during the colonial era. Even worse was that the police on 6 June 
1949 had launched an armed attack against the members of a special tribunal that had been 
organized by the South Korean legislative body to punish pro-Japanese collaborators. Rhee had 
turned a blind eye to this incident and even defended the police as being vital in combating 
communism. After the attack, the special tribunal was terminated in June 1949.365 In other words, 
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the legitimacy of South Korean government was already stained and it could suffer further 
damage if invited to the peace conference. There was also the danger that South Korea might 
take a deliberately “punitive” stance against Japan in order to counter its collaborationist 
image.366  
Various legal and political factors, therefore, seemed to point against South Korean 
participation. Nevertheless, the State Department acknowledged that “complete rejection of 
Korean participation” would cause resentment against the US. It understood that Korea’s sense 
of entitlement ran deep, because of its suffering throughout the annexation period. Hence, it had 
to grant at least “the appearance, though not necessarily the substance, of a consultative role.” 
Meanwhile, whether or not South Korea would sign the peace treaty would be decided later, 
based on Korea’s “conduct” and “opinion.”367 While the State Department had not yet made a 
final decision, “Korea” was therefore added as one of the potential signatories in the 29 
December 1949 US draft treaty.368  
 
The Transformation of the US Attitude and Reactions from Britain and Japan 
 
With the outbreak of the Korean War, the US abandoned its early ambiguity and expressed 
unequivocal support for South Korea participation in the Japanese peace treaty. In July 1950, the 
State Department remarked that South Korea could augment its prestige by signing the treaty on 
behalf of “Korea.” However, South Korea should only be invited in a “consultative capacity” 
rather than as a “negotiating” member.369 
Meanwhile, Yu Chino – a member of a special ad hoc committee for developing South 
Korea’s policy regarding the Japanese peace settlement – submitted a long analysis to Rhee in 
defense of South Korea’s right to sign the treaty. In this report, dated October 1950, Yu pointed 
out that after WWI, Poland and Czechoslovakia had become independent and had both been 
allowed to sign the peace treaty with Germany and Austria. Yu also stressed that after WWII, 
Albania and Ethiopia had become independent and took part in the peace treaty with Italy; the 
latter signed the treaty while the former was invited to accede at a later date. In other words, 
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Korea’s lack of independence until 1945 should not hinder it from participating in the peace 
treaty.370 Subsequently, on 31 November 1950, Rhee once again requested Washington to invite 
South Korea to participate in both the “negotiation and signing” of the Japanese peace treaty, 
arguing that Korea had been subjected to “Japanese aggression,” had engaged in “anti-Japanese 
belligerency” and made a “significant contribution” to defeating Japan.371  
Rhee also elicited British support. On 11 December 1950, the South Korean Mission in 
London informed the Foreign Office that South Korea was “vitally interested” in the Japanese 
peace settlement. The Foreign Office responded that there were legal difficulties. Korea 
remained “part of the Japanese Empire” until the termination of hostility, and considering that 
the Japanese peace treaty would “bring Korea into existence as an independent state,” inviting 
Korea as a party would be difficult.372 As was the case with the US, Britain’s position was that 
for Korea to be legally independent, the 1910 annexation treaty had to be either rescinded or 
superseded by another treaty. Britain believed that the Japanese peace treaty would fulfill this 
role, and that until then Korea was not legally independent. The Foreign Office also internally 
remarked that there was no precedent for the “association of a state formed out of part of the 
territory of a defeated enemy with the negotiation of a peace treaty between it and the victors.”373 
In short, South Korea could neither negotiate nor sign the treaty. 
As a possible concession, Britain briefly entertained the idea of allowing South Korea to 
accede at a later date. To elaborate, in early January 1951 the Foreign Office noted that Albania 
– which had been conquered and occupied by Italy, and later Germany during WWII, and had no 
exile government recognized by the Allies – nevertheless had been invited to the Italian peace 
conference to express its views and later acceded to the Italian peace treaty. It therefore followed 
that Korea could “express its views” and accede to the Japanese peace treaty later.374 However, 
the idea was quickly shelved, as the Foreign Office’s legal adviser identified an important 
weakness in this argument. A “fiction” had always been maintained that Albania had never lost 
its sovereignty and was automatically treated as an independent country after the war. In contrast, 
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Korea had “unquestionably” been part of Japan and was to become independent through the 
Japanese peace treaty.375 In short, Korea should not take part in the Japanese peace treaty in any 
capacity. 
Around this time, South Korea dispatched a series of curious messages to Washington. 
On 4 January 1951, Chang Myŏn (ROK Ambassador to the US) sent a letter to Acheson 
requesting that South Korea be bestowed the “privilege” of signing the peace treaty. Rhee 
immediately reprimanded Chang on 14 January 1951 for his word choice, which was too 
subservient and “entirely contrary” to Rhee’s attitude. Rhee told Chang to revise the wording and 
demand that South Korea should either sign the peace treaty or convene a “separate peace 
conference with Japan.”376 Chang complied and relayed this message to Dean Rusk (Assistant 
Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs) and Acheson on 17 January and 20 January 1951 
respectively.377 
In doing so, South Korea essentially expressed – not once, but twice – its willingness to 
forgo signing the peace treaty and instead to engage in separate normalization talks with Japan. It 
is unclear why Rhee decided to chart the course this way. It is possible that he thought the 
problems between Korea and Japan were special and thus required a separate dialogue. Indeed, 
as early as 28 November 1950, Rhee confided to the South Korean Ambassador in Washington 
that there were “acute problems” – including the termination of annexation treaty, the legal status 
of Korean residents in Japan, and bilateral commercial relations – that had to be solved “between 
the authorities of the two Governments.” 378  It is also possible that Rhee, who had been 
suspicious of Japan’s potential for aggression in the past and continued to remain so in the post-
treaty era, did not wish to sign a treaty that was premised on Japan’s remilitarization.379 In fact, 
as explained below, he opposed Japanese rearmament in April 1951.  
Whatever the reason, South Korea made a major diplomatic blunder, as the US now had a 
legitimate pretext to exclude South Korea from the peace treaty. Of course, South Korea had not 
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yet given up all hope of signing the peace treaty. Indeed, on 26 January 1951 Chang once again 
brought up the prospect of South Korean participation, to which Dulles responded that the US 
“would continue to support the right of the Republic of Korea to participate in the Japanese 
peace settlement.”380  
Britain, meanwhile, continued to oppose South Korean participation. When Britain was 
informed by the US that the March 1951 draft peace treaty would be delivered to Rhee, the 
Foreign Office internally noted that South Korea should neither be consulted nor invited to sign, 
especially as its fate remained uncertain due to the recent military reversal resulting from the 
PRC’s intervention.381 When the Americans and British met to discuss the Korean question on 
21 March 1951, the former explained that it wished to keep South Korea updated on the treaty 
talks for “political reasons,” while the latter opposed this because of Korea’s “legal position.”382 
When the two delegates convened again on 22 March 1951, Britain opposed treating South 
Korea as one of the parties to the treaty, arguing that from a legal point of view Korea was “part 
of the Japanese Empire” and was thus “never at war with Japan.” In response, the US 
“recognized the legal point,” but stressed that there were “political arguments in favor of the 
Republic of Korea being included.”383 On 27 March 1951, the US informed Britain that the 
question of Korean participation should not be determined purely on “legalistic grounds.”384 
However, Britain remained opposed. On 30 March 1951, the Foreign Office internally 
noted that since the idea of excluding the “two Chinas” from the treaty was being entertained, the 
“two Koreas” should also be excluded from the treaty. In addition, it observed that if South 
Korea were chosen over North Korea to be represented in the treaty, as the US suggested, then 
the PRC and the Soviet Union would protest.385 While Herbert Morrison – who had succeeded 
Bevin as the British Foreign Secretary – on 16 April 1951 expressed his willingness to acquiesce 
to the US position over South Korea, this was his own personal opinion and not that of the 
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Foreign Office.386 For legal and political reasons, Britain remained opposed to South Korean 
participation. 
When Britain and the US conferred again in May 1951, the former continued to insist that 
South Korea should not sign the treaty. To dissuade the US, Britain contended that supporting 
South Korean participation was more of a political liability than an advantage. Britain pointed 
out, against the backdrop of the two Chinas being formally excluded from the treaty, that 
allowing South Korea to sign the treaty could antagonize certain Asian countries, specifically 
neutralist Burma, India and Indonesia, all of whom supported the PRC.387 This was a serious 
issue, as Britain and the US were desperately trying to secure as many Asian participants as 
possible to sign the Japanese peace treaty, lest it become a white men’s pact with Japan.388 In 
response, the US simply repeated its belief that there would be “political advantages” to South 
Korea’s participation.389 
Japan also initially opposed South Korean participation. When Yoshida conferred with 
Dulles on 23 April 1951, the former stated that Korea should not be a signatory for three reasons. 
First, Korea was not in a state of war or belligerency. Second, Korea was not yet an independent 
country. Third, if Korea became a signatory, “one million Koreans residing in Japan, most of 
them Communist, would have the property and compensation rights (derived from the Treaty) of 
Allied nationals.”390 In response, Dulles indicated that the US wished to build up the “prestige” 
of South Korea by inviting it to sign the treaty. However, he shared Yoshida’s concerns and 
assured him that the issues of Korean compensation rights “could and should be taken care 
of.”391 Yoshida responded that Japan would not oppose inviting South Korea to sign the treaty, if 
it were “definitely assured” that Korean residents in Japan would “not” acquire the “status of 
Allied Powers nationals.”392  
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In sum, the US was engaged in a lonely battle to include South Korea as a signatory. No 
other country rallied behind the US in support of South Korean representation in the peace treaty. 
Instead, Britain, the most important partner in the peace negotiations, consistently objected to it. 
Combined with South Korea’s response that did not exactly conform with the US plans, as 
explained below, the State Department finally discarded the idea inviting South Korea to San 
Francisco. 
 
The Exclusion of South Korea 
 
South Korea responded to the March 1951 draft on two occasions: on 10 April and 26 April 1951. 
It demanded that it should be consulted as a negotiating power and be given recognition as an 
Allied power.393 It further stressed that Korea had formally declared independence on 1 March 
1919 and that “from that date on until the liberation of Korea in 1945 engaged in a state of 
belligerency against Japan.”394  
On 9 May 1951, the State Department drafted an analysis of South Korea’s response. The 
US likened South Korea to Poland during and after WWI. This comparison was both fascinating 
and apt, as both countries had been occupied in the past by foreign powers and had both 
liberation and collaborationist elements.395 However, unlike the Polish provisional government 
that had been set up and recognized by the Entente powers during WWI, the Korean exile 
government (KPG) had never been recognized. The fact that the KPG had declared war on Japan 
and had fought against it in China thus had “no significance.”396 In other words, Korea had never 
been accepted as a belligerent and was therefore not fit to sign the peace treaty. Consequently, on 
1 June 1951, the State Department concluded that “in agreement with the British position, Korea 
is not entitled to be a signatory.”397  
Dulles relayed this decision to Yang Yuch’an (Chang’s successor as the ROK 
Ambassador) on 9 July 1951, explaining that South Korea would not be invited to sign the treaty, 
as “only those nations in a state of war with Japan and which were signatories of the UN 
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Declaration of January 1942 would sign the treaty.”398 The South Korean government protested 
vehemently – on 19 July and 16 August 1951 – arguing that Korea had been engaged in a war 
against Japan in China under the KPG’s leadership, and that its exclusion would damage public 
morale.399 Yang also made a scathing press statement on 28 July 1951, expressing “fury” at the 
“unsound” decision to exclude South Korea.400 Unfortunately for Korea, the US decision was 
final and South Korea was not accorded the status of a signatory. Subsequently, at the San 
Francisco Peace Conference (5 September 1951), Dulles announced that South Korea would not 
sign the treaty because “Korea was never at war with Japan,” as it had “tragically lost its 
independence long before” the Pacific War and did not regain independence until after Japan had 
surrendered. While many individual Koreans were engaged in anti-Japanese resistance wars, 
they were private individuals and “not recognized governments.”401  
Why did the US change its mind and decide to exclude South Korea? As pointed out by 
Pak Chinhǔi, one big reason was that Britain and Japan, two of the most important parties to the 
peace treaty, expressed opposition and the US could not ignore this.402 But, simply blaming the 
Americans, British and Japanese is an over-simplified narrative. As a number of Korean scholars 
argue, Korea also shared the blame, as it committed a major diplomatic blunder. 
So what exactly was the mistake that South Korea made? Yu Chino and Pak Chinhǔi 
argue that Korea did not pay enough attention to the peace treaty talks and sent its response to 
the US too late.403 However, as Chǒng Pyǒngchun points out, Korea’s response (sent in April 
1951) was not late compared to those of the other governments.404 Indeed, most of the FEC 
member states, the “principal parties” to the Japanese peace settlement, sent their responses 
between mid-April and mid-May 1951. For instance, Britain responded with its own draft peace 
treaty on 7 April.405 Based on peripheral evidence, the Netherlands seems to have responded on 
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17 April 1951.406 In the case of the ROC, its responses came on 24 April and 23 May 1951.407 
The French and Soviet responses did not arrive until 4 May and 7 May, respectively, while the 
Philippines sent its response on 31 May, more than a month after South Korea.408 Australia/New 
Zealand and Ceylon respectively sent their responses on 25 May and 28 May.409 In other words, 
South Korea’s response came in time; tardiness was not its diplomatic blunder.  
Meanwhile, Chang Pakjin and Chǒng Pyǒngchun argue that South Korea was excluded 
because its response largely contradicted what Dulles wanted to accomplish.410 Indeed, South 
Korea did make demands that were difficult for the State Department to accommodate. For 
instance, South Korea expressed reservations about Japan’s rearmament, which was counter to 
the US objectives. It also made the “punitive” demand that Japan “return” Tsushima, claiming 
this as Korean territory that had been stolen.411 The State Department, in response, remarked that 
Japan had been exercising “complete” control of Tsushima for “at least 350 years” and therefore 
this claim did “not appear to be well-founded.”412 
South Korea also requested the maintenance of the “MacArthur Line,” in order to protect 
its fishing interests.413 This was a temporary maritime border that had been established by the 
SCAP during the early occupation era in order to restrict Japan’s maritime activities. According 
to this directive, Japan was prohibited from fishing or navigating in those parts of the high seas 
that Korea considered to be its own. However, in an effort to rebuild Japan’s economy, the US 
was against continuing this restriction. Furthermore, Dulles believed that trying to permanently 
regulate the Japanese high-sea fishing industry through the peace treaty would delay the 
settlement and hence wished to divorce the question of fisheries from the treaty (see Chapter 
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9).414 In addition, South Korea asked that all property belonging to its nationals that had been 
either confiscated or damaged by Japan should be restored. As explained above, Yoshida and 
Dulles agreed that this should be prevented; the US thus rejected this request.415 
However, many other governments also presented demands that conflicted with the US 
interests. As a matter of fact, when compared to the attitudes of Australia, Britain, Burma, 
Canada, Indonesia, New Zealand, the Philippines, the Soviet Union and Vietnam – which all 
demanded some form of restrictive clause in the treaty to suppress Japan economically and 
militarily – South Korea’s demand cannot be singled out as being particularly contrary to US 
intentions. It is also telling that in stark contrast to Burma, the Philippines and Vietnam, South 
Korea indicated that it would make “no claim for reparations.”416 It is doubtful, therefore, if 
South Korea’s demands could be considered a major diplomatic blunder. 
Instead, South Korea made a critical mistake in January 1951 by expressing its 
willingness to forgo signing the peace treaty and instead engage in bilateral talks with Japan. 
This gave the US, when pressed for time, a convenient pretext to exclude South Korean. As 
explained in Chapter 3, the outbreak of the Korean War gave added urgency to the need to end 
the occupation of Japan. Against this backdrop, inviting South Korea to sign the treaty was not 
the best idea. While the US believed that there were political advantages to treating it as a 
signatory, there were also significant legal and political obstacles. Most notably, Britain was 
adamantly opposed to South Korean participation. Meanwhile the latter, by raising the idea of 
bilateral normalization talks with Japan, created the impression that it did not see its participation 
as something absolutely essential. Furthermore, South Korea made demands that did not cater to 
the lenient peace envisioned by the US. Given these developments, the US felt it more politically 




In conclusion, South Korea was excluded from the Japanese peace treaty due to legal, political, 
international and domestic factors. Legally, it was unclear if Korea could be considered a 
belligerent, since it had been an internationally recognized colony of Japan in the past. Even after 
the war, Korea’s status remained unclear as the annexation treaty had never been rescinded. 
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Politically, South Korean participation could strengthen its leverage to demand reparations from 
Japan, which could damage the US plans to rebuild Japan’s economy. At the same time, it might 
provoke a hostile reaction from the communist bloc and drive potential Asian signatories away. 
Internationally, both Britain and Japan expressed strong reservations about South Korean 
participation. The chances of South Korean signing the treaty were therefore extremely dim. Its 
only hope was if the US believed that South Korea’s prestige could be strengthened by inviting it 
to sign the peace treaty. Unfortunately, South Korea voluntarily closed this precious window of 
opportunity by raising the possibility of its engaging in separate bilateral normalization talks 
with Japan. When pushed for time, the US thought it politically expedient to exclude South 
Korea 
 




Chapter 6. The Question of the Associated States of Indochina 
 
This chapter seeks to understand how the Associated States of Indochina – specifically, 
Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam – were able to sign the Japanese peace treaty. Reminiscent of 
Korea’s case, whether or not the three Indochinese states were entitled to sign the treaty was 
disputed, due to legal and political factors. Despite these odds, however, they were all invited as 
signatories. This owed to the fact that the Indochinese representation in the peace treaty served 
the respective interests of France, Indochina and the US.  
The Indochinese aspect has been almost totally neglected in the existing historiography. 
This is puzzling considering the fact that it was one of the major points of contention at the time 
of the treaty negotiations. While Hosoya, Hara and Van Aduard acknowledge the existence of 
the issue, none of them provide a detailed analysis of why the question of Indochinese 
representation emerged in the first place or how it was resolved. 417  Also, while Miyashita 
examines how France’s concerns about its security and the need to restore its prestige as a world 
power affected its attitude towards the peace settlement, the specific question of Indochinese 
participation is missing in his analysis.418 This chapter fills this gap by attempting to construct a 
full narrative detailing how Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam were able to sign the peace treaty. 
The Indochinese representation question is peculiar in that it involved certain factors that 
were not directly related to Japan. Indeed, as will be elaborated below, it was affected by 
developments in Southeast Asia and to a lesser extent Europe. The question of Indochinese 
representation is therefore significant in that it shows that the Japanese peace treaty was not 
simply about Japan, but also concerned the wider world, thus showing once again the 
international character of the treaty. It should also be noted that the Indochinese case 
demonstrates how the treaty could never be a purely legal document and was heavily affected by 
political factors, especially the question of what was most expedient for containing communism. 
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The Historical Context: the French Colonial Interests, Indochinese Yearning for 
Independence and US Response 
 
Before discussing the question of Indochinese representation in the Japanese peace treaty, it is 
important to examine the region’s history, as certain developments from the past – especially 
during the Pacific War and the years immediately after the war – affected Indochina’s fate in the 
treaty. French Indochina can be understood as the area consisting of today’s Cambodia, Laos and 
Vietnam. Beginning with Catholic missionary activities in the seventeenth century, France began 
to slowly assert its authority and was able to secure effective control over the entire region by the 
end of the nineteenth century.419  
In the age of imperialism, control of an overseas colony bolstered France’s reputation as 
a major world power. But more importantly, Indochina had economic and geostrategic value for 
its raw material (such as rice, rubber and tin), natural waterways (Mekong River) and harbors 
(Haiphong and Cam Rahn).420 Not surprisingly, France developed considerable attachment to its 
treasured colony. However, the French colonial regime was known for its ruthlessness. This was 
most pronounced in Laos, which was grossly under-developed – no major schools, roads or 
hospitals were built there – but nevertheless subject to heavy taxes and demands for labor. Hence, 
perhaps with the exception of the ruling elites, who benefited from the educational and career 
opportunities offered by the French, a large segment of Indochina wanted their colonial overlords 
to leave.421 The French position became more precarious when Japan appeared at its doorsteps 
during the months leading up to the Pacific War. 
Amid the aggression against China in the 1930s, Japan turned its gaze to Indochina, one 
of the supply routes that fed the Chinese forces. Eager to block this logistical flow from 
Indochina to the Chinese, Japan from the late 1930s gradually began to assert its authority over 
the region.422 In response, the French Governor-General in Indochina from July 1940 to April 
1945, Jean Decoux, made numerous concessions to Japan, allowing Japan to station its forces 
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and move freely throughout Indochina, while also allowing access to seaports and air bases. 
Decoux also supplied Japan with various raw materials that were crucial for war. Decoux, as the 
representative of Vichy France, also suppressed Free France elements in Indochina that resisted 
the Axis Powers. Decoux thus aided the Japanese in turning French Indochina into a forward 
base for aggressive war against the Allies, including Britain, China and the United States.423 
Of course, Franco-Japanese relations in Indochina were hardly friendly, as the French 
were often bullied by Japan into submitting to various demands. For instance, when Decoux 
refused in September 1940 to comply with Japan’s demands to cut off the supply route from 
Vietnam to China, the Japanese attacked the French in Langson. Also, when the fortunes of war 
turned against the Axis powers in 1944 and de Gaulle’s Free France recovered Paris, Japan 
became concerned that the French would turn against them in Indochina and decided to take 
direct control over the region. Japan’s concerns were amplified by the fact that Free France had 
already declared war on Japan on 8 December 1941 and that French commandos were operating 
in Laos. Additionally, there were secret overtures between the French officials in Indochina and 
De Gaulle. Accordingly, on 9 March 1945, Japanese forces attacked and subjugated the French 
colonial forces, assuming direct control over Indochina and entering into a de facto state of 
belligerency against France. 424  Nevertheless, the fact that Decoux had earlier opted for 
concessions, rather than outright resistance, stained the French colonial regime with a pro-
Japanese collaborationist past. 
The situation in Indochina became even more complex in 1945. As Japan sought to 
secure its control over Indochina, it wooed various segments of the population, especially the 
nationalist elements, to cajole them away from France. Most importantly, Japan persuaded the 
ruling elites to denounce the French and collaborate with Tokyo. On 11 March 1945, Emperor 
Bao Dai proclaimed Vietnam’s independence from France and stressed that he would work 
closely with Japan. This was followed by similar moves on the part of King Norodom Sihanouk 
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of Cambodia on 13 March 1945 and King Sisavang Vong of Laos on 8 April 1945.425 In effect, 
the top leadership in Indochina discredited itself by associating with Japan in return for pseudo-
independence. While collaboration with Japan was simply a means to achieve real independence 
for certain leaders – including Tran Trong Kim (future Prime Minister of Vietnam), Son Ngoc 
Thanh (future Prime Minister of Cambodia) and Prince Phetsarath Ratanavongsa (Prime Minister 
of Laos) – their affiliation with Japan, however nominal, damaged their reputation in public 
eyes.426  
Unlike the ruling class, the radical elements in Indochina engaged in outright resistance 
against foreign domination and began to win wide support. This was especially pronounced in 
Vietnam; the revolutionary elements had already attempted an unsuccessful armed uprising in 
southern Vietnam (Cochin China) against France and Japan in late 1940. The Vietnamese 
resistance survived the war and continued to earn the public’s respect and trust. The ruling class, 
meanwhile, was further discredited as some supported Japanese suppression of the resistance, 
which threatened the power of the established elites.427 
Another important aspect of Japan’s occupation was the near-complete devastation of the 
Indochinese economy. Most notably, there was a serious food shortage by the end of the conflict, 
partly caused by a combination of Japan’s extraction of resources and the consequent crop 
failures in 1944. Indochina also experienced serious inflation, as Japan circulated a special 
currency which technically had no value. Moreover, northern Vietnam, where the mining 
industry and plantation agriculture were concentrated, was particularly hard hit by aerial 
bombing. The widespread hunger and economic dislocation unsurprisingly led to intense 
resentment against Japan. This would later be cited by the Indochinese as one of the justifications 
for representation in the Japanese peace treaty.428  
In sum, by the time the world emerged from WWII, French prestige was damaged and its 
wartime standing ambiguous as Vichy France had opted for a modus vivendi rather than armed 
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resistance against Japan. The ruling elites of Indochina were also tainted with collaboration by 
flirting with Japan in an attempt to seek independence. These factors would later lead to the 
question of whether or not Indochina could be considered a belligerent that fought against Japan 
and raised doubts about the wisdom of inviting the Indochinese states to sign the peace treaty. 
Nevertheless, Japan’s cruel occupation that left the local economy in tatters fueled an 
impassioned demand among the Indochinese that their voices be heard. 
After the Pacific War, Indochina was unfortunately mired in yet another conflict. To 
elaborate, France worked frantically to regain control over the region. This was no easy task, as 
France confronted strong nationalist sentiments throughout Indochina. Most notably, militant 
nationalists led by the Viet Minh in Vietnam, Khmer Issarak in Cambodia and Lao Issara forces 
(later reorganized as the Pathet Lao on 13 August 1950) in Laos continued their respective 
struggles to expel the French.429  
The Viet Minh, a united front coalition within which the communists were the most 
powerful element, was the strongest of all the nationalist groups. Its unwavering commitment to 
independence made the Viet Minh intolerant of any compromise. Hence, while the French 
engaged in dialogue with its leader Ho Chi Minh between 1945 and 1946 in search of a modus 
vivendi, the Viet Minh’s opposition to continuing French rule led to escalating violence near 
Hanoi and eventually ignited the First Indochinese War. Furthermore, the Viet Minh forged ties 
with the Cambodian and Laotian revolutionaries and aligned themselves closely with the Soviet 
Union and later the PRC in their struggle for independence. To the dismay of the French, not 
only did the PRC and the Soviet Union recognize (in January 1950) the Democratic Republic of 
Vietnam (DRV), the state established by the Viet Minh, but also promised the DRV military and 
economic assistance. True to this commitment, by September 1950, the PRC was training and 
equipping the Viet Minh armed forces, further strengthening the latter’s war capacity.430  
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In response, France reached out for American support. In doing so, Paris devised a two-
pronged strategy. To begin with, France portrayed itself as defending Indochina against 
communism. Aware that colonial rule was an anathema to the Americans – indeed, stretching 
back to Franklin D. Roosevelt, the US had been pressuring France to relinquish control over 
Indochina – France had to frame its interests in Indochina in a way that did not conflict with 
America’s anti-colonial mentality.431 Paris shrewdly capitalized on the growing US hostility to 
communist expansion by amplifying the menace posed by the revolutionary elements in 
Indochina and thus the need for a French presence as a stabilizing force in the region.432  
Its second action was to grant pseudo-independence to Indochina. For the French 
government, its standing as a global power depended on its colonial possessions. Hence, the 
complete termination of its control over Indochina was unacceptable.433 In lieu of full liquidation 
of its colonial authority, Paris decided to admit Indochina into the “French Union.” While similar 
to the British Commonwealth system in appearance, the French Union did not recognize 
overseas territories as being independent. Instead, the real power was vested in Paris, as the 
French president was empowered to make major policy decisions for the French Union, ranging 
from foreign policy, defense and finance.434 In fact, when Vietnam was formally admitted to the 
French Union on 8 March 1949 by signing the Elysee Accord with Paris, Vincent Auriol (French 
President) stressed that Vietnam’s foreign policy would be decided “under the direction and 
responsibility of the government of French Republic.” Laos and Cambodia were also admitted to 
the French Union on 19 July and 8 November 1949 respectively on the same terms with 
Vietnam.435 Real independence was not achieved until the 1954 Geneva Accord. Until then, the 
sovereignty of the Indochinese states remained questionable. 
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If France hoped to win immediate American sympathy and support, it was disappointed, 
as the initial US reaction to these French overtures was reserved. In response to the Elysee 
Accord, for instance, the State Department internally noted on 6 June 1949 that this was only a 
half-hearted attempt to appease Vietnamese nationalist sentiment and that the locals would 
“continue to fight” to gain complete independence, which in turn would require “military force at 
great cost.”436 Of course, this did not mean outright rejection of the French pleas. 437 While 
sympathetic to the nationalist sentiments in Indochina, the US, as early as 17 December 1946, 
had also recognized that the French presence was vital to ensure stability.438 Hence, the US 
decided to remain non-committal, hoping to avoid choosing sides between the “French 
imperialism” and Indochinese “militant nationalism.”439 
Fortunately for the French, a series of events in 1949 and 1950 led the US to become 
more supportive. To begin with, the Chinese Communist success in driving out the Nationalists 
in 1949 created a heightened sense of fear that the CCP might support subversion in Southeast 
Asia. In response, and to counter the Soviet and PRC recognition of the DRV, the US recognized 
the three non-communist Associated States of Indochina on 7 February 1950 and lobbied other 
governments to do likewise.440 Moreover, as suggested by the State Department and the JCS, 
Truman on 10 March 1950 approved $15 million in military aid for Indochina to curb 
communism, marking the start of US aid to the region. 441 On 24 April 1950, Truman also 
approved NSC 64, stressing the need to take “all practicable measures” to prevent further 
communist expansion in Indochina, which essentially meant assisting the French armed forces 
there.442 With the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, combined with a major Viet Minh 
victory at Cao Bang in October 1950 that brought a large area of Tonkin under its control, the 
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US became further alarmed about the prospect of the communization of Southeast Asia.443 In 
response to this sense of crisis, a Mutual Defense Assistance agreement was signed with the 
three Indochinese states on 23 December 1950.444 
For the US, the defense of Indochina – and thus assisting the French – was important for 
several reasons. To begin with, the stabilization of the region and secure access to its raw 
materials was seen as key to European and Japanese economic recovery.445 Additionally, loss of 
Indochina could lead to the loss of Southeast Asia as a whole to communism; and with the 
Congress constantly battering the administration for sacrificing China, Truman could not afford 
to risk a further setback.446 
Moreover, the US became more accommodating to the French because of European 
defense questions.447 Already in 1948 and 1949, when the negotiations for the NATO were 
taking place, the US was keenly aware of the need to include France in the nascent 
organization.448 The need for French support became even more acute with the adoption of NSC 
82 (11 September 1950), wherein the US envisioned the creation of a European defense force in 
order to facilitate eventual West German rearmament.449 It goes without saying that the US 
expected France to become an integral part of this scheme. The problem was that France was not 
amenable to the idea of reviving German military and could sabotage the whole effort. 
Additionally, the French armed forces and finances were stretched thin, partly because of its 
embroilment in the war in Vietnam, which meant that France might not be able to contribute to 
the defense of Europe. This essentially left the US with two options. The first was to replace 
France in Indochina and take over direct responsibility there, thereby allowing French financial 
and human resources to be rechanneled to Europe. However, this was not a preferred option, as 
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the US was also stretched thin at this time, especially with the on-going Korean War. The 
alternative was to aid the French war effort against the revolutionaries in Indochina. The French, 
of course, capitalized on this dilemma and continually pressed the US for assistance, lest it have 
no other choice than to leave Indochina and expose the region to possible communist 
infiltration. 450  Unsurprisingly, the US opted to assist the French in Indochina. Inviting the 
Indochinese states to sign the Japanese peace treaty must be understood as part of this policy. In 
other words, the Indochinese participation became intricately linked to the anti-communist 
struggle in Southeast Asia and Europe. 
 
The Emergence of the Indochinese Question 
 
When the pace of negotiations for the Japanese peace treaty began to pick up in 1949, the 
question of Indochinese representation was examined by the State Department. In an undated 
document, the State Department noted that the US wished to foster Indochina and was inclined to 
invite Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam as signatories. At the time, however, Indochina’s 
relationship with France, its ability to enter into international agreements and the French 
government’s position remained unclear. 451  In other words, were the Indochinese states 
empowered to sign a multilateral international instrument, considering their quasi-independence? 
This concern was repeated in a letter from Robert Fearey to John Allison on 23 February 
1950.452 
Despite the ambiguity, the State Department’s Office of Legal Adviser was optimistic. It 
opined on 5 January 1950 that while Vietnam’s sovereignty was “limited,” it nevertheless could 
be considered a “state.” More importantly, referring to Morocco, the Legal Adviser pointed out 
that while its foreign relations were determined by France, this did not prevent other countries, 
such as the US, from entering into treaty relations.453 This Moroccan precedent indicated that the 
diplomatic capacity of the French Union members could be handled flexibly and portended the 
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fact that the question of Indochinese representation in the Japanese peace treaty would ultimately 
require a political decision. 
Interesting to note is that, according to the available American records, it was not until 4 
May 1951 that France demanded that the Indochinese states be invited to sign the peace treaty 
with Japan.”454 It is unclear why France did not bring up the question any earlier. It is possible 
that France felt that inviting the Indochinese states to adhere to the treaty would strengthen their 
case for independence and thus initially wished to avoid this, but that when the tide of war turned 
against France in late 1950, it felt the need to explore more options in order to strengthen the 
non-communist regimes. What exactly Paris was thinking requires examining the Quai d’Orsay 
archives, which is beyond the scope of this study. Whatever the case was, the US gave no 
immediate response. Meanwhile, Britain, perhaps for reasons similar to those pertaining to Korea, 
entertained the idea of accession at a later date.455  
The question of Indochinese representation was brought up again by France on 11 June 
1951, when Dulles was visiting Paris trying to wrap up the treaty negotiations. When Alexandre 
Parodi (Secretary General of the French Foreign Ministry) requested that the Associated States 
of Indochina (AS) be invited to sign the peace treaty, Dulles responded that the US would not 
oppose it. However, the latter also expressed the concern that other potential signatories – 
specifically India, Burma and Indonesia – might refuse to sign the treaty if the AS were invited. 
In light of the fact that Vietnam was divided between the Viet Minh and the pro-French regime, 
each being recognized respectively by the communist and non-communist bloc, Dulles argued 
that if the pro-French regimes were invited, while the Viet Minh were not, this partiality could 
cause ill feelings among certain Asian governments. Dulles, hence, proposed that in the worst-
case scenario, the AS may need to sign a separate peace treaty with Japan, just as Britain and the 
US had recently agreed to do in the case of China. Perhaps in order to win American goodwill by 
pressing the decolonization switch, Parodi stressed that signing the treaty would be very 
important for the AS to secure their “independent sovereign status.”456  
On the same day (11 June 1951), Donald R. Heath, the head of the US Mission in Saigon, 
wrote a long analysis to Acheson. Heath had four concerns. To begin with, the status of the AS 
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was unclear. While France claimed that the AS through their past colonial links with France were 
in a state of war with Japan and thus deserved to sign the treaty, Heath questioned the validity of 
this argument. Heath believed that the AS – which were created “after termination of hostilities” 
– and wartime French Indochina were different entities. Hence, from a legal point of view, the 
AS had “never been at war with Japan” and therefore their entitlement to sign the peace treaty 
with Japan was questionable. At the same time, considering the questionable independence of 
Indochina, there was also the technical problem of whether the AS could represent themselves in 
a treaty or not and if France had to sign on their behalf.457  
The second problem was the Vichy regime’s controversial past. While acknowledging the 
fact that Japan had eventually seized power from the Vichy colonial administration in Indochina 
in March 1945, Heath noted the fact that Decoux had until then avoided open confrontation and 
made several concessions. Also, while Free France had declared war on Japan, Vichy France had 
not. As such, Japan had “never considered itself at war with France.” From a legal standpoint, 
this led to the question of whether or not “France” really had been in a state of war against Japan; 
if not, this naturally meant that Indochina had not been a belligerent and hence had no reason to 
sign the peace treaty.458 
Heath’s third concern was the controversial conduct of the Indochinese leadership during 
the Pacific War. Specifically alluding to the case of Vietnam, where various segments of the 
population had collaborated with Japan, Heath pointed out that this very act of collaboration, 
even if done under duress, damaged the credibility of Indochina’s state of belligerency against 
Japan. Moreover, echoing Dulles’ concern, Heath worried that inviting the AS could provoke an 
adverse reaction from both the communists and other Asian states.459  
His fourth concern was related to the reparations issue. If the AS signed the Japanese 
peace treaty, then they would be entitled to demand reparations from Japan. Heath found this 
prospect “unacceptable,” as the Indochinese, due to their past grievances, were certain to make 
such demands. Heath believed that this would hamper Japan’s economic rehabilitation leading to 
the latter’s continuing reliance on American financial assistance, which in turn would impair the 
 





US capacity to aid Southeast Asia.460 It should also be recalled that the US had already decided 
to terminate the reparations program on 6 May 1949. 
In sum, whether or not Indochina should be invited to sign the Japanese peace treaty was 
no simple matter, as there were various legal and political complications. Nevertheless, Heath 
recognized that the US could not simply decline the French request, as this might damage the 
latter’s reputation and authority in Southeast Asia. Heath thus ended his telegram with the simple 
question: should Indochina be invited to sign the Japanese peace treaty despite the numerous 
complications?461  
 
Unfolding of Debate, Opposition from Asian Governments and Initial Hesitation 
 
In response to the Indochinese question, the State Department investigated the attitudes of other 
governments throughout July 1951. In general, the Asian governments were either indifferent or 
hostile to the prospect of co-signing the peace treaty with the AS. While Burma, Ceylon and the 
Philippines expressed no particular opinion, Indonesia thought it would be a “serious mistake” 
that could “alienate other Asian states” and was therefore “very strongly opposed” to the AS 
participation. Furthermore, the Indonesian Foreign Ministry believed that supporting the AS 
participation could give a pretext for its domestic opposition party to attack the government, 
which might jeopardize Indonesia’s support for the US-led treaty. India was even blunter, 
declaring that it would refuse to sign the treaty if the AS were invited as co-signers, as the latter 
were not sovereign countries. Pakistan, although “well-disposed” towards the Indochinese, did 
not recognize the AS and explained that it would be “embarrassed” by their presence at the peace 
conference. Moreover, Pakistan wanted the Soviet Union and the PRC to sign the treaty, but felt 
that Indochinese participation might make this difficult. Hence, Pakistan “strongly” 
recommended against Indochinese participation. Meanwhile, no overt opposition came from the 
West. Against this backdrop, the State Department decided that although inviting the 
Indochinese would allow the US to “maximize number of oriental signatories,” if India, 






a separate peace arrangement should be worked out between Japan and the AS. Britain, the co-
sponsor of the Japanese peace treaty, endorsed this approach.462  
The State Department’s attitude was shaped largely by its hope of securing as many 
Asian signatories as possible. This discussion was, after all, taking place following the decision 
to exclude the two Chinas and two Koreas from signing the treaty, which meant that the peace 
conference could well develop into a gathering between Japan and the West, and the US wished 
to avoid this scenario. It was especially important to secure Indian and Filipino participation, as 
their refusal to sign the peace treaty could also lead Indonesia and Burma to refuse as well.463  
Around this time, Cambodia and Vietnam began to lobby for a place at the Japanese 
peace treaty. On 23 July and 24 July 1951 (and again on 3 August and 16 August 1951) 
Cambodia protested the exclusion of the AS from signing the treaty. Cambodia argued that it had 
inherited the status of a belligerent through its former links to France – and that it had suffered 
war damage from the Japanese occupation – just as Burma and Indonesia were accorded 
recognition through their ties with Britain and the Netherlands. Cambodia also complained that 
Ceylon and India, which had not even been occupied by Japan, were still being invited to sign 
the treaty. Cambodia also stressed that it was now an independent country that had the ability to 
enter into international agreements and highlighted that it was engaged in the anti-communist 
struggle in Southeast Asia.464  
Aware of the Indian opposition to the AS participation, Cambodia also proposed a non-
recognition formula on 23 July 1951. In other words, even if the AS signed the Japanese peace 
treaty, this would not mean that the other co-signatories were obligated to recognize the AS. This 
meant that India, Indonesia and the Philippines could simply sign the treaty along with the AS, 
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while continuing to refuse recognizing the latter. In response, the State Department expressed its 
sympathy towards Cambodia’s demands and the non-recognition proposal. This Cambodian 
proposal would ultimately be adopted as one of the terms governing the San Francisco peace 
conference.465 
Coincidentally, Henri Bonnet (the French Ambassador to the US) visited the State 
Department that day. Bonnet expressed concern that if the AS were excluded from signing the 
Japanese peace treaty, this may be detrimental both to their morale and that of the French troops 
fighting the communists in the region.466 He was especially concerned that with the armistice 
talks in Korea now underway and some relaxation of tension there, the Chinese communists 
might re-direct their forces to Southeast Asia. Bonnet even claimed that if the AS were excluded 
from signing the treaty, then Foreign Minister Robert Schumann would not attend the San 
Francisco peace conference. Considering the fact that foreign ministers were expected to 
represent their countries at this conference, this was a very strong message. Aware of the 
unfavorable responses from the Asian governments, however, the US remained cautious and no 
decision was reached.467  
Meanwhile, both the French and Indochinese press raised awareness of the fact that 
France was lobbying to invite the AS to sign the peace treaty.468 Certain Vietnamese newspapers 
portrayed participation in the treaty as a manifestation of national sovereignty and expressed 
displeasure that the US was being oversensitive to India and hesitant to invite Vietnam. In light 
of these developments, Heath informed Washington on 24 July that the AS would be 
disappointed if they were not included as signatories. While aware of the strong Indian 
opposition, Heath felt that the State Department should nevertheless try “strongly” to persuade it 
to support AS participation.469 
On 26 July 1951, the Vietnamese president Tran Van Huu contacted the American 
Legation in Saigon, demanding his country’s representation in the peace treaty and expressing 
his displeasure that fellow Asians were opposing it. In response, Heath confided to Washington 
that, despite his reservations concerning the collaborationist past of the Vietnamese leadership 
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and Vichy France, he nevertheless believed that AS participation was “desirable” and that their 
exclusion would be “seriously disappointing” to the locals. Heath, therefore, suggested inviting 
the AS to sign the treaty and inform the other co-signatories that they could still deny recognition. 
Otherwise, an accession clause should be arranged to enable the AS to become parties to the 
treaty at a later date.470  
Meanwhile, David Bruce (US Ambassador to France) offered his own analysis on 26 July 
1951. In response to the Indian opposition, Bruce suggested that Britain should take the lead in 
convincing the Asian Commonwealth – India and Burma – to support AS participation. In the 
worst-case scenario, however, Bruce felt that the US might have to exclude the AS, in which 
case the US could work with Britain and France to negotiate a separate peace treaty between AS 
and Japan at a later date.471  
In sum, when the question of AS representation was first brought to the fore in July 1951, 
India, Indonesia and Pakistan expressed strong reservations. Because the US was trying to ensure 
their participation, it remained hesitant to formally invite the AS to the peace conference. As late 
as 27 July 1951, a little over a month before the peace conference, when Jean de Lattre de 
Tassigny (the French High Commissioner in Indochina) visited Heath to request that the AS be 
invited to the San Francisco peace conference, the State Department still could not offer a clear 
response.472 This would soon change with the hard lobbying of the US Legation in Saigon and 
confirmation of Ceylonese, Indonesian, Pakistani and Filipino participation in the peace 
conference. 
 
Towards Invitation: the American Legation in Saigon, Indochinese Demands and 
Maximizing of Asian Representation 
 
As the US continued to hesitate, Vietnam sustained its lobbying to secure its representation in the 
Japanese peace treaty. For instance, on 29 July 1951, the Vietnamese government asked Thomas 
Dewey (Governor of New York), who was visiting Vietnam at the time, to support its 
representation, in the hope that he would exert some pressure on the US government.473 Also, on 
31 July 1951, Huu visited Heath to once again demand an invitation to sign the treaty. Huu 
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asserted that Vietnam had “every right” to be a signatory, arguing that it had contributed to the 
Allied victory at a tremendous cost during the Pacific War. With regards to collaboration, Huu 
claimed that Vietnam had had to “yield” to Japanese occupation due to the inefficiency of the 
French forces; even so, Vietnam had still engaged in “reduced resistance” and contributed to 
Allied victory. Vietnam also felt that it was unfair to make an issue out its collaborationist past, 
as such elements had been present in Burma, India, Indonesia and the Philippines, who were 
nevertheless being recognized as belligerents. Unfortunately for Vietnam, all that Heath could 
offer in response was sympathy.474  
Amid this on-going debate, Health cabled Dulles on 10 August 1951, arguing that since 
other governments that had recently become independent, such as India, were being invited as 
full signatories, not granting the same treatment to the AS would be discriminatory and damage 
the American and British effort to build up the international legitimacy of AS. Heath also added 
that the AS might possibly seek out other non-participants, such as China and Korea, to jointly 
lobby for a place in the Japanese peace treaty. He therefore suggested that the State Department 
should invite the AS to sign the treaty and convince the other Asian countries to co-sign based on 
Cambodia’s non-recognition formula. Failing this, a separate peace arrangement should be made 
between Japan and the AS.475  
Meanwhile, there were some encouraging signs. On 4 August 1951, Ceylon expressed its 
willingness to sign the treaty.476 Pakistan on 8 August 1951 reversed its position and informed 
France that it favored the AS participation.477 Indonesia, although unfavorable to AS, also did 
not refuse to attend the peace conference – and there were indications that it might sign the treaty 
– even if the AS were invited as co-signers.478 In short, even if India and the Philippines refused 
to sign, there was a good chance that the US would end up with a reasonable number of Asian 
participants. Perhaps buoyed by these developments, the State Department on 8 August 1951 
informed Britain that the US intended to invite the AS to sign the Japanese peace treaty, as long 
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as London had “no serious objection.”479 The fact that the French Foreign Ministry (also on 8 
August 1951) informed the US that France could not sign the treaty on behalf of Indochina 
would have further convinced the State Department of the wisdom of inviting the AS.480 
On 12 August 1951, Laos also officially demanded invitation to sign the treaty. Laos 
echoed Cambodia and Vietnam in arguing that it had “inherited” the status of a belligerent from 
France and that it had suffered tremendously from the Japanese occupation. At the same time, 
Laos stressed that it was an independent country recognized by the US and its participation was 
supported by France. Laos also emphasized that its participation in the peace treaty would 
facilitate “mutually beneficial economic cooperation between Laos and Japan.”481 
Against this backdrop, on 13 August 1951, Heath sent another note to Dulles with the 
following thoughts on India and the Philippines. To begin with, now that Ceylon, Indonesia and 
Pakistan had expressed their willingness to participate in the peace conference, Heath suggested 
proceeding with the peace conference without India if it continued to oppose. After all, why 
should the US favor India, which was friendly towards the PRC – a communist and an 
“aggressor” in the Korean War – over the Indochinese states that were fighting against 
communism?482 In his telegram to Washington on 15 August and 16 August 1951, Heath also 
argued that failure to invite the AS would only aid the communists in Southeast Asia.483 
France and Vietnam, meanwhile, continued to exert pressure. On 14 August 1951, the 
French Embassy in Washington once again requested inviting the AS to sign the treaty, arguing 
that not doing so would be “practically equivalent” to supporting the Viet Minh, which would 
have “considerable” repercussions and lead to a crisis in the region.484 Meanwhile, the Bao Dai 
government used the press to place more pressure on the US.485 While criticizing the US for 
favoring India, Indonesia, Pakistan and Burma at the expense of AS interests, local newspapers 
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demanded that Vietnam be invited to sign the treaty for reasons including sovereignty, prestige, 
morale, anti-communism and upholding the French position in the region.486  
Finally, on 17 August 1951, the State Department made a momentous decision. In light 
of the fact that the Soviet Union had announced its decision (on 12 August 1951) to attend the 
peace conference, the State Department was convinced that Soviet participation would induce 
India, Indonesia and Burma to attend the peace conference and therefore that it was safe to invite 
the AS. Responding to Indian opposition that the AS were not entitled to participate because they 
were not sovereign states, the State Department pointed out that India had attended the 1919 
Paris peace conference, even though it had not been really independent. Hence, unless Britain 
objected, the US was planning to invitee the AS.487 
Britain responded immediately on 18 August 1951 and supported the idea that the AS 
should be invited to the San Francisco peace conference. Britain reasoned that Indochina had 
“suffered directly from Japanese aggression” and that there was a need to “bring as many Asians 
as possible” to the peace conference. Additionally, since France insisted that it could not sign on 
behalf of the AS, the Indochinese had to sign the treaty themselves. Britain also felt that India 
could be convinced to co-sign the treaty by adopting Cambodia’s non-recognition formula.488 
This essentially marked the end of the negotiations for Indochinese representation. 
 
Invitation to San Francisco Peace Conference 
 
On 21 August 1951, two weeks before the San Francisco peace conference, the State Department 
decided to invite Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam to the conference as full signatories; the 
invitations were delivered the following day (22 August 1951).489 When informed on 22 August 
1951, the Philippines did not raise any objections and simply demanded the right to adopt the 
non-recognition formula.490 Afterwards, the San Francisco peace conference “Rules of Procedure” 
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Article 8 adopted Cambodia’s non-recognition proposal.491 Burma and India, unfortunately for 
the US, refused to attend the peace conference. However, as explained in later chapters, this was 
not because of Indochinese participation; Burma was not happy with the reparations clause, 
while India did not approve of certain territorial and security provisions in the treaty. However, 
the US was able to secure all other Asian participants – Ceylon, Indonesia, Pakistan and the 
Philippines – as co-signers, while adding further Asian representation by inviting the AS. 
In conclusion, numerous factors enabled Indochinese representation at the Japanese peace 
conference. Although the Indochinese entitlement to sign the treaty was questionable because of 
its controversial past and legal postwar status, it enjoyed the solid backing of France, one of the 
major world powers (albeit an ailing one) and a former Ally. France, in order to retain its 
influence in Southeast Asia, sought to build up the legitimacy of the pro-French regimes that 
were established after the end of WWII; Indochinese participation in the Japanese peace 
settlement was one means to accomplish this end. In order to win American support, France 
constantly inculcated the US with the idea that Indochinese participation would not only build up 
the legitimacy and sovereignty of the local governments, but also contribute to the anti-
communist cause. This struck a chord with the US, which was seeking ways both to prevent the 
spread of communism in Southeast Asia and end European colonial rule; at the same time, the 
AS participation would increase Asian representation in the Japanese peace treaty. For the three 
Indochinese states, signing the treaty was not only a given right, considering the state of 
belligerency they inherited from their links to France during the Pacific War and the tremendous 
human and material loss that had resulted from Japan’s aggression, but also a way to strengthen 
their status as independent states. Not surprisingly, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam persisted in 
their demands to be invited to sign the treaty. The Indochinese participation, in other words, 
served the interests of all three parties – France, Indochina and the US – and by the end of 
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Chapter 7. The Reparations Clause (Article 14): historical and international 
origins 
 
This chapter examines how the reparations clause (Article 14) was formulated. Article 14 
stipulated that the “resources of Japan are not presently sufficient” to make “complete reparation,” 
and hence reparations would be confined to two forms. One was “services” in terms of 
“production, salvaging and other work.” The other was allowing the Allies to confiscate 
Japanese property located within their own territories. Otherwise, the Allies were made to 
“waive all reparations claims.”492 In short, it was intended to discourage extracting reparations 
from Japan. This chapter demonstrates that this clause was the product of both the Cold War and 
a number of historical experiences preceding it. 
Article 14 was another extremely controversial aspect of the Japanese peace treaty and its 
significance is acknowledged in virtually all existing studies.493 Interesting to note, however, is 
that, with the exception of Harry Scheiber, it has not received much detailed scholarly attention 
in the West. This is rather surprising considering the major role that the US played in crafting 
Article 14. In contrast, numerous scholars from Korea and Japan have analyzed the effects of 
Article 14 on bilateral relations between these two countries.494 Taking this into account, this 
chapter seeks to breathe life into the debate on reparations in the English-speaking academia. 
Another goal is to build on the existing historiography by tackling three important 
shortcomings. While virtually all the existing studies recognize that Dulles was affected by the 
post-WWI Paris peace conference, none explain what he exactly experienced at this conference 
and which particular elements of this settlement he wanted to avoid. Additionally, the fact that 
Article 14 was affected by the post-WWII Italian peace settlement and the German reparations 
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question is totally overlooked. This chapter seeks to fill these gaps. Also, while Korean and 
Japanese scholars have extensively analyzed the origins and legacies of Article 14, they usually 
focus on the roles played by Japan, Korea and the US. This chapter attempts to provide a more 
international and fuller understanding of how Article 14 was formulated by examining the roles 
of the other governments as well. 
 
The 1919 Versailles Peace Treaty and Dulles 
 
There were two elements of the Versailles peace treaty that were relevant to the Japanese 
reparations question. The first was the principle of “payment in principle, but restraint in 
practice.” To elaborate, Article 231, the so-called war guilt clause, stipulated that Germany 
“accepts the responsibility of Germany” for “causing all the loss and damage” to the “Allied and 
Associated Governments.” Article 232, however, stipulated that Germany did not have adequate 
resources to pay “complete reparation.” 495  In other words, while Germany was forced to 
recognize its responsibility to pay reparations, the Allies acknowledged, in turn, that it could not 
make full payment. One of the proponents of this principle was Dulles. 
This was a compromise solution devised in 1919 to satisfy both the Germans and the 
Allies, the latter of which were internally divided over what and how much should be paid. The 
US believed that Germany should be required to pay for civilian damages only and was strongly 
against making it responsible for war costs. This would have confined the reparations payments 
mostly to Belgium and France, which had sustained the greatest losses. The American delegation 
further estimated that Germany could only pay $25 to 30 billion. The US wished to save the 
Germans from an excessive reparations burden. This was motivated by the belief that damaging 
Germany’s economy would not only impair overall international trade – and thus hurt the 
American economy – but also drive Germans towards Bolshevism, an anathema to many of the 
top decision-makers in the US. This concern was shared by Woodrow Wilson, Robert Lansing 
(Secretary of State and Dulles’ uncle), Thomas Lamont and Norman Davis (both members of the 
US reparations team), and Dulles.496 
In contrast, the Allies – in particular, Britain, France, Italy and Serbia – opted for a harsh 
reparations formula. They demanded that Germany should be made liable for paying not only 
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civilian damages, but also “all” of the war costs; this meant the replacing of damaged property 
and compensation for the expenses incurred in obtaining weapons, ships, planes and other 
supplies. In terms of the amount, Britain and France respectively demanded $90 billion and $200 
billion worth of reparations. The Europeans took a more punitive approach due to security 
concerns and public opinion. Not only did they share a desire to curb the German threat, but also 
their general sentiment did not incline them towards mercy for Germany.497 
Articles 231 and 232 were devised to resolve these differences.498 Unfortunately, while 
the Allies ultimately agreed on this compromise after much bickering, neither the Allies nor 
Germany was satisfied. Germany, in particular, was extremely unhappy with the fact that Article 
231 singled it out as the sole villain of the war. 499  Unsurprisingly, it sought to undo the 
Versailles peace treaty in the following years, framing the reparations formula as being an 
unworkable burden on the German economy and as adversely affecting world trade in general.500 
Meanwhile, there were a number of notable figures on both sides of the Atlantic who 
opposed the harsh reparations approach. These included John Maynard Keynes, Ray Stannard 
Baker and Harold Nicolson, all of whom had either witnessed or taken part in the 1919 Paris 
peace conference.501 They all accused the Europeans of wanting a “Carthaginian peace” and 
thought that the reparations terms would cripple the German economy and cause economic chaos 
worldwide, leading to another war. Later writers would also contend that more moderate peace 
terms would have helped avoid creating Hitler.502 
It should be noted that more recent scholarly findings have demonstrated that the 
reparations formula of Versailles peace treaty could have worked had the Allies and the Germans 
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taken appropriate action.503 Tony Smith even argues that the real problem lay with Germany’s 
internal structure. Since democracy never really took root in Germany, while militarism 
continued to exist and economic affairs were dominated by mercantilist cartels, Smith argues that 
the rise of Hitler would still have been probable even if the Allies had opted for a generous 
peace.504 
Regardless, the popular notion that the reparations formula of the Versailles peace treaty 
was doomed to failure survives to this day.505 Most importantly, Dulles shared this belief and 
was convinced that the formula that he had helped to create was fundamentally flawed. Hence, 
for the Japanese peace treaty, he decided to do things differently and specifically refused to adopt 
a war guilt clause. 
The second component of the Versailles peace treaty that would later have an impact on 
the Japanese reparations question was Article 233, which stipulated that an Inter-Allied 
Commission (reparations commission) would be set up. The objective of this commission was to 
calculate the exact reparations amount to be paid by Germany. At the Paris peace conference, the 
Allies were not able to agree on the reparations bill, as the US sought to minimize it, while 
Britain and France, mindful of their public opinion, feared that they might agree to too little. 
Consequently, the Allies agreed to delay and study the precise amount of reparations after the 
signing of the treaty, culminating in Article 233.506  
The reparations commission’s performance was unimpressive, as it continued to revise its 
decision. Initially, on 21 May 1920, it agreed on a total sum of 132 billion gold marks to be paid 
by Germany. This agreement, conventionally called the “London Schedule of Payments,” was 
revised twice, once on 9 April 1924 (“Dawes Plan”) and again in 1929 (“Young Plan”). In 
recognition of Germany’s difficulty in paying the full amount, the former reduced the reparations 
amount to around 40 billion marks, while the latter suggested payment of around 67 billion 
marks over 59 years. Eventually, with the imminent collapse of the German economy in 1931, 
reparations were cancelled in 1932 at the Lausanne Conference. The total amount of reparations 
that Germany paid eventually came to approximately 21 billion marks.507  
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Dulles’ experience at the Paris peace conference had a profound effect on him personally 
and the Japanese peace treaty in two respects. To begin with, Dulles learned that adopting a “war 
guilt clause” was not the wisest option. Secondly, he became pessimistic about the practicality of 
post-treaty Allied coordination in formulating a precise reparations schedule. Of course, there 
were other important developments that would affect the terms dictating the Japanese peace 
treaty. It is to this question that we now turn to. 
 
The Emergence of the Japanese Reparations Question, Post-WWII German and Italian 
Settlements and Preliminary Decisions, 1945-1947 
 
While the main focus of this chapter is to understand how Article 14 was formulated between 
1950 and 1951, the narrative on reparations would not be complete without examining the early 
peace treaty developments. Taking this into account, this section and the subsequent one will 
briefly explore the early reparations plans before 1950. 
The US began to explore the question of Japanese reparations rather early. Already at the 
end of the Pacific War a debate had emerged between those who argued for a punitive approach 
and those who were against it. The latter were concerned about Japan’s economic well-being, 
while the former argued that Japan should not enjoy a more lenient policy than JCS1067 (April 
1945), which stated that Germany’s living standards should not be at a higher level than those of 
its neighbors.508  
There was also a debate on the type of reparations that Japan would be obligated to pay. 
Two notable documents were produced in early 1945 by the State Department regarding this 
question: PR-2 (“Economic Policy of the US with respect to Japan”) and SC101 (“Economic 
Policy toward Japan: summary statement”).509 Although PR-2 and SC101 were not formally 
adopted by the US on the grounds that they lacked clarity on the question of what specific 
industrial facilities could be delivered as reparations, some of the suggestions contained in the 
two reports would later be adopted. 510  For instance, these reports argued that Japanese 
reparations should be premised on: demilitarization, the liquidation of its economic dominance 
overseas (and helping the former victims to recuperate), the assurance of a minimum living 
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standard, the strengthening of its economic ties with the free world, and conformity with the US-
envisioned postwar economic order in East Asia. 
Regarding the permissible forms of reparations, both reports saw the removal of 
industrial plants and transfer of overseas Japanese assets as the most favored solution. In other 
words, any capital equipment – such as steel and aluminum plants and machinery – that had war 
potential and was not necessary for the peacetime economy would be dismantled and given to 
the Allies; the Allies would also be free to confiscate Japanese property located within their own 
territories. The former conformed to the idea of Japan’s demilitarization, while the latter would 
help the rehabilitation of recipient countries. While reparations in the form of stockpiled 
commodity “goods” were also entertained, both reports were ambiguous about the applicability 
of this approach, since it might divert certain export commodities to paying for reparations, thus 
losing the chance to earn foreign exchange and hindering Japan’s economic recovery. 
Both reports opposed any cash form of reparations, as it was believed that there would 
not be enough disposable money left in Japan by the end of the war.511 This was formalized in 
the Potsdam Declaration of July 1945, which indicated that Japan’s reparations payment should 
be “in kind” and not in cash.512 This non-cash principle was maintained throughout the treaty 
negotiation process and ultimately adopted in the final 1951 draft. 
Meanwhile, two important developments took place in postwar Europe that would later 
impact on the question of Japanese reparations. The first was the German settlement. At the 
Potsdam conference in July 1945, the Allies agreed that certain industrial equipment from the 
western occupation zone (administered by Britain, France and the US) would be given to the 
Soviet Union as reparations; in return, the Soviet Union would deliver raw materials from its 
occupation zone to the West.513 However, the Soviet Union refused to live up to its promise, 
citing economic difficulties as the reason. Worse still, the Soviet Union confiscated capital 
equipment in its own occupation zone indiscriminately without consulting the other Allies. 
Additionally, the Soviet Union started to take reparations from current production, which was 
not even part of the Potsdam agreement. 
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This Soviet behavior was controversial, because it went against the principle of treating 
Germany’s economy as a whole; any reparations removal from its zone of occupation was bound 
to have an adverse effect on the other zones of occupation. The discord between the Soviet 
Union and the US led Lucius Clay (Military Governor of US-occupation zone) to propose the 
termination of the reparations program in the May 1946, to which both Britain and France agreed. 
It should be noted that the US was partly motivated by its own economic interests, as Germany’s 
economic difficulties could only be overcome with American financial support, a burden that it 
did not wish to continue indefinitely. Hence, the US decided it was best to stop the removal of 
industrial equipment and instead worked to revive German productive capacity and make it self-
sustaining again.514  
The second important development was the 1947 Italian peace treaty. Under this treaty 
(Article 74), Italy was made to pay reparations from “current production” to Albania, Ethiopia, 
Greece, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. Important to note here is the fact that this was 
predicated on the condition that the recipient countries would provide the necessary raw 
materials to Italy. Furthermore, Article 74 stipulated that reparations should neither interfere with 
Italy’s economic reconstruction nor impose “additional liabilities” on other Allies, an indirect 
way of saying that the US should not be made to indirectly pay for reparations. This formula, 
with slight modification, would eventually be adopted for the Japanese peace treaty. 
The problem with the Italian case was that only the Soviet Union had the capacity to 
provide such raw materials. In contrast, Greece was not able to do this due to its civil war and 
on-going border skirmishes with Albania over Northern Epirus. Meanwhile, reparations for 
Albania and Yugoslavia did not progress for various “political” reasons, including the war 
criminals issue – as Italy refused to extradite its nationals to Yugoslavia or Albania for trial – and 
the territorial dispute over Trieste. In Albania, the American and British secret services were 
attempting to topple the communist Enver Hoxha regime. Thus, naturally, both tried to prevent 
reparations going to Albania.515 Simply put, the experience with the Italian reparations questions 
was not a happy one. 
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Hence, even before the Japanese peace treaty negotiations began, there were a number of 
important developments that affected the reparations question. To begin with, there was already 
a consensus within the US that the only permissible form of reparations would be in-kind, an 
idea that was later formally agreed with the other Allies in the Potsdam Declaration; the cash 
form of reparations was thus ruled out early on. Equally important was the fact that postwar 
reparations in Europe had neither been successful after WWI nor WWII. As explained below, 
this led to a general disillusionment with the prospect of any successful Allied agreement on 
reparations for Japan. 
 
Evolution of Reparations Terms for Japan: from harsh reparations towards no-reparations 
 
To recall, the initial US policy towards Japan was not dictated by Cold War concerns; instead, 
the wartime anti-Axis mentality still dominated. The early reparations policy was developed in 
conformity with this principle. This was first evidenced in the “Initial Post-Surrender Policy” (6 
September 1945), which stated that reparations would be geared towards “Japan’s 
demilitarization” and provided for the confiscation of its overseas assets and the transfer of 
“goods or existing capital equipment and facilities.” 516  The reparations policy was further 
crystallized by Edwin Pauley, an American oil tycoon, who was appointed by Truman on 27 
April 1945 to develop a specific formula for Japan. Pauley’s proposal – which was delivered to 
Truman on two occasions, an interim report on 18 December 1945 and a final report on 1 April 
1946 – was a two-pronged solution that sought both to demilitarize Japan and assist the industrial 
development of the neighboring Asian countries.517 Pauley pointed out that Japan’s industrial 
capacity was “far greater” than needed for peacetime use and that such excess facilities should be 
made available for reparations. The specific industries that he targeted included steel and iron, 
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chemicals, shipping and shipbuilding, machine parts, power plants and communications with the 
total value of approximately $2.466 billion.518  
Subsequently, the FEC decided on 13 May 1946 to start removing industrial plant that 
had been earmarked for reparations, and on 4 April 1947 the JCS directed MacArthur to begin 
delivery.519 This so-called “advance reparations” program – in which 30% of those resources 
earmarked for reparations were removed and transferred to Britain, China, the Netherlands and 
the Philippines – would be the first and the last industrial assets from Japan that were actually 
delivered overseas.520 
In short, the early Japanese reparations policy had three important characteristics. To 
begin with, it was geared towards demilitarizing Japan to ensure that it did not re-emerge as a 
threat. Secondly, reparations were limited to in-kind payments and the confiscation of Japanese 
properties abroad. Finally, in Pauley’s own words, it was based on a “principle of severity” that 
would “severely” limit Japan’s industrial capacity.521  
The reparations clause of the first draft peace treaty that was developed in 1947 was 
premised on this punitive approach. The preamble clearly depicted Japan as being an aggressor 
that had engaged in a state of war against the Allies. Furthermore, Article 32 obligated Japan to 
make “equitable reparation” to the Allies by transferring “capital equipment and facilities” and 
goods out of current and future production. Meanwhile, Annex J stated that overseas Japanese 
assets would be transferred to the Allies as reparations and outlined the percentage share of each 
claimant and appended a list of the specific industries earmarked for reparations. 522  This 
resonated with the 1919 Versailles precedent, as it clarified Japan’s war guilt and its obligation to 
rectify its past crimes through reparations. It was also a punitive policy that could have seriously 
impaired Japan’s economy. 
Fortunately for Japan, this treaty was discarded and drastically revised amid the 
escalating Cold War tensions of 1947-8 and the emergence of the “reverse course” that 
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prioritized Japan’s economic rehabilitation. Kennan, for instance, argued in PPS 10 (14 October 
1947) that “none out of current productions” should be made available for reparations.523 This 
was echoed by MacArthur who argued on 28 October 1947 that the present policy essentially 
amounted to making the US pay for reparations, as Japan’s production capacity depended on 
American assistance.524 
Meanwhile, Kenneth Royall (Secretary of the Army) gave a speech on 6 January 1948 in 
San Francisco in which he implied that even those industries with “war potential” might need to 
be retained by Japan for the sake of a “sound and self-supporting economy.”525 The Royall 
speech was followed by three reports that were submitted sequentially to the Army and the State 
Department, each criticizing the existing reparations policy and suggesting amendments. The 
first report was submitted on 18 February 1948 by Clifford Strike (Head of Overseas Consultant, 
Inc.), who was tasked by the Army to review reparations policy. Strike argued that Japan’s 
demilitarization was complete and thus it did not pose any threat in the immediate future. Strike 
added that, in his view, economic recovery would steer Japan away from militarism and 
contribute to regional stability. He was therefore “against the removal of productive facilities 
(except primary war facilities) that can be effectively used in Japan” and suggested restoring 
Japan as a “strong industrial nation.” The total value of reparations removal was also scaled 
down to $1,648,156,000.526 
The second report was submitted on 26 April 1948 by Percy H. Johnston (Chairman of 
the Chemical Bank and Trust Company), who was tasked by the Army to examine the economic 
situation in Japan. Johnston largely endorsed Strike’s arguments. Furthermore, he reiterated that 
demanding reparations from Japan was against American interests, as the US “would in reality 
be paying the reparations bill.” Since Japan could only sustain itself with US financial support, 
the former’s reparations payment simply meant channeling American taxpayers’ money through 
Tokyo to the recipients. The total reparations amount was also scaled down to $662,247,000.527 
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One salient feature of Johnston report was that it proposed the formula of “Japan : neighbors = 
supplier of finished goods : supplier of raw material.”528 This was premised on the idea that 
Japan had the industrial capacity to make the goods that its neighbors needed, while the latter 
had the raw materials that Japan lacked and that the two sides should use their comparative 
advantage to mutually benefit one another.529 This idea would later be adopted by Dulles, who 
wanted to build up Japan as a supplier of finished goods and Southeast Asia as a provider of raw 
materials. 
The third report was PPS 28 (25 March 1948), developed by Kennan and his team. This 
report advised that, aside from the aforementioned “advance reparations,” the peace treaty should 
not allow any further payments. Kennan also argued that even “primary war facilities” should 
now be exempt from removal.530 On 9 April 1949, Acheson approved these suggestions and 
decided to make them known to the FEC “regardless of likely unfavorable reception.”531 
The US was thus increasingly inclined towards discouraging reparations payments from 
Japan. This change in mood eventually culminated in NSC 13/3, signed by Truman on 6 May 
1949, which sought to terminate all reparations program and reduce the “whole” reparations 
question to a “dead letter.”532 Frank McCoy (US Representative at the FEC) informed the FEC 
members accordingly on 12 May 1949, stressing that Japan had already paid substantial 
reparations through the expropriation of its overseas assets and that further reparations would 
hinder the occupation’s objective of putting its economy back on a self-sustaining basis. McCoy 
additionally stated that the FEC had not been able to agree on reparations since the end of the 
war and hinted that there was no immediate prospect of an agreement.533 The same day, the JCS 
directed the SCAP to formally terminate all reparations removal.534 The draft peace treaty was 
also duly revised. Article 30 of the 7 September 1949 treaty adopted the no-reparations policy, 
stipulating that the reparations claims of the Allies were deemed to have been satisfied from the 
seizing of the Japanese assets located in their respective territories and those assets received 
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through the advance reparations program.535 Also, to recall, the October 1949 draft revived the 
idea that Japan should prioritize the repayment of the initial occupation aid and assistance 
provided by the US over reparations (see Chapter 2). Although this clause was eventually 
discarded, the idea was maintained into the post-treaty era and would have an important bearing 
on Japan’s economic relationship with Korea and Southeast Asia, a subject that will be revisited 
in the concluding chapter. 
 
The FEC Reactions to the No-Reparations Formula 
 
Even before Dulles’ appointment, the US had thus already decided not to exact further 
reparations from Japan. This no-reparations formula was duly adopted in Dulles’ seven-point 
memorandum of 11 September 1950; with the exception of the transfer of Japan’s overseas 
assets and the industrial equipment already received via the advance reparations program, “all 
parties would waive claims arising out of war.”536 When this memorandum was circulated to the 
FEC members, only the Philippines objected. 537  India simply endorsed Dulles’ formula. 538 
Likewise, China (ROC) explained that it was prepared to waive its reparations claims. 539 
Meanwhile, the other members of the FEC made no mention of reparations at all. 540 Only 
belatedly on 29 January 1951 would Britain demand that the gold reserves in Japan be made 
available for reparations.541 
Dulles also conferred at this point with Burma, even though it was not an FEC member. 
Burma stated it was “very much concerned over the waiving of reparations.” James Barrington 
(Burmese Ambassador to Washington) stressed the country’s economic difficulties, as well as 
the “damage done by the Japanese” and the “lack of Japanese assets present in Burma” that were 
available for seizure. In other words, Burma needed reparations. Dulles, however, rejected 
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Burma’s pleas, arguing that if Japan were to pay reparations, then the US would be technically 
paying the bill, which it was not willing to do.542 
Since Burma was not a member of the FEC, it was not treated as a principal negotiating 
partner. It therefore did not need to be consulted as closely as the Philippines. This necessarily 
meant that the discussion on reparations was mostly confined to the US and the Philippines, and, 
to a lesser extent, Britain. If Dulles ever thought this was going to be an easy battle – after all, 
there was really one small country (the Philippines) to deal with – he would be flabbergasted at 
how fanatically the Philippines was opposed to not receiving reparations. 
 
The “Security in Lieu of Reparations” Approach 
 
In response to the no-reparations formula, the Filipino Congress on 10 February 1951 protested 
vehemently and demanded that the Philippines be accorded the same preferential treatment for 
reparations as had been the case for Belgium in 1919. This meant treating the Philippines as the 
first among equals in receiving reparations. It further stated that Japan should pay approximately 
$8,000,000,000 worth of reparations in the form of capital goods, consumer goods, gold, 
technical services, stocks and merchant ships. Elpidio Quirino (President of the Philippines) at 
this congressional meeting highlighted the “terrible suffering” that the Philippines had 
experienced under Japanese aggression and complained that the US seemed more interested in 
helping the former enemy than its ally.543 
In his own address to the Filipino Congress (11 February 1951) and private conversation 
with Quirino (12 February 19510), Dulles expressed his “great sympathy.” At the same time, 
however, he stressed that Japan’s economic reconstruction was necessary for the “common good” 
of the Pacific. He further argued that Japan had to be anchored to the West and must not fall to 
communism – a principle that even the Philippines agreed with. Thus, harsh reparations would 
be counterproductive. Dulles also claimed that it would be impossible for the Philippines to 
receive the kind of reparations it envisioned, citing “at length” the past difficulties with the 
German reparations terms after WWI and the “fruitless” attempt to resolve the reparations issue 
in the 1947 Italian peace settlement. Dulles also internally referred to the post-WWII German 
 
542 Memorandum of Conversation: Japanese peace treaty, 19 October 1950, RG59, Entry A1 1252, Burma, accessed 
via NIKH. 
543 Joint meeting of Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and House Committee on Foreign Affairs attended by 
the Acting Secretary of Foreign Affairs on Saturday, 10 February 1951, on the proposed Japanese peace treaty, 
RG59, Entry A1 1252, Lot 54D423, Philippines, accessed via NIKH 
146 
 
reparations as another reason for doubting that any meaningful agreement could be reached. 
Dulles added that the “only” way for Japan to pay reparations was for the US to foot the bill, 
which the American government did not want.544 The Philippines, in turn, disagreed and the two 
countries entered into a deadlock. 
To break the impasse, Dulles started to entertain the idea of extending a security 
guarantee to the Philippines as a quid pro quo for the no-reparations formula. As indicated in a 
letter to MacArthur (2 March 1951), Dulles believed that that one of the driving needs for the 
countries in the Pacific was a security guarantee against possible Japanese re-aggression and that 
as long as this need was met, the reparations demands could be silenced.545 Dulles was perhaps 
encouraged by the advice of Manolo Elizalde (one of the most powerful businessmen in the 
Philippines), who believed that a Pacific security arrangement might “cushion” any problem 
arising from a lenient reparations approach.546 Myron Cowen (US Ambassador to Manila) also 
endorsed this idea of trading security for reparations.547  
Meanwhile, Britain revisited the question of reparations in late January 1951 and again in 
mid-March 1951, by demanding that Japan’s gold bullion be used for reparations. The US, 
however, disagreed with this idea, reasoning that the Allies had never been, and hence never 
would be, able to agree on the division of shares. In fact, on 29 July 1948 McCoy had already 
informed the FEC members that gold and precious metals would not be given as reparations, as 
they were needed for Japan to secure foreign exchange.548 The US further added that if Japan had 
the ability to pay reparations at all, then it should first repay the US’s advance occupation costs. 
Additionally, the US stressed that the removal of gold might damage Japan’s already-precarious 
living standards and that the Congress might refuse to ratify the treaty, if further reparations were 
extracted, as the US would be essentially paying for them. The US also pointed out that it would 
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be awkward to force Japan to pay reparations to Britain, while Dulles was trying to discourage 
the Philippines from making its own demands.549  
 
The New Dulles Formula and Transition Away from No-Reparations Principle 
 
Amidst the on-going discussion with the Philippines and Britain on reparations, Dulles reported 
on his overall progress to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in March 1951. In this 
meeting Dulles highlighted the importance of preventing the further extraction of reparations 
from Japan, noting the potential burden on the US. Dulles also pointed out that, due to corruption 
in the Filipino government, the existing advance reparations that went to the Philippines were 
“completely wasted…lying rotting on a little island in Manila Bay.” In other words, reparations 
served no useful purpose, other than damaging Japan’s industrial capacity and possibly 
threatening the US economy.550 Judging from the rather favorable response from the Senate, 
Dulles must have been reassured. Not surprisingly, the updated draft treaty dated 23 March 1951 
maintained the no-reparations formula. 
Dulles, however, could not simply ignore the Philippines. The US needed to ensure that 
the Philippines continued to be pro-US and internally stable. However, the pro-US ruling party 
(Liberal Party) confronted formidable opposition from the Nacionalista Party, which tended to 
take a more independent line, and the militant Huk rebels.551 Hence, the US had to assist the 
Quirino regime in all permissible ways.  
Dulles soon began to reconsider the existing no-reparations formula and entertained the 
possibility, should the Philippines refuse to give way, of obligating Japan to pay some 
reparations. On April 17, 1951, Dulles revealed to his team that he was thinking about applying 
the current production form of reparations from the 1947 Italian peace treaty to the Japanese 
peace treaty. However, in making any such transition, Dulles wanted to ensure that this new 
approach would benefit not only the Philippines, but also Japan. The idea was to arrange 
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reparations payment in a way that would allow the flow of raw materials from Southeast Asia to 
Japan in exchange for finished products. He hoped that this would in the long run “reopen a 
channel for trade with Philippines, Malaya, Burma and other reparations claimant countries.” In 
Dulles’ own words, it would essentially constitute trade between Japan and Southeast Asia “in 
the guise of reparations.”552 This was not his optimum policy, as he still wished to adhere to the 
no-reparations formula, but it was one that he could live with if necessary.  
Meanwhile, the British Commonwealth came up with its own draft peace treaty on 7 
April 1951, independently from the US. The preamble of the British draft adopted a war guilt 
clause, stipulating that Japan “undertook a war of aggression” against the Allies, for which Japan 
“bears her share of responsibility for the war.” In light of this, Article 23 obligated Japan to 
transfer “gold and bullion” and “precious metals and jewels” as reparations “in addition to the 
sums already paid by her” under the 1947 advance reparations.553 This was precisely the formula 
that Dulles wished to avoid. Britain admitted that it was impossible for the US to agree to these 
terms and hence indicated that it was willing to drop these demands.554 Nevertheless, on 4 June 
1951, Morrison made one last attempt to demand that Japan should pay reparations using its gold. 
Morrison reasoned that Japan’s past wrongdoings, especially the cruel treatment of POWs, were 
“not forgotten and could not be wholly ignored in the treaty.” For reasons mentioned so far, the 
US opposed this.555 This marked the end of reparations talks between Britain and the US. 
Although this British demand was rejected, it would be wrong to assume that the US 
completely ignored Britain’s indemnification rights. Indeed, Article 16 provided for 
compensation for the former European POWs, who had languished in Japanese prison camps, by 
creating a fund from Japanese overseas assets held in neutral and former axis countries. This 
topic deserves a separate analysis and hence this study cannot detail all the discussions. It 
suffices to say that Article 16 – while unsatisfactory, as it limited the recipients to military POWs 
and excluded civilian victims – sought to address the need to compensate the Western Allied 
victims of Japanese aggression. 
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Dulles now had to convince the Philippines, which continued to object to the “no further 
reparations” formula. Contrary to Dulles’ view, Felino Neri (Acting Foreign Secretary) argued 
that the Versailles peace treaty had been “sound and valid” that was based on the “principle of 
justice.” According to Neri, it made sense that the “cost of a wrong should be borne by the 
wrong-doer.” The treaty had also, he believed, been mindful of the public sentiment of the 
victims. Neri also argued that allowing the wrong-doer to “escape payment for the damage he 
wrought” would not lead to peace, but rather encourage him to “break the peace again.” Indeed, 
Neri believed that WWII erupted because Germany had been allowed to stop its reparations 
payments. In short, Neri opposed the no-reparations formula, as it not only ignored the sentiment 
of the victim countries, but also entailed the risk of another conflict. In response, Cowen cabled 
Washington on 20 April 1951 and recommended that “some reparations” be given to the 
Philippines, even if these were a “token” amount.556 Meanwhile, Dulles and his team conferred 
with Yoshida on 23 April 1951 in order to hint at the possibility that Japan might eventually have 
to pay reparations and to find possible ways to satisfy the Filipino demands.557 A number of 
ideas were explored. Most notable was a proposal for salvaging sunken vessels around the 
Philippines, in which Japan would pay for the salvaging operations and all vessels recovered 
would be transferred to the Philippines. A second plan was for Japan to receive raw materials 
from the Philippines for processing and for these then to be delivered as finished goods to the 
Filipino government.558 It is worth noting that these plans were eventually adopted in the formal 
reparations agreement between Japan and the Philippines in 1956.559 
It would be unjust to assume that all Filipino leaders took an uncompromising attitude 
towards Japanese reparations. Certain Filipino officials, especially Manolo Elizalde and Senator 
Lorenzo Martinez Tañada, were sympathetic to Dulles and believed that their country’s demands 
were unrealistic. Nevertheless, the dominant sentiment forced the Filipino government to 
continue its hardline stance. The opposition Nacionalista Party even threatened to vote against 
ratification of the peace treaty if no reparations were forthcoming.560  
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The Philippines specifically demanded a total of $8,079,624,000, which included 
physical damage ($807,411,000), human loss ($1,667,892,000) and commandeered goods and 
services ($5,514,321,000). Perhaps as a gesture of goodwill, the Philippines added that it was 
willing to scale this down to $6,527,260,500. With regards to the method of payment, it proposed 
creating a special committee consisting of representatives from the US, the Philippines and Japan 
to discuss the implementation process. Reparations would be extracted from numerous “sources,” 
including government revenue generated through various taxes and the profits made by Japan’s 
financial institutions. The Philippines also demanded that, even if all other Allied powers were to 
waive their right to reparations, it should be made the “sole exception.”561  
For Dulles, the Filipino demands reminded him too much of the Versailles precedent. Not 
only was the reparations amount considerable, but also the idea of establishing a special 
committee was reminiscent of the reparations commission whose legacy had been discredited. 
Furthermore, the “sources” referred to by the Philippines essentially called for a cash form of 
reparations, to which Dulles was utterly opposed. 
Dulles, therefore, responded with another proposal, which became the backbone of 
Article 14. To begin with, Japan would only pay reparations to those Allies whose “metropolitan 
territories” (as opposed to “colonial territories”) it had occupied. It would do this by making 
available its “skills and industry” in “manufacturing, salvaging and other services.” Meanwhile, 
any raw materials required for “manufacturing” in Japan would be supplied by the recipients of 
reparations. Dulles added that reparations should neither interfere “with the economic 
reconstruction of Japan,” nor impose any “additional liabilities on other Allied Powers,” which 
was another way of saying that the US had no intention of paying the bill.562  
Dulles’s proposal was notable in many respects. Most importantly, Japan was now 
obligated to pay reparations, a major shift from the “no further reparations” policy. At the same 
time, however, reparations would specifically take the form of “services” instead of cash, which 
would prevent the loss of Japan’s foreign exchange, but still be beneficial to the more backward 
economies of Asia. The West had no need for Japan’s “skills and industry” as they were all 
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advanced industrial societies, and in any case were barred by the reference to “metropolitan 
territories.” At the same time, the beneficiaries would only include those who were able to offer 
“raw materials,” which essentially meant that reparations would be limited to resource-rich 
Southeast Asia. This was clearly in line with the idea of turning Japan into a “workshop,” with 
Southeast Asia providing raw materials and Japan turning them into finished goods. While 
Yoshikawa credits the Filipino pressure for bringing about these changes, one should also 
acknowledge Dulles’s shrewdness in confining Japan’s reparations to Southeast Asia and thus 
reducing potential economic burden on Japan.563 Additionally, although the new formula was 
meant to satisfy the Philippines, one can also speculate that Dulles aimed to win the support of 
other Southeast Asian states (and avoid the accusation doing special favor to Manila) by 
extending the same rights to them. Dulles’ new formula was adopted in the updated draft treaty 
of 14 June 1951 – which was published by the New York Times on 15 June 1951 – and would 
eventually make it into the final draft treaty almost intact.564  
For the interim, however, the Philippines continued to oppose Dulles’ reparations policy. 
On 20 June 1951, Romulo sent an extensive letter of protest to Dulles. Romulo likened Dulles’ 
lenient approach towards Japan to Neville Chamberlain’s appeasement policy towards the Nazis; 
it was fraught with the danger of causing another war. The only sensible solution, he argued, was 
to make Japan pay a heavy price so that it had no means to wage another conflict. Romulo also 
added that it was Washington’s protectionist policies and unwillingness to cancel inter-allied 
debts that had led to the worldwide economic collapse in the early 1930s and the outbreak of 
WWII, not the reparations terms of the Versailles peace treaty.565 This argument that the US 
protectionist policy had contributed to the war was something that even Dulles agreed with.566 
Perhaps because of this, Dulles referred to the WWI precedent less and less. 
The situation therefore remained in deadlock. Until mid-July 1951, the two governments 
exchanged numerous proposals and counterproposals. There were three major points of 
contention. To begin with, whereas the Philippines wished to stipulate Japan’s war guilt and its 
responsibility to pay reparations, the US opposed this. Secondly, whereas the US believed that 
Japan had no capacity to pay, the Philippines believed otherwise and felt that the US was 
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unfairly shielding it at the expense of the former Allies. Finally, whereas the Philippines wished 
to leave the door open for cash reparations, the US was absolutely opposed to this and insisted on 
services-only form of reparations. Throughout this process sentiments turned bitter, with the US 
and the Philippines accusing one another of insufficient understanding. The Filipino Foreign 
Ministry at one point (2 July 1951) indicated that it might not even sign the Japanese peace treaty, 
unless its “reasonable claim for reparations and essential safeguard for its security” were 
satisfied.567 Without doubt, the State Department was alarmed at this response, especially as the 
US was trying to secure as many Asian signatories as possible. At the same time, there was an 
added urgency in the need to extend some sort of security guarantee to the Philippines. 
 
The Quasi-War Guilt Clause and Final Adjustment 
 
On 12 July 1951, the reparations talks entered a new phase, when Romulo suggested the 
following revised wording of Article 14: “It is recognized that Japan should pay reparations for 
the damage and suffering caused by it during the war and should make adequate reparations to 
the Allied Powers.”568 While Yoshikawa interprets this as being a war guilt clause, it did not, in 
fact, bluntly state that Japan recognized its responsibility for the conflict, a stark contrast from 
the Versailles precedent.569 It would be more apt to call it a quasi-guilt clause. 
In response, Cowen suggested on 20 July 1951 that Washington should adopt Romulo’s 
quasi-war guilt clause with some minor revisions. Cowen believed that a revised version, 
coupled with a security pact, would satisfy the Philippines. 570  Although State Department 
initially rejected this suggestion on the grounds that reparations might endanger Japan’s 
economy, Cowen persisted that a compromise was “badly needed” and that Romulo’s formula 
should be accepted with “some rephrasing.”571 
There were some other alarming developments around this time. On 21 July 1951 Burma 
noted its disapproval of the Japanese peace treaty on the basis of its unsatisfactory reparations 
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terms. Meanwhile, faced with the continued rejection of its proposals, on 25 July 1951 Eugenio 
Padlan Perez and Claro Recto – both influential members of the Filipino Congress – once again 
talked of not signing the peace treaty. In response, the State Department briefly entertained the 
idea of eliminating both Burma and the Philippines from the treaty.572  
Despite being frustrated, the State Department continued its attempt to find a solution. On 
1 August 1951, it cabled Cowen with a new proposal. Reversing its earlier position, it now 
partially accepted the wording of Romulo’s quasi-war guilt clause. It suggested including the 
following phrase, “it is recognized that Japan should pay reparations to the Allied Powers for the 
damage and suffering caused by it during the war” while deleting that Japan “should make 
adequate reparations to the Allied Powers.”573 This was another milestone that brought the US 
and the Philippines closer to a final agreement. 
During the following week, there was another round of proposals and counterproposals. 
The point of contention now narrowed down to the question of monetary reparations. The 
Philippines argued that although Japan might not be able to make payments now, its economy 
might improve in the future and therefore become capable of paying reparations both in goods 
and cash. While confidentially acknowledging that the Philippines had a point, Acheson argued 
that “psychological factors and political assumptions” also had to be considered. Simply put, 
exacting monetary reparations in the future could theoretically lead to a “substantial tax increase” 
and inflation, thus eroding economic, political and social stability. Furthermore, there was no 
guarantee that Japan’s economy would improve in the future. Simply put, monetary reparations 
had to be avoided. Acheson and Dulles subsequently obtained a letter from Truman (dated 7 
August 1951), which rejected the Filipino demands on the basis of Japan’s need for foreign 
exchange and the difficulty in deciding the precise percentage share among the recipients.574 
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Finally, on 9 August 1951, the Philippines acquiesced, marking the end of this arduous 
process.575 
One token concession that the Philippines won at this stage was the deletion of the word 
“skills.” Quirino and Romulo were displeased with this expression, because it sounded as if the 
Philippines lacked talent and had to seek its former enemy’s help. 576 Cowen also informed 
Washington that the Philippines feared Japan’s economic infiltration through its “services,” and 
that being made a supplier of raw materials connoted “colonial subservience.” 577  Acheson, 
however, dismissed the idea that opening up the Philippines to Japanese products would lead to 
its economic dependence on Japan. But as if to show that he was not totally blind to colonial 
sensitivities, Acheson deleted the word “skills.”578 
Here a brief explanation is necessary on why the Philippines gave in to the US pressure. 
While public sentiment forced the Filipino government to take an uncompromising attitude on 
the surface, the Philippines did not actually have a lot of negotiating leverage, as it was 
dependent on the US for its economy and security. Although not made known to the public, both 
Quirino and Romulo were also quite supportive of the US policy towards Japan. Quirino, for 
instance, believed that amity with Japan would benefit the Philippines economically and 
strategically. Meanwhile, Romulo agreed with the idea of Japanese rearmament (albeit with 
reservations) and of its rebuilding on an economically self-sustaining basis in order to lift 
America’s financial burden; he was even ready to give up reparations. Hence, the Filipino 
acquiescence to Dulles’ reparations formula was not surprising. 
Equally important is the fact that the over-riding priority for the Philippines had always 
been security. There was a genuine fear of the communist menace in the Philippines at the time 
of the Japanese peace treaty negotiations, especially as the Huk rebels were threatening the 
country from within. There was also a lingering concern about the possible resurgence of Japan 
as a military threat. For these two reasons, it persistently demanded that some security safeguard 
be provided.579 Dulles shrewdly exploited this opportunity. To reiterate, Dulles had in March 
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1951 raised the possibility of offering a security guarantee to the Philippines in return for 
agreeing to a non-punitive reparations policy. Cowen also endorsed the wisdom of this approach, 
aware of the Filipino fear of the resurgence of Japanese military power. 580  Cowen further 
believed that a security guarantee would cushion Quirino and Romulo against any backlash for 
accepting Dulles’ reparations proposal. 581 Subsequently, the bilateral US-Philippines security 
treaty received an “urgent and most serious consideration” over the following months and the 
final draft was agreed upon on 27 August 1951.582  
Of course, the security treaty did not exactly develop in the way that the Philippines 
envisioned. For instance, whereas it wanted to adopt Article 5 of the NATO treaty, which 
provided for automatic American military intervention in case of attack, Dulles rejected this 
demand, noting that the prevalent isolationist sentiment in the Senate discouraged committing 
US forces overseas. The Philippines also wished to give a multilateral tone to the US-Philippines 
security treaty by adopting Article 8 of the ANZUS treaty, which established a “Council” that 
was empowered to consult multiple countries in the Pacific. However, the Defense Department 
was “strongly” opposed to this, as it might further expand its already over-stretched 
commitments overseas. Most importantly, the US stipulated that the security treaty would only 
be effective if the Filipino government signed and ratified the Japanese peace treaty.583 Although 
not entirely happy, Quirino believed that this was a sufficiently satisfactory trade-off and asked 
the public to support the Japanese peace treaty. Fortunately, the Filipino newspapers reacted 
favorably to the bilateral security treaty, which certainly offset the feeling of disappointment 
with Article 14.584  
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To conclude, Article 14 was a product of complex historical experiences and Cold War 
diplomacy. Initially, the Allies opted for harsh reparations in accordance with the wartime 
agreement on demilitarizing Japan. However, with the escalating Cold War tension and the 
resultant “reverse course” that stressed the importance of Japan’s economic reconstruction, the 
US decided to prevent any further reparations; the treaty consequently adopted a “no reparations” 
approach. However, in the face of fierce opposition from the Philippines, Dulles eventually 
acknowledged that Japan should pay reparations, although in the form of “services” only and 
limited to Southeast Asian countries. 
As Yoshikawa points out, Article 14 was crafted in a way that primarily served US and 
Japanese interests. Not only was the US able to limit Japanese reparations to Southeast Asia and 
in the form of “services” alone, but also this consequently contributed to Japan’s re-entry into 
Southeast Asian markets. Japan was pleased with Article 14, as Yoshida believed that it would 
help the development of backward regions, secure raw materials and open markets in Southeast 
Asia, all of which would benefit Japan.585 Nevertheless, there was one major cost to it: losing 
Burmese support. Burma refused to sign the San Francisco peace treaty on the grounds that the 
treaty failed to provide adequate reparations.586 This was obviously disappointing for Dulles, as 
he had hoped to secure as many Asian signatures on the peace treaty as possible. 
It is also important to note that Article 14 was a compromise. While Borden correctly 
argues that the US was working hard to open the Southeast Asian market to Japan and cleverly 
exploited the reparations arrangement to facilitate Japan’s economic integration with Southeast 
Asia, it would be wrong to assume that Dulles had been planning all along to craft the 
reparations clause in order to enable Japan’s re-entry into Southeast Asian market.587 Rather, it 
was an improvised scheme that went through multiple amendments to calm the Philippines. 
On the brighter side, the Philippines gained both reparations and the US security 
guarantee, albeit in terms much less than what it wished for. Equally important is the fact that 
Article 14, thanks to the Philippines, allowed all Southeast Asian countries to demand 
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reparations, while also paving the way for economic cooperation with Japan, the details of which 






Chapter 8. Postwar Japanese Shipping and Shipbuilding Capacity 
 
This chapter examines the question of Japan’s merchant marine (how many ships Japan should 
be allowed to have and operate) and shipbuilding (how many ships Japan should be allowed to 
build) capacity during the Japanese peace treaty negotiations. While the Allies initially 
entertained the idea of adopting a restrictive treaty clause to limit Japan’s shipping and 
shipbuilding capacity, this never happened; Japan was left free to own and construct as many 
ships as it wished. Why no such restriction was adopted is the central question of this chapter. It 
argues that the US efforts to frame Japan’s postwar shipping and shipbuilding capacity as an 
economic question rather than a military one was the key to dissuading the Allies from adopting 
a restrictive clause. 
Examining this question is important in several respects. To begin with, its significance is 
neglected in the existing historiography. This is surprising because Japan’s shipping and 
shipbuilding capacity was a serious issue during the treaty negotiations. At best, existing studies 
on the peace settlement simply recognize the existence of the issue.588 Moreover, while business 
historians have written extensively on the development of Japan’s shipping and shipbuilding 
industries from the 19th to 20th centuries, they all tend to take a domestic angle, rather than a 
diplomatic one; hence, while they clarify the roles of the Japanese government and the private 
sector, no satisfactory explanation is provided as to what other governments had to say during 
the peace treaty negotiations.589 In this regard, an analysis by John Weste on the British response 
to the revival of Japan’s postwar shipping and shipbuilding capacity is a welcome 
historiographical contribution. Yet even he offers no specific explanation as to the nature of 
British policy towards the treaty terms on shipping and shipbuilding. Meanwhile, the roles of the 
other governments have been entirely overlooked. 590  Likewise, while many scholars have 
examined the postwar shipping issue as it relates specifically to Korea and Japan, these 
narratives tend to focus on developments after the signing of the Japanese peace treaty.591 In 
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short, no detailed study of the debate over postwar Japanese shipping and shipbuilding capacity 
during the peace treaty negotiations exists, and this chapter attempts to fill this gap. 
This chapter also has a larger significance. For decades, Japan has ranked continuously as 
among the world’s top shipping and shipbuilding powers. Indeed, with the exception of 1973, 
Japan was consistently the top exporter of ships from 1964 to 2005, when it was replaced by 
South Korea.592 Had the Allies adopted a restrictive clause in the peace treaty, this might not 
have been possible. Hence, it is important to understand why the former belligerents decided not 
to limit Japan’s shipping and shipbuilding ability. 
Additionally, the Allied discussion on Japan’s postwar shipping and shipbuilding 
capacity exemplifies how the Japanese peace settlement was much more international than 
hitherto perceived. In addition to Japan and the US – the usual protagonists in the existing 
historiography of postwar occupation and peace settlement with Japan – Australia, Britain, and 
New Zealand figured prominently in this debate. Korea and the Philippines, though not very 
well-known actors in the Japanese peace settlement, also played a part. 
    
The Initial US Policy towards Japanese Shipping and Shipbuilding Capacity and the 1947 
Draft Peace Treaty 
 
Here, a brief overview is necessary regarding the significance of the shipping and shipbuilding 
sectors to the state. A country’s ability to own, operate and build ships has important economic 
and security implications, as ships can be employed not only for trade, but also for fighting wars. 
This was certainly the case for Japan. As a resource-poor country, Japan had to rely on importing 
vital raw materials from abroad – such as coal, petroleum, and rubber – for its industrial 
development.593 Japan also depended on its merchant marine to export its products, such as silk 
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and textiles, to earn foreign exchange.594 It should be briefly noted that Japan’s textile exports 
had in the interwar period led to commercial competition with the European powers, particularly 
Britain, and would later affect the British attitude towards Japan’s postwar shipping and 
shipbuilding capacity. Of course, one also cannot ignore the fact that the Japanese Navy played a 
prominent role in the wars in Southwest Pacific, which would later contribute to Australia’s 
perennial suspicion towards anything that had to do with Japan and ships.595  
The war brought forth dire consequences for Japan’s shipping sector, as Japanese 
merchant vessels were targeted by Allied bombers and submarines and nearly annihilated.596 
Indeed, Japan lost 80% of its ships, leaving its shipping sector virtually incapacitated. In stark 
contrast, Japan’s shipbuilding capacity, both commercial and naval, was left almost intact; 
indeed, only 20 percent of the shipbuilding yards were damaged by the war.597 The survival of 
this infrastructural foundation meant that Japan had the potential to become a formidable naval 
power again. It was against this backdrop that the question of Japan’s postwar shipping and 
shipbuilding capacity developed into an important discussion point for the US. 
The initial US policy was to dismantle Japan’s shipping and shipbuilding industries, in 
accordance with the demilitarization policy. According to the “Basic Initial Post-Surrender 
Directive” (1 November 1945), with the minor exception of those craft necessary for carrying 
out occupation tasks, all “naval vessels” were to be eliminated, while civilian “merchant ships” 
would be subject to either “reduction or elimination.”598 A more detailed recommendation was 
submitted later on 1 April 1946 by Edwin Pauley, who proposed that shipbuilding equipment 
should be removed for reparations and that any “immovable installations” be destroyed. At the 
same time, the maximum size of Japanese merchant ships was to be restricted to 1.5 million tons 
with any remaining ships removed for reparations.599 
The draft peace treaty developed in 1947 embodied these terms. For instance, Article 27 
stipulated that Japan “shall be and shall remain demilitarized and shall not rearm.” And for this 
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purpose, “naval forces...shall be and shall remain completely disarmed, demobilized and 
disbanded” and the “manufacture of all naval vessels of any classes” was to be prohibited. 
Additionally, the stockpiling of strategic raw materials, including iron ore, pig iron and scrap 
iron – all essential in building ships – in excess of peacetime requirements was to be banned. 
Meanwhile, Annex J of the draft peace treaty, which outlined the reparations terms, stated that 
“steel merchant ship building and ship repair” facilities would be made available for reparations 
removal (Article 1) and that (Article 2-c) the existing merchant ships that were earmarked for 
reparations would be distributed to the appropriate recipients.600 
Japan was, of course, horrified and protested vehemently, arguing that ships were 
essential to its peacetime economy. It further contended that because of the already limited 
number of ships at its disposal, it had to rely on expensive foreign shipping, which meant, in turn, 
an increased financial burden; this would be made worse if more ships were removed for 
reparations.601 It is intriguing that this would be the exact logic that the US would later employ to 
oppose any restrictions against Japan’s shipping and shipbuilding. 
 
The Reverse Course and the Transformation of the US Attitude on Japanese Shipping and 
Shipbuilding Capacity, 1948-1949 
 
As explained in Chapter 2, the postwar US policy towards Japan in 1947-8 entered the phase of 
the “reverse course,” which prioritized Japan’s economic revival. Against this backdrop the US 
began to frame Japan’s shipping and shipbuilding capacity as an economic question and 
increasingly adopted a non-restrictive approach. This was exemplified in the “Strike Report” of 
18 February 1948 (see Chapter 7), which argued that Japan’s current shipping and shipbuilding 
capacity was “grossly inadequate” and that it had to be able to build its own ships “to the 
maximum extent possible.” Furthermore, Strike reversed Pauley’s earlier recommendation, 
arguing that no existing merchant ships or shipbuilding facilities should be made available for 
reparations. In addition, he suggested that Japan should be allowed to build ships for foreign 
customers, as this would allow it to earn foreign exchange, thus making a “substantial 
contribution to Japanese economy.”602 Strike’s arguments were echoed in the Johnston Report 
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(26 April 1948), which also proposed permitting Japan to increase its merchant shipping and 
shipbuilding capacity without any restrictions in light of their importance to the export trade and 
economic revival.603  
These recommendations resonated with a shift in mood within the US government. 
Kenneth Royall (Secretary of the Army), for instance, expressed caution on 6 January 1948 in a 
public speech at San Francisco, stating that destroying Japan’s shipbuilding industry could 
“adversely affect the peace potential.”604 Also, on 25 March 1948, the Navy suggested at a State-
Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee (SANACC) meeting that Japan should retain 
“all merchant ships now available” rather than removing them for reparations, as Japan needed 
sufficient capacity to achieve a self-supporting economy.605 
Subsequently, on 9 October 1948, Truman approved NSC 13/2, which recognized the 
need for “Japanese merchant shipping” in the “revival of Japanese foreign trade” and 
“exports.”606 NSC 13/3, approved by Truman the following year on 6 May 1949, added that all 
reparations programs should be terminated and that the use of “primary war facilities” – which 
included shipbuilding facilities that had the capacity to build merchant vessels of over 3,000 tons 
– should be permitted to help Japan’s economic revival. This signified that no more merchant 
vessels or shipbuilding facilities would be removed from Japan. At the same time, as long as 
ships were useful for Japan’s “peaceful” economic development, “no limitation” on new building 
would be imposed.607 
On 9 September 1949, the Pentagon further concluded that there should be no limitations 
at all on Japan’s merchant shipping and shipbuilding capacity. The Pentagon argued that this was 
necessary for Japan to trade and to attain “reasonable prosperity,” which would not only lift the 
financial burden on the US, but also allow democracy to flourish. It could also contribute to the 
“eventual establishment of limited Japanese armed forces.” In light of this, the Pentagon 
suggested forcing the US’s opinion on the FEC.608 MacArthur concurred (2 November 1949) 
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that Japan should be permitted to develop its merchant shipping and shipbuilding industries 
without limit as an important source of foreign exchange.609 
Hence, between 1948 and 1949, there was a major shift in the attitude of the US towards 
the question of Japanese shipping and shipbuilding capacity. The latter’s retention was no longer 
framed as a military question, but rather as an economic one. The peace treaty was amended 
accordingly and by November 1949 all references to restricting Japan’s shipping and 
shipbuilding capacity were removed.610 
Japan’s shipping and shipbuilding sector also began to slowly take off under US auspices. 
Its first new shipbuilding order came from Norway in 1948, and by March 1949, 16 ships 
totaling 62,000 tons had been contracted with foreign customers. Among these vessels was a 
tanker of 18,000 tons, which exceeded the limit posed by Pauley. 611  Also, when the FEC 
member states – specifically Australia, Britain, France, the Netherlands, New Zealand and the 
Philippines – sought to block a “Maritime Safety Authorities Bill” that was proposed by the 
Japanese Diet in April 1948 to help increase the number of merchant ships, the US defended the 
bill by vetoing the FEC opposition.612 In short, the US not only relaxed its attitude, but also 
actively assisted the revival of Japan’s shipbuilding industry. It was against this backdrop that 
Dulles was appointed to lead the Japanese peace treaty negotiations. 
 
Allied Discussion on Japanese Shipping and Shipbuilding Capacity during the Formative 
Years, 1950-1951 
 
When Dulles took the lead in negotiating the peace treaty, he concurred that no restrictions 
should be applied to Japan’s shipping and shipbuilding capacity.613 The outbreak of the Korean 
War, meanwhile, created a new demand for ships. As Japan had the ability to meet this demand, 
the US took this opportunity to further strengthen its shipping and shipbuilding sector. 614 
However, whether or not Japan’s shipping and shipbuilding industry could continue to grow 
required the approval of other countries as well. Unfortunately, many countries were opposed, 
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especially Australia, Britain and New Zealand. Indeed, even back in 1947, when the first attempt 
had been made to convene a Japanese peace conference, they had sought to limit Japan’s 
capacity to a ceiling determined by the Allies.615 Again in May 1950, Australia, Britain and New 
Zealand, while recognizing that Japan should have a viable economy, felt that its present 
shipbuilding capacity was in excess of normal peacetime needs and wished to cut this down.616  
Why were Australia, Britain and New Zealand so concerned about Japan’s shipbuilding 
capacity? Australia and New Zealand were profoundly affected by their experience of Japanese 
aggression during the Pacific War. Having directly confronted Japan, both countries wished to 
make sure that it could not reemerge as a threat. 617  As Robert Menzies (Australian Prime 
Minister) explained to Acheson on 29 July 1950, Australia was particularly concerned about the 
potential revival of Japan’s ability to “build a navy with offensive capabilities.”618 Likewise, any 
prospect of Japan’s military revival worried New Zealand throughout the peace treaty 
negotiations.619 Britain, on the other hand, appears to have been affected more by commercial 
motives dating back to the 1930s. Gascoigne observed to Dulles in June 1950 that Britain was 
opposed to Japan having any excess shipbuilding capacity and was not especially happy with the 
prospect of its exporting ships to foreign buyers.620  
These concerns were reiterated when Dulles consulted the FEC member states with his 
seven principles in late 1950. Australia and New Zealand again noted their concern about the 
possible re-emergence of Japan as a threat, a sentiment shared by the Philippines, the Soviet 
Union and the neutralist bloc (Burma and India). While Britain was not against Japanese re-
armament – as this was necessary to contain communism and align Japan to the West – it was 
concerned about the commercial threat posed by the shipping and shipbuilding industry, and 
explicitly requested that some safeguard be provided against it.621 This prevalent concern about 
Japan’s potential military and commercial threat did not augur well for Japan’s shipbuilding 
capacity. 
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The British Commonwealth members, however, were aware that Japan’s shipping and 
shipbuilding capacity could not be suppressed permanently, as it needed to have a viable 
economy.622 Moreover, while the three members of the British Commonwealth wished to restrict 
its capacity in some form, how this was to be accomplished was unclear. This lack of any 
concrete proposal placed Australia, Britain and New Zealand in a weak negotiating position vis-
à-vis the US which was contemporaneously working enthusiastically to rebuild Japan’s shipping 
and shipbuilding industry, as exemplified in the National Bulk Carriers (NBC) project. 
The NBC in November 1950, at the height of the Korean War, was looking for potential 
shipyards that could build very large cargo ships and had their eyes on Kure shipyard 
(Hiroshima). In April 1951, while Japan was still occupied and at the height of the Japanese 
peace treaty negotiations, a portion of Kure shipyard was leased to NBC for 10 years.623 NBC’s 
decision to sign a contract with Kure shipyard signified that the US was actively partaking in the 
revival of Japan’s shipbuilding sector. Hence, it would be awkward for the US to adopt a 
restrictive treaty clause. 
Not surprisingly, the US clashed with many of its friends in the following months. When 
Dulles embarked on his trip to Asia and the Pacific in early 1951, he confronted strong 
opposition from Australia, Britain and the Philippines. Britain reiterated that Japan’s present 
merchant shipbuilding capacity was above its normal needs, and that any excess capacity should 
be destroyed. Additionally, Britain made clear that it wanted to protect its industries from 
Japanese competition. This last statement reflected the pressure from the British shipbuilding 
industry, which feared fierce competition from Japan, as well as the Lancashire textile industry, 
which wanted to limit Japan’s capability to export competitive cotton textile goods to South and 
Southeast Asia. Hence, while the possession and building of merchant fleets could not be denied 
to Japan, Britain strongly demanded a definite cap.624  
Australia strongly demanded restricting Japan’s military capability. While Australia did 
not specifically refer to shipping, considering the intrinsic military value of ships, it can be safely 
assumed that its demands implied limiting Japan’s capacity in this sector. Perhaps because of 
Menzies’ pro-British inclination and sympathy towards its commercial concerns, Australia also 
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demanded economic restrictions in the treaty against potential competition from Japan. 
Meanwhile, New Zealand – although it believed that leaving Japan economically weak was 
unwise – opposed the rebuilding of the Japanese navy, arguing that Japan’s martial 
characteristics were still very much alive and that it could always use sea lanes to attack others. 
Hence, New Zealand favored treaty terms that would restrict Japan’s shipbuilding industry.625 
Meanwhile, although the Philippines did not oppose Japan’s rearmament, it too insisted 
on adequate guarantees against the latter’s possible re-emergence as a military threat. Moreover, 
it demanded that the Japan’s merchant vessels, together with industrial equipment and technical 
services, should be given as reparations, which would have undermined Japan’s shipbuilding and 
shipping capacity. Later (on 15 March 1951), the Philippines also added that it did not wish 
Japan to possess a navy.626  
Hence, by early 1951, it had become clear that Dulles would have to address the security 
and commercial concerns of Australia, Britain, New Zealand and the Philippines in order to 
avoid formal restrictions on Japan’s shipping and shipbuilding industry.627 Confident that he 
could find a viable solution, Dulles assured Yoshida on 7 February 1951 that the peace treaty 
would pose no restrictions on this industrial sector.628 To Dulles’ surprise, however, convincing 
other countries turned out to be much more difficult than he expected. 
On 12 March 1951, Britain once again argued that Japan had excess shipbuilding 
capacity and that the British industries must be protected against competition. Furthermore, on 
21 March 1951, Robert H. Scott (Undersecretary of Far Eastern Affairs from the British Foreign 
Office) explained to Allison that, in addition to commercial concerns, Britain also worried that 
the “innate characteristic of Japan” (its martial nature) had not changed since the war and hence 
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many of Japan’s shipyards could still be used for aggressive purposes. He therefore argued that a 
restrictive clause might be valuable in preventing potential Japanese aggression in the future.629  
On both occasions, however, the US expressed disagreement. The US did not believe that 
Japan had surplus capacity that could be dismantled, pointing to the fact that Japan’s merchant 
fleet had virtually been destroyed during the war. Additionally, because shipping in general was 
in short supply after WWII, the US believed that dismantling Japan’s shipbuilding facilities 
could only contribute to further worldwide shortages. Indeed, the US argued that Japan’s surplus 
shipbuilding capacity was vital to American security, considering the new shipping demands 
created by the Korean War. Furthermore, the Japanese government could not afford to destroy its 
shipbuilding capacity, lest this cause popular discontent. The US also observed that Japan’s 
shipbuilding output was naturally constrained due to its reliance on imports of steel, which was 
already in short supply, and on the raw materials from Southeast Asia required to construct steel. 
Hence, Britain need not worry about competition from Japan. Finally, the US noted that it was 
being lobbied by its own shipping interests to destroy some of Japan's ship-building capacity.630 
Indeed, the National Federation of American Shipping had protested against the expansion of 
Japanese shipping on the grounds that it could create difficulties for the American industry.631 
Accordingly, since the US government was resisting this domestic pressure for the sake of Japan, 
Britain should follow suit. 
While no agreement was reached at this stage, an updated draft peace treaty was 
produced on 23 March 1951 and distributed to the relevant powers. When Dulles went public to 
explain the “essentials” of the peace treaty at Whittier College on 31 March 1951, he stressed the 
need to avoid restricting Japan’s shipping and shipbuilding capacity. Dulles claimed that 
impairing Japan’s economy would incite “great public bitterness” in Japan and cause an 
“inhuman burden” on the Allies as Japan would continue to rely on their financial support.632 
To recall, the British Commonwealth had already in late 1947 agreed on the need to 
allow Japan to achieve a self-sustaining level of economic livelihood. Hence, Dulles’ pleas to be 
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mindful of Japan’s economy must have reverberated with Australia and New Zealand. 
Nevertheless, this did not mean that they no longer had qualms about Japan’s possible re-
emergence as a threat. Although this would eventually be resolved when the US agreed to offer a 
security guarantee (see Chapter 3), until this (ANZUS Pact) finally materialized, Australia and 
New Zealand continued to express concerns about Japan’s shipping and shipbuilding capacity. 
Indeed, even after Truman made a public statement on 18 April 1951 of his intention to continue 
working on this pact, Australia and New Zealand proposed that Japan should convert its 
shipbuilding capacity to other industrial uses. The State Department, however, responded that it 
saw “no justifiable economic grounds” for such a move and opposed adopting any such 
compulsory terms. The State Department also argued that the problem of shipping and 
shipbuilding could not be resolved “other than through economic approach.”633 In other words, 
ships were an economic rather than a security question. Also, it noted that since both countries 
had already agreed that there should be no economic restrictions on Japan, they should not insist 
on impeding the growth of Japan’s shipping and shipbuilding industry, lest it damage economic 
reconstruction. 
Meanwhile, South Korea demanded (on 26 April 1951) the return of “certain vessels” 
that had been confiscated by Japan during the colonial period. If this were not possible, then the 
treaty should include specific provisions for “some form of compensation by Japan.” 634 
Numerous Korean-registered ships had been anchored in Japan when the conflict suddenly ended, 
but had subsequently been prohibited by SCAP from crossing the sea back to Korea. 
Unsurprisingly, Korean ship-owners wanted these vessels back; otherwise, some compensation 
had to be made. These were portrayed as “just claims” that were important for South Korea’s 
economic life. However, the US had been prioritizing Japan’s economic recovery since 1949, 
and these vessels, however small, were seen as essential. Thus, as Korea’s demand meant the 
removal of important assets from Japan, the US naturally rejected it.635  
Around this time, the US and Japan each produced (respectively on 18 June 1951 and 25 
June 1951) studies of Japan’s current and future shipbuilding requirements. While the details 
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cannot be covered in full, both governments agreed that Japan did not have excess shipbuilding 
capacity and should be able to manufacture 500,000 tons of ships every year in order to restore 
its prewar living standard. Britain was informed accordingly by the US on 3 July 1951.636  
Britain, however, believed that both Japan and the US were inflating Japan’s shipping 
requirements. According to a Cabinet paper, dated 30 July 1951, an output of 400,000 tons per 
year, instead of 500,000, was more realistic. In other words, the Cabinet still believed that 
Japan’s shipbuilding capacity was excessive and that if it were not reduced it would lead to 
“intensified” competition with Britain, a prospect that was causing “widespread anxiety” within 
the British shipbuilding industry. Nevertheless, the Cabinet decided not to demand any formal 
treaty restriction, since the US would oppose it regardless of British opinion. Britain was also 
mindful of the shipping needs created by the Korean War. Furthermore, it recognized that Japan 
had to be able to find “some economic means” to support its population, lest the country fall into 
economic distress and be exploited by the communists. Finally, the Asian members of the 
Commonwealth – Ceylon, India and Pakistan – were “strongly opposed” to restricting Japan’s 
shipbuilding capacity.637 As explained in Chapter 6, both Britain and the US were trying to 
secure as many Asian representations in the peace treaty as possible, and hence had to be 
sensitive to their opinions. 
Still, Britain could not leave the issue unaddressed, as the British shipbuilders and ship 
operators were “extremely vocal.” Hence, Britain sought ways “outside the treaty” to curb 
Japan’s shipbuilding capacity by requesting that Japan voluntarily limit its shipbuilding 
capacity.638 The US was duly informed of this proposal on 2 August 1951.639 New Zealand also 
suggested that Japan voluntarily reduce its “excess” shipbuilding capacity.640 Accordingly, the 
US brought the Britain and New Zealand proposal before Japanese officials. The latter responded 
that, out of its 810,000 tons of annual shipbuilding capacity, some 133,000 tons capacity had 
been suspended or discontinued and that Japan was willing to take steps to assure that this 
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capacity would not be restored.641 The US also made another token concession to Britain, as 
Article 12(D) stipulated that Japan could not cite its “balance of payments” or its “external 
financial position” as a reason for discriminating against foreign shipping. 642  Meanwhile, 
although Australia was not entirely happy with the treaty crafted by the US, it acknowledged that 
the document was a “grim necessity” and it made no further demands for restriction.643 It should 
be noted that by this point the ANZUS treaty had been finalized (10 July 1951). Thus, it could be 
argued that since the security concerns of both Australia and New Zealand had been addressed, 
they were now willing to drop other demands.644 By early August 1951, the discussion over 




To conclude, the Japanese peace treaty did not restrict Japan’s shipping and shipbuilding, 
because the US worked vigorously to dissuade other countries from pursuing this line. Ever since 
shifting the emphasis from demilitarizing Japan to reconstructing its economy, the need to revive 
the latter’s shipping and shipbuilding industry to foster trade was stressed in the US. In order to 
convince other governments – particularly Australia, Britain and New Zealand – the US sought 
to address the security concerns of Japan’s Pacific neighbors, by providing security guarantees, 
while framing Japan’s shipping and shipbuilding industry as an economic question rather than a 
military one. At the same time, the US obtained Japan’s voluntary restriction of some of its 
shipbuilding capacity and extended token concession (Article 12-D). Ultimately, these actions, 
combined with the wide consensus among America’s allies on the need for Japan to rebuild its 
economy, allowed the US to silence demands for limiting Japan’s shipping and shipbuilding 
capacity, thereby removing one more obstacle that could have hampered proceeding promptly 
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Chapter 9. The Question of Fisheries and the Japanese Peace Treaty 
 
This chapter traces the formation of Article 9 of the Japanese peace treaty, which dictated 
Japan’s postwar fishing activities. Article 9 did not impose any restrictions on Japan’s fishing 
activities and simply obligated Japan to negotiate fisheries agreement with concerned 
countries.645 Considering the fact that many countries – as well as many American fishermen – 
had strongly advocated a stern treaty provision to limit Japan’s fishing grounds after the war, this 
was another surprising development. Why did the treaty not incorporate any restrictions against 
Japan’s fishing activities? This owed to the fact that the US, the most powerful actor in crafting 
the peace treaty, was committed to the principle of mare liberum (freedom of the seas) and was 
against creating any legal precedent that might damage this. At the same time, the US also 
wanted an early peace settlement that was geared towards rebuilding Japan’s economy and 
thought it best to address the specific questions related to Japanese fisheries through a separate 
agreement. 
This topic is significant in three respects. To begin with, considering the importance of 
the question of post-war Japanese fisheries during the peace treaty negotiation – fish in general is 
an important topic for Japan, not only because it constitutes an integral part of Japan’s everyday 
diet, but also because of its relevance to maritime law as elaborated in the section below – there 
is a surprising lack of analysis of this issue. While the existence of the issue has been 
acknowledged by a number of authors, again a detailed examination is lacking.646  
Of course, Japan’s post-war fishing activities have been researched extensively as a 
stand-alone topic by a number of scholars, most notably Harry Scheiber, a legal historian of 
oceanic regime and maritime law. These studies offer an excellent overview of the various 
international conflicts – as well as the domestic debate within the US between the government 
and the fishermen of the American West Coast – involving Japan’s deep-sea fishing in the 
Pacific. However, these studies are not strictly about the Japanese peace treaty; instead, the focus 
is broader taking in fisheries (environmental) regimes and oceanic law.647 In the case of Smith 
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and Shimizu, the question of Japan’s postwar fisheries is narrated as one part of the overall US 
occupation concern about securing resources (food) for Japan.648 This chapter attempts to add to 
these findings by examining the question of postwar Japanese fisheries specifically within the 
context of the Japanese peace settlement. 
Secondly, this chapter seeks to narrate the postwar Japanese fisheries issue from a more 
international angle. Japan’s fishing activity in the Pacific was a multilateral problem that 
involved several different countries, including Australia, Canada, Indonesia, Korea, New 
Zealand, the Philippines and the US. While existing studies have examined the discussion on 
fisheries between Japan and foreign governments, these studies are rather “compartmentalized” 
in that each author tends to focus on Japan’s interaction with a specific country or group of 
countries. Hence, for instance, the aforementioned books and articles tend to focus heavily on 
Japan’s dialogue with the United States without sufficiently taking into account the viewpoints 
of Asian countries. Others focus specifically on South Korea and touch very lightly on the 
viewpoints of western countries.649 Taking this into account, this study attempts to provide a 
more comprehensive account and try to understand the viewpoints of all the countries concerned. 
Thirdly, the question of postwar Japanese fisheries is unique in the sense that it was the 
only issue over which Dulles faced formidable domestic opposition.650 This is rather surprising, 
as the Japanese peace treaty in general did not receive a lot of attention from the American 
general public. Furthermore, the fisheries issue was the only issue in which other strong 
personalities played a key role. This is noteworthy in that the Japanese peace treaty in general 
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was Dulles’ one-man project, in which he exercised tremendous liberty over decision-making. In 
terms of fisheries, however, Wilbert Chapman and William C. Herrington would greatly 
influence Dulles’ decisions. 
 
Bad Press, Normative Changes, Conservation and Voluntary Restraint 
 
Before discussing Article 9 of the Japanese peace treaty, it is necessary to revisit certain 
developments from the past that would later have an important impact on the shaping of the 
fisheries terms of the treaty. To begin with, during the prewar era Japanese fisherman had 
received a “bad press” from various countries bordering the Pacific Ocean. This was most 
pronounced on the American West Coast, particularly among Alaskan salmon fishers. To 
elaborate, advances in fishing technology in the interwar period allowed Japanese fishing vessels 
to travel farther away from their coastal waters and by 1937 they were able to enter Bristol Bay 
(Bering Sea) off Alaska for salmon. Until then, Alaskan salmon had been fished exclusively by 
American vessels under strict government regulation. Salmon was designated by the US 
government as a resource that needed protection. In order to avoid depletion, how much and 
what kind of salmon could be caught was circumscribed. The Japanese fishermen, on the other 
hand, were free from such regulations. This naturally caused an outcry from American fishermen, 
who demanded that the US government expel the Japanese ships from “our [American]” waters. 
A portrait of Japan’s fishing practices as being predatory and ruthless was painted in trade-press 
articles, scholarly studies and political debates. 651  The fact that Japan refused to join the 
International Whaling Convention added to this negative image.652  
This bad press manifested itself again during the Japanese peace treaty talks, and the 
American West Coast fisheries interest strongly advocated that restrictive fishing terms should 
be included in the treaty. The attitude of the American fishing lobby was significant in that it had 
the ability to muster Congressional support and pose a real threat to the treaty. Hence, the 
American delegates in charge of the treaty negotiations had to be sensitive to their concerns.653  
The second important development was the erosion of the three-mile principle. During 
the early twentieth century the US and most other countries adhered to the idea that a country’s 
sovereignty over the seas was limited to those areas that lay within three miles from its coastline; 
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waters beyond this limit (the “high seas”) were not owned by anybody and therefore open to 
everybody (referred to as mare liberum). However, the appearance of Japanese fishing boats in 
the salmon fishing areas of the Bristol Bay – which were located outside the three-mile limit – 
led American fishers to demand that the federal government extend offshore jurisdiction beyond 
the traditional three-mile limit in order to keep the Japanese out of these waters. This sentiment 
was shared by a good number of Senators, as well as State Department officials. This lobbying 
eventually led to the “Truman proclamation” of 28 September 1945 which was the first public 
declaration of the US’s intention to review its adherence to the three-mile rule. This question of 
whether or not a country’s offshore jurisdiction should be extended beyond three miles would 
manifest itself frequently during the peace treaty negotiations.654  
The third important development was the increasing significance of “conservation,” as 
shown in the Truman proclamation. In order to avoid the depleting of fisheries resources, 
Truman publicly stated his intention to establish “conservation zones” on the “high seas.” These 
“conservation zones,” even though they would be located on the “high seas,” would be under US 
jurisdiction if the fisheries had been developed by the US.655 In short, offshore jurisdiction could 
be extended beyond three miles to keep foreign vessels out in the names of conservation. During 
the Japanese peace treaty negotiations, those advocating restrictive fisheries terms against Japan 
would frequently cite conservation as a justification. It should be noted that Truman himself 
never actually followed up on his declaration to create any “conservation zones.” Instead, he was 
committed to maintaining the three-mile rule. However, following Truman’s statement, Mexico 
(29 October 1945), Chile (23 June 1947), Peru (1 August 1947) and Costa Rica (2 November 
1949) proclaimed “conservation zones” off their coastal waters, extending their maritime borders 
beyond the three-mile limit. Hence, conservation was increasingly becoming an important 
political discourse, and consequently the US worked enthusiastically to obtain a Japanese 
commitment to conservationist principles.656 
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The fourth important development was the emergence of the idea of voluntary restraint. 
In response to the angry reaction among the Alaskan salmon fishers towards Japan’s fishing 
activities in the Bering Sea, Cordell Hull (Secretary of State) had asked Hirota Koki (Japanese 
Minister of Foreign Affairs) in 1938 to restrain Japanese fishermen from entering these areas. In 
order to avoid damaging US-Japan relations, already tense at the time from the ongoing Sino-
Japanese conflict, the Japanese government grudgingly consented in March 1938. This 
“voluntary restraint” set an important precedent for the Japanese peace treaty negotiators and 
would be revived once again in 1951.657  
To recap, there were four important developments before the Japanese peace treaty 
negotiations began that would profoundly affect the question of postwar Japanese fisheries: the 
bitter resentment of the American fishermen towards the Japanese fishermen for invading their 
seas; the challenge to the existing principle of the three-mile rule (mare liberum); the emerging 
debate on need for “conservation” of maritime resources; and the idea of voluntary restraint. It 
was against this backdrop that the treaty terms for postwar Japanese high seas fisheries were 
discussed. 
 
The Question of Fisheries and the Japanese Peace Treaty, 1945-1947 
 
Japan’s fishing industry was in a very sorry state at the end of the war, with many boats either 
sunk or heavily damaged. Furthermore, the SCAP on 20 August 1945, almost immediately after 
Japan’s surrender, prohibited the ocean sailing of all Japanese ships, including fishing vessels. 
Consequently, the fish catch dropped by half in the immediate postwar period. Combined with 
the massive inflow of overseas expatriates, Japan began to experience serious food shortages. 
Alarmed by these developments, the Japanese government requested the SCAP to relax its 
controls. The SCAP responded quickly. On 14 September 1945, the SCAP allowed wooden ships 
to fish within 12 miles of Japan’s coasts. This was quickly followed by another directive on 27 
September 1945 – the so-called “MacArthur Line” – that allowed Japan to fish in certain areas 
on the high seas. Thereafter, the SCAP incrementally expanded the permissible fishing areas for 
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Japan; within one year after the beginning of the occupation, Japan had recovered many parts of 
its prewar fishing grounds on the high seas, accounting for 80% of its catch.658  
Hence, from very early on, the US worked to allow Japan to re-enter its former fishing 
grounds. The immediate reason was the importance of tackling food shortages in Japan, not only 
for humanitarian concerns, but also because hunger provided an ideal breeding ground for 
communism.659 Additionally, the US believed that rebuilding Japan’s fishing capacity would 
lessen its own financial burden. It should also be noted that the US was committed to the 
principle of mare liberum and – with the notable exception of a few individuals – wished to 
eventually restore Japan’s open and equal access to the high seas.660  
The pressure from Japanese fishing interests for the relaxation of controls was very 
strong and SCAP, to a certain extent, had to respond to this. While food shortages were a 
powerful driving force, Japan was also equally motivated by sentimentality and pride. Many of 
the prewar fishing grounds in the Far East, which were important sources of mackerel, salmon 
and tuna – in particular, the waters surrounding the Korean peninsula, Russia (the Kurile Islands 
and Southern Sakhalin), Taiwan, South Pacific and the Bristol Bay area – had been developed 
extensively by Japanese fishermen who naturally wanted to recover them.661  
Here, a brief explanation of the aforementioned “MacArthur Line” is necessary, as it was 
one of the most important developments during the early occupation phase. This was an arbitrary 
line set by the SCAP to govern how far Japanese vessels were permitted to travel to fish on the 
high seas. Since its introduction on 27 September 1945, the MacArthur Line was revised twice – 
once on 22 June 1946 and again on 19 September 1949 – each time expanding the area open to 
Japanese vessels for fishing.662 Although the MacArthur Line was intended to maximize food 
production for Japan, it also contained two restrictive elements that would later affect the treaty 
negotiations. To begin with, in the name of conservation, it sought to prevent potential 
overexploitation of the high seas fisheries; hence, Japan’s fishing grounds remained proscribed. 
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At the same time, it sought to avoid disputes with neighboring countries. Thus, Japan was 
prohibited from fishing too close to the waters off China, Korea, the Philippines and Russia. Not 
surprisingly, Japan sought to undo the MacArthur Line, while certain countries, such as Korea, 
wished to maintain it in order to protect their own fishing interests.663   
The fact that the US increasingly adopted a lenient fisheries policy toward Japan was not 
welcomed by other countries. One of the earliest conflicts occurred when the SCAP allowed 
Japan to resume whaling off Antarctica in 1946 to increase food production. Various FEC 
members, especially Australia, expressed objections to this. This opposition was rooted in 
mistrust, due to Japan’s past failure to join conservation agreements and recent war experience. 
Australia, for instance, believed that Japan’s fishing operations had been a cloak for spying 
activities and other preparations for war. The US responded that the whaling was a “temporary” 
measure, and that any future Japanese whaling operations would be subject to prior consultation 
and strict adherence to international conservation agreements. With this assurance, the Allied 
complaints subsided. The truth of the matter, however, was that the State Department and 
MacArthur were opposed to restricting Japan’s fishing grounds, as they wanted a “liberal policy 
toward the Japanese economy” that ensured stable access to food.664 This line portended an 
inevitable clash between the US and other countries regarding the fisheries terms for the peace 
treaty. 
It was against this backdrop that the first draft peace treaty was developed. According to 
Article 49 of the draft 1947 peace treaty, Japan was to observe the terms of present and future 
international fishery conservation agreements “whether or not Japan is a party.” In the absence of 
such agreements, Japanese fishermen operating in certain areas of the high seas were obligated to 
observe the relevant state conservation regulations that applied there.665  
In some ways, Article 49 was punitive, as Japan was obligated to respect and adhere to 
other countries’ conservation regulations, while no reciprocal obligation was imposed on other 
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countries. Overall, however, it was lenient in the sense that the treaty did not prohibit Japan from 
entering any particular area of the high seas; it was largely in conformity with the principle of 
mare liberum. Obligating Japan to follow conservationist practices was most likely meant as a 
cushioning device to sell the idea of granting it equal and free access to the high seas to those 
countries that held grudges against its fishermen. This idea of obligating Japan to uphold 
conservationist practices in return for granting freedom of the seas would eventually be adopted 
in the final treaty. 
 
The Reverse Course and Fisheries Talk, 1948 to 1950 
 
To recall, between 1947 and 1949, the US shifted its policy from demilitarizing Japan to 
rebuilding its economy. Accordingly, the State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee 
(SANACC) on 16 December 1948 observed that fisheries were an important source of not only 
food but also foreign exchange for Japan. Hence, Japan should “eventually” be permitted access 
to “all high seas areas” with no limitation on the type and size of the Japanese fishing fleet.666 
Meanwhile, Sebald added that the peace treaty should avoid any fisheries terms that were more 
restrictive than those the Soviet Union might offer, lest Japan start to “play off the Soviet Union 
against the western powers.”667 This naturally strengthened the case of those advocating a liberal 
fishing policy for Japan. 
These developments were accompanied by a gradual weakening of those in the State 
Department who advocated the extension of maritime jurisdiction beyond the traditional three-
mile limit. This was especially true after the US clashed with Mexico over tuna fisheries off the 
Mexican coast. The Eastern Pacific off the coast of Mexico was a rich source of tuna, much 
coveted by fishermen from the American West Coast. The problem was that several Latin 
American countries, especially Mexico, wanted to protect this area from foreign vessels. For this 
purpose, Mexico referred to the Truman proclamation of 1945 and argued that, just as the US 
was willing to extend its maritime jurisdiction to protect its fisheries, so Mexico also wished to 
designate certain areas beyond the three-mile limit as a “conservation zone” to keep American 
fishermen out. The US thus found itself in a quandary. If the US sought to keep Japanese 
fishermen out of the Bristol Bay area by extending its maritime jurisdiction, the Mexicans would 
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use the same formula to keep American trawlers from Mexican waters. This was not a 
welcoming prospect for the US. As a result, the State Department started to distance itself from 
the Truman proclamation and instead stressed America’s adherence to the traditional three-mile 
principle.668  
Concomitantly, the idea of adopting any restrictive fisheries terms in the Japanese peace 
treaty also became less favored. Of course, there still was a minority opinion that wanted to 
adopt a more regulatory approach. The most notable figure was Wilbert McLeod Chapman, the 
special assistant to the Under-Secretary of State for Fisheries and Wildlife. Chapman had strong 
ties with the American West Coast fisheries. Unsurprisingly, he sought to curtail the activities of 
the Japanese fishing fleet in the North and East Pacific, especially in the Bristol Bay area, where 
American fisheries interests were most at stake. For this purpose, he drafted a bilateral fisheries 
treaty to be signed with Japan based on a formula of “mutual forbearance,” which prevented both 
parties from fishing within 150 miles of each other’s coastline.669 
However, when Chapman’s draft treaty was conveyed to the SCAP in October 1949, 
MacArthur rejected it, arguing that the restrictive nature of the treaty could become a precedent 
for other countries to exclude Japan from their waters. MacArthur also cited the Atlantic Charter 
and the Potsdam Declaration, which committed the American government to the principle of 
equal access to raw materials for all countries. MacArthur claimed that violating the Atlantic 
Charter would damage American leadership in Japan and the rest of world.670 The Far Eastern 
specialists and economic policy makers in the State Department backed MacArthur and 
advocated Japan’s freedom to undertake fishing activities on the high seas of the Pacific.671 
Canada was also against Chapman’s formula, albeit for different reasons (see footnote), and this 
strengthened the case for the advocates of mare liberum.672 And as will be explained below, 
Chapman himself would also later move away from the restrictive approach, so as to protect 
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American tuna interests off the coast of Mexico. In short, the opponents of mare liberum 
increasingly lost ground. 
These developments led to the emergence of a new “subtractive” approach to fisheries. 
Prior to the “reverse course,” the SCAP took an “additive” approach; the departure point was that 
Japan was wholly prohibited from the high seas, and the SCAP would add piecemeal exceptions 
and allow Japan gradually to enter certain areas that had previously been off-limits. In contrast, 
the departure point now was that Japan was entitled to unrestricted access to the high seas, and it 
would only be prohibited from entering certain areas in exceptional cases. This was expressed at 
a FEC meeting of 24 May 1949, when the US argued that while other member states were 
welcome to forbid the entry of Japanese fishing boats to certain areas of the high seas, such 
restrictions had to be backed by clear “security reasons” or “legitimate conservation measures.” 
Otherwise, Japan should be free to fish on the high seas.673 The final peace treaty ultimately 
embodied this “subtractive” approach. 
However, the growing consensus within the US government for mare liberum was 
opposed by a formidable lobby of American fishermen from Alaska and West Coast. After 
WWII, a coalition of fishery interests in the American West Coast – including boat owners, 
fishermen and cannery operators – had formed the Pacific Fisheries Conference (PFC) in 1946 to 
defend Bristol Bay from Japan’s fishing vessels. The PFC was a powerful lobbying group with 
strong ties to Congress. For Dulles, addressing the concerns of the PFC proved to be very 
important, lest the Senate reject the Japanese peace treaty.674  
In order to obtain support for Japan’s free access to the high seas from other governments 
and the domestic American fisheries lobby, the State Department thought it best to obtain written 
assurances from Yoshida that Japan would observe conservationist principles. In response, the 
Japanese Foreign Ministry issued a letter to the State Department on 20 March 1950, indicating 
its intention to accede to the International Whaling Convention and to join other international 
agreements for regulating halibut and tuna. It also indicated Japan’s willingness to voluntarily 
restrain its fishermen from entering the Bristol Bay area, just as it had done in 1938.675 This 
letter would eventually allow Dulles to isolate the fisheries problems from the peace treaty and 
prevent any restrictive terms that could damage Japan’s free access to the high seas. 
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Overcoming International and Domestic Pressure against Mare Liberum for Japan 
 
By the time the Japanese peace treaty discussions revived, it had become a foregone conclusion 
that the terms dictating Japan’s postwar fisheries would be premised on the principle of mare 
liberum. In order to ensure Japan’s free and equal access to the high seas, Dulles first sought to 
isolate the question of fisheries from the peace treaty. This was no easy task, as the most vocal 
opposition came from the British Commonwealth, America’s closest partner in the treaty 
negotiations. Indeed, the Commonwealth view on postwar Japanese fisheries did not exactly 
conform to the principle of mare liberum. For instance, when the British Commonwealth 
members convened in London in May 1950 to discuss the Japanese peace settlement, the 
member states agreed that the treaty should oblige Japan to observe existing international 
conventions and make other conservation arrangements. The British Commonwealth also 
entertained the idea of allocating specific fishing areas to Japan.676 
Dulles also had to wrestle with the domestic lobby, the PFC, which continued to make 
strong demands for a restrictive fisheries policy. Here there emerged another formidable 
individual, who would pose a significant challenge to Dulles, Edward Allen. Allen, a lawyer and 
the vice chairman of PFC, was a staunch defender of American fishing interests. His position 
was clearly outlined in a letter he sent to Dulles on 23 June 1950. In this communication, Allen 
pointed out that the maritime resources of the Northeastern Pacific, specifically sardines, herring, 
tuna, halibut and salmon, were an important source of income for American and Canadian 
fishermen. The problem was that these resources were often found outside “territorial waters,” 
which meant that anybody was free to catch them. The Japanese fishermen had “ruthlessly” 
exploited this freedom in the past and if they were not “in some way” restricted, then they would 
again devastate the fisheries. Allen therefore opposed an “unrestricted peace treaty” and 
demanded that some form of regulation be adopted, either through the peace treaty or some 
“concurrent” agreement. The formula that Allen envisioned was reminiscent of Chapman’s 
earlier “mutual forbearance” proposal, in which the Japanese and US/Canadian fishermen would 
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“stay out of each other’s coastal fisheries” that had been respectively conserved and 
developed.677  
Surprisingly, the fisheries issue did not initially receive a lot of attention from foreign 
governments. Indeed, when Dulles distributed his seven principles – which stated that Japan 
would “adhere to multilateral treaties” dealing with fishing – to FEC member states in September 
1950, with the exception of Canada, no strong opinions were expressed.678 Instead, Dulles had to 
confront senatorial inquiries from Harry P. Cain (Republican, Washington) and William F. 
Knowland (Republican, California), both representing West Coast fishing interests, who asked 
him if the treaty would protect US fishing rights. In response, Dulles explained that he wished to 
tackle the question of fisheries separately from the peace treaty.679  
Meanwhile, perhaps aware of the strength of the PFC, Japan sent a fishing industry 
delegation to the US to confer with the PFC on 9 November 1950.680 The Japanese delegation 
admitted that its fishermen wished to enter the North American coastal waters in order to 
increase fishery production. Furthermore, it stated its opposition to any treaty restrictions that 
would limit Japan’s high-seas fishing, since this might create an “unfortunate precedent” for 
other countries to also forbid its vessels from entering other specified areas on the high seas. 
Nevertheless, the delegation acknowledged its past indifference to conservation and expressed its 
willingness to enter into a “binding (and reciprocal) agreement”, separately from the peace treaty, 
that would keep Americans and Japanese from entering each other’s coastal waters.681  
Following this conversation, the PFC released a resolution on 29 November 1950, 
demanding the adoption of a provision in either the peace treaty or another concurrent agreement 
to “ensure that Japanese fishermen will stay out of the fisheries of the Northeast Pacific.”682 This 
demand – which essentially called for mutual forbearance – was repeated by Miller Freeman 
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(PFC Chairman) and Allen on 11 December 1950 and 12 January 1951, respectively.683 In light 
of these pressures, on 15 December 1950 Knowland proposed incorporating a mutual 
forbearance formula in the peace treaty, in which Japan would “refrain from entering the 
developed fisheries of the other signatory powers” while other countries would refrain from 
entering the developed fisheries of Japan. Knowland also suggested that the treaty obligate Japan 
to join the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling that had been signed at 
Washington in December 1946.684 
However, Chapman – who had now moved away from his earlier regulatory approach –
opposed Knowland’s proposal. In his letter to Dulles on 4 January 1951, Chapman explained that 
mutual forbearance would not only set a precedent for other countries to restrict Japan’s high 
seas fisheries, but could also possibly delay the peace settlement. Instead, Chapman advised that 
Dulles divorce the fisheries question from the treaty and address it through separate agreements 
between Japan and the concerned countries. 685  Chapman also proposed reviving the 1938 
voluntary restraint formula. Before Dulles embarked on his trip to Tokyo, Chapman delivered 
(on 10 January 1951) a draft statement to be handed to Yoshida. The core idea was that Yoshida 
would make a public declaration that Japan would promptly negotiate appropriate fisheries 
agreements with concerned countries for conservation purposes. Until such time, the Japanese 
government would voluntarily prohibit its vessels from entering those fishing grounds in the 
Bristol Bay area that had been developed by Canada and the US.686  
Perhaps in order to facilitate an early peace settlement, Yoshida accepted Chapman’s 
draft statement with some revisions. According to Yoshida’s memorandum to Dulles (dated 7 
February 1951), Japan recognized the importance of conservation efforts to prevent the 
exhaustion of high seas fisheries and would “as soon as practicable” enter into negotiations with 
other countries. However, Yoshida insisted that this should be after the peace treaty came into 
effect. In the meantime, Japan would “as a voluntary act” prohibit fishing operations in 
“presently conserved fisheries,” including the “eastern Pacific Ocean and Bering Sea [Bristol 
Bay].”687 Yoshida’s statement was made public on 13 February 1951.688 Japan was now formally 
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committed to conservation and voluntary restraint, in return for its eventual free access to the 
high seas.689  
Unfortunately for Dulles, however, Yoshida’s promises did not yield immediate results. 
Instead, on 14 February 1951, soon after Yoshida’s statement, the Michigan Wholesale Grocers 
Association complained to Senator Arthur Vandenberg (Republican, Michigan) that Japanese 
fishing activities had led to a “considerable depletion” of salmon and a concomitant rise in 
production costs and retail price. To remedy the situation, the Association argued that the peace 
treaty should restrict Japanese fishing vessels from entering Alaskan territorial waters. Although 
Vandenberg doubted the practicability of the Association’s proposal, he nevertheless cautioned 
Dulles that “some protection measures” were necessary for American fisheries.690  
In response, Dulles worked vigorously to sell his agreement with Yoshida to the West 
Coast Senators and Representatives in the hope of avoiding any restrictive fisheries clause in the 
peace treaty.691 Meanwhile, Chapman sought to court the PFC, since this meant that the entire 
West Coast fishing interest could be won over. Thankfully, these efforts began to bear fruit. On 
15 March 1951, Chapman informed Dulles that there was now a general agreement in the 
American fisheries industry that an arrangement with Japan should be made separately from the 
peace treaty. This was an important step towards preventing a restrictive fisheries clause. 
However, Chapman was also aware that the grievances of the American West Coast 
fishing interests were still strong and unresolved. Hence, he recommended that the State 
Department should start working immediately on a fisheries agreement with Japan – although its 
signature would have to wait until the peace treaty came into effect – lest the fishing interests 
become impatient.692 In order to facilitate agreement with Japan, Chapman produced a draft 
“International Convention for the Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean” on 15 March 1951, 
incorporating the principle of voluntary restraint.693 
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Just as Chapman had warned, the PFC sent a letter to Acheson on 21 March 1951, 
insisting that the State Department should “at once” start drafting the future fisheries agreement 
with Japan. 694  Furthermore, a joint memorandum was adopted by the Senators and 
Representatives from Oregon, demanding a safeguard against Japanese incursions into American 
waters.695 The negotiation process for this trilateral agreement warrants a separate analysis, and 
thus will not be dealt with in this chapter. Here, it suffices to say that in response to this 
mounting pressure, the State Department from April 1951 began discussion on the terms of the 
fisheries agreement with Japan. 
In addition to the domestic outcry, Dulles also had to wrestle with other governments that 
had qualms about a non-restrictive fisheries clause. Even while Dulles was working on his 
exchange of letters with Yoshida, Gascoigne remarked that Japan had in the past been “guilty of 
poaching, overfishing and using their fishing vessels for intelligence purposes.” It was therefore 
“reasonable” to restrain Japan through the peace treaty.696 Fortunately for Dulles, Britain on 13 
March 1951 informed Washington that if the US opposed adopting any restrictive treaty terms, 
then Britain was open to negotiating a separate fisheries convention with Japan. This was 
precisely the formula that Dulles was working on and the US gladly expressed agreement.697  
Amid the on-going debate on Japan’s future fishing activities, a new draft peace treaty 
was developed on 23 March 1951 and circulated to other governments for comment. Article 9 of 
this draft simply stated that Japan would promptly negotiate separate conventions with the 
concerned governments for protecting high seas fisheries. 698 Otherwise, no restrictions were 
incorporated. Dulles defended this policy by arguing that trying to permanently regulate Japan’s 
high-seas fisheries in the treaty would delay its conclusion, as it would require coordinating the 
conflicting views of multiple countries. The better alternative therefore was to work on a series 
of bilateral agreements with Japan. As a cushioning device, Dulles also stressed the fact that 
Yoshida had committed himself to negotiating fisheries agreement after the conclusion of the 
peace treaty and that Japan would voluntarily restrain its activities in the meantime.699 
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Britain, whose responses were sent on multiple occasions between April and June 1951, 
meandered between proposing and withdrawing a provision that obligated Japan to restrain 
fishing in certain areas of the high seas until an international agreement had been signed. While 
the US agreed that Japan should voluntarily restrain its fishing operations until the conclusion of 
international fisheries agreement, the US was against documenting this in the peace treaty. As an 
alternative, the US wanted the British Commonwealth countries to come to some type of 
understanding directly with the Japanese separate from the peace treaty. Yoshida was also 
consulted to see if he would be willing to make a “further voluntary declaration” to restrain 
fishing in the conserved areas.700 He complied and on 13 July 1951 publicly committed Japan to 
voluntarily restrain its activities in the presently conserved areas in “all waters” until the signing 
of the fisheries arrangements with concerned countries.701 Afterwards, Britain no longer made an 
issue out of the fisheries clause. 
Meanwhile, South Korea was vehemently opposed to Dulles’ lenient fisheries policy. On 
26 April, 9 July and 19 July 1951, South Korea demanded that the MacArthur Line remain in 
effect, at least until Japan entered into the international fisheries agreement. South Korea’s 
demands had multiple dimensions. To begin with, fishing was an important source of foreign 
exchange for Korea after WWII, and hence Japanese fishing off the Korean coast was perceived 
as an economic threat. Equally important was the fact that Koreans had been harboring envy and 
bitterness towards Japan’s fishing practices stretching back to the late nineteenth century. On the 
one hand, the Japanese fishermen, who enjoyed better fishing technology than Koreans, had been 
able to reap considerable profit; on the other hand, their voracious catch caused the near-
exhaustion of Korean fisheries. As if to fan the flames, throughout the postwar occupation period, 
Japanese fishermen frequently crossed the MacArthur Line to fish near the Korean coast, 
especially during the Korean War, when the American military was focused on fighting the war 
and fisheries supervision became looser. South Korea also felt that Japan’s growing deep-sea 
fishing indicated the potential re-emergence of a military threat, citing the fact that many of the 
former naval officers and seamen had been transferred to fisheries training institutes. Dulles, 
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however, rejected South Korea’s request, arguing that the US had gone a long way to silence 
“great pressure” from both other countries and American fishing interests and that any changes at 
this point would cause a “very serious delay” in the treaty. The State Department also secretly 
confided that South Korea’s request could damage Japan’s economic recovery. Instead, South 
Korea was advised to negotiate a bilateral fisheries agreement with Japan.702  
While Korea’s request was rejected, this did not mean that its concerns were totally 
disregarded. Indeed, they were taken quite seriously by the State Department, as indicated in 
Herrington’s letter to Dulles of 23 July 1951. In this letter, Herrington explained that Korea had 
legitimate concerns about Japanese fishing activities. He pointed out that Japanese fishing boats, 
which were “much superior” to those of Korea, had the potential to “swarm into water 
surrounding Korean Peninsula” and deplete the stocks of fish that South Korea depended upon. 
Hence, Herrington suggested that the US offer its good offices to arrange “some international 
agreement” between Korea and Japan for the management of the fish resources of this area.703  
Canada also expressed some concerns. On 23 July 1951, A.D.P Heeny (Acting Secretary 
of State for the Canadian Ministry of External Affairs) informed Washington that while Canada 
welcomed Japan’s voluntary restraint, its concerns were not entirely resolved.704 Canada wished 
to engage in more detailed discussions about the future conservation agreement with Japan.705 To 
recall, the State Department had started working on a fisheries convention with Japan since April 
1951; perhaps in response to Canada’s demands – combined with the fact the PFC on 29 July 
1951 once again stressed the need to prevent “Japanese invasion” – the American fisheries 
experts invited Canadian officials to partake in discussing the future of Japan’s fisheries 
problem.706 These discussions would eventually culminate in a trilateral convention between 
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Canada, Japan and the US (International Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the North 
Pacific Ocean) signed on 9 May 1952. 
Between May and August 1951, Australia, the Netherlands and the Philippines also 
demanded revising Article 9 to restrict Japan’s high seas fisheries until the signing of an 
international fisheries agreement. All three countries wished to prevent Japanese fishermen from 
operating off their territorial waters; the Netherlands and Australia were particularly worried 
about the tuna and trochus shell site off New Guinea that they had respectively developed. The 
US, however, was against inserting any provision governing fishing on the high seas, as this 
would delay the treaty’s conclusion. Instead, the US stressed that concrete solutions should be 
found outside the treaty through separate arrangements and that the three governments should be 
satisfied with Japan’s commitment to voluntary restriction in the meantime. Perhaps because 
fishing was not the priority for the three governments they quickly relented.707  
By the end of August 1951, the multilateral fisheries talks were therefore over. The US 
had successfully prevented any formal restriction of Japan’s postwar high seas fisheries. This 




To conclude, Article 9 of the Japanese peace treaty was a product of hard bargaining between 
two opposing schools of thought. One group wished to protect the principle of mare liberum and 
apply the same principle (free and equal access to the high seas) to Japan. The other group 
wished to challenge the traditional notion of the three-mile rule and to curb Japanese fishing 
activities in the high seas in the name of conservation. Dulles and many other State Department 
officials belonged to the former, while many non-US governments and the American West Coast 
fishing lobby belonged to the latter. In order to ensure that Japan would eventually be granted 
free and equal access to the high seas, while also paving the way for a prompt conclusion of 
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peace with Japan, Dulles came up with a two-pronged solution. The first was to divorce the issue 
of fisheries from the peace treaty and simply state Japan’s intention to negotiate separate 
conservation agreements with concerned countries. The second was to obtain Japan’s 
commitment that until such an arrangement could be signed, it would voluntarily restrain from 
fishing in areas that were developed and conserved by other countries. This approach, aided by 
the fact that fishery control was not the most pressing issue for some governments, ultimately 
allowed Dulles to proceed promptly with a lenient peace. 
Article 9 indicated the triumph of mare liberum. At the same time, Japan’s fishing 
industry was able to avoid being permanently crippled.708 However, it was also a controversial 
formula that favored American and Japanese interests over those of other countries and later led 
to complications, the details of which will be discussed in the last chapter. 
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Chapter 10. The Territorial Terms and Undefined Ownership 
 
Perhaps no other aspect of the peace treaty produced consequences that have been as long-lived 
and visibly controversial as its territorial terms. Indeed, the questions of ownership regarding the 
“Northern Territories” (Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan and Habomai islands), Tokdo/Takeshima 
(Liancourt Rocks) and Taiwan, for instance, have outlived the era of US-Soviet rivalry that first 
begot them and continue to pose a challenging diplomatic agenda for China, Japan, Korea and 
Russia. The Ryukyu Islands (Okinawa), whose sovereignty was reverted back to Japan in 1972, 
also continue to plague US-Japan relations due to the presence of American military bases and 
have created controversy over ownership of the Daioyu/Senkaku islands between the PRC, the 
ROC and Japan. There is also the “South China Sea” dispute, involving two island groups – the 
Spratly and Paracel islands – which continues among Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, the PRC, 
the ROC and Vietnam. Taking this into account, this chapter seeks to understand how these 
controversies originated. 
According to Article 2 of the Japanese peace treaty, Japan simply “renounces all right, 
title and claim” to “Formosa and the Pescadores” (Taiwan), “Kurile Islands,” “Antarctic area,” 
“Spratly Islands” and “Paracel Islands.” Who therefore has sovereignty over them is unclear. 
Likewise, Japan simply concurred to the idea of placing the Ryukyus under a UN trusteeship 
system, but who owned the islands was never specified. Of course, Antarctica is not owned by 
anybody, and hence no ownership was stipulated. Also, as will be explained in the conclusion, 
the Liancourt Rocks were not even mentioned in the treaty, and the dispute over its ownership 
continues to this day.709 This naturally leads to the question: why did the treaty not clarify 
ownership over these island territories? 
This chapter argues that territorial ownership was left intentionally vague, as the US 
wanted to avoid a “domino” effect. In other words, aware that clarity for one territory would 
require clarity for all, the US opted for a consistent “vagueness for all” approach. This was a 
politically convenient solution that had multiple advantages for the US, most importantly 
safeguarding its own influence in the Pacific, while denying it to the Soviet Union. 
This study is significant in two respects. To begin with, as already noted above, it has 
contemporary significance, as the territorial disputes resulting from the peace treaty continue in 
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the Asia-Pacific. Better understanding of how these problems originated will perhaps contribute 
to the formulation of a potential solution. Secondly, it adds to the existing literature by 
reconstructing the narrative through a different angle. Simply put, there is hardly any 
comprehensive analysis of how the individual terms for the different islands under Article 2 were 
inter-related. There is a plethora of studies that focus on specific island territories. For instance, 
John J. Stephans, David Rees, Kimura Hiroshi, Fiona Hill and Brad Williams examine the 
historical development of the dispute between Japan and Russia over the Kuril islands. 710 
Meanwhile, the questions relating to Okinawa have been examined by such authors as Watanabe 
Akio and Robert Eldridge.711 The territorial dispute between Korea and Japan over the Liancourt 
Rocks has been written about extensively by Chŏng Pyŏngchun.712 All of these works, however, 
tackle the specific islands individually and thus do not sufficiently explain how the terms agreed 
over one specific island affected the others. Of course, there have been some attempts to link the 
treatment of the different islands. Hasegawa Tsuyoshi and Wada Haruki, for example, examine 
the link between the Kuril islands and Ryukyus.713 However, they do not sufficiently explain 
how the Kurils and the Ryukyus were also related to other islands, such as Taiwan and the 
Spratly/Paracel groups. 
In 2007, Hara Kimie wrote a groundbreaking analysis that sought to examine all the 
territories that were addressed in the Japanese peace treaty. Hara convincingly argues that the 
territorial terms of the treaty were determined by the US-Soviet rivalry, and that the relevant 
clauses were deliberately phrased to serve the interests of the free world while undermining those 
of the communist bloc. The most salient feature of Hara’s work is that she examines the roles of 
other governments that had hitherto been overlooked, including all the British Commonwealth 
countries, China, Korea and the Philippines.714 However, Hara’s main framework is the Cold 
War and its impact on the fate of the islands. This chapter takes a slightly different angle by 
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focusing on the idea of “undefined ownership,” a formula that predated the Cold War, and is 
therefore structured and narrated differently. 
 
The Mandate Islands, the Ryukyus, and the Spratly and Paracel Islands 
 
The first island groups to which the formula of undefined ownership was applied were the 
Mandate Islands, the Ryukyu Islands, and the Spratly and Paracel Islands. The so-called 
Japanese Mandate Islands referred to a group of islands in the southern Pacific – the Caroline 
Islands, Mariana Islands and Marshall Islands (commonly referred to as Micronesia) – that Japan 
gained from Germany after WWI. With the Pacific War – combined with the increasing 
importance of air power in modern warfare and the need to consider American strategic 
objectives from a more global perspective – these islands became intricately linked to American 
security interests.715 Indeed, during the Pacific War, the JCS opined that the Mandates should 
come under US control and form a part of a chain of naval and air bases, stretching from Hawaii 
to the Philippines and the Bonin Islands. Roosevelt too showed interest in building permanent 
bases upon them. Combined with the fact that Australia and New Zealand, for their own security, 
also favored US control over these islands, securing American influence became ever more 
important. It should be noted that the Mandate Islands also had commercial value as stopping 
points on an important maritime transportation route. After many months of internal bickering 
over the appropriate form of control over the islands – the military proposed outright annexation, 
which the State Department opposed – the US at the end of WWII settled on a compromise 
solution: UN trusteeship. Under the guise of international supervision, trusteeship would allow 
the US to exert influence over these islands without the appearance of overt imperialism.716  
It was against this backdrop that UNSC Resolution 21 was adopted on 2 April 1947. 
According to this resolution, the Japanese Mandate Islands were placed under the “Trusteeship 
System” (Article 1), with the US as the “Administering Authority” (Article 2) that was entitled 
“to establish naval, military and air bases” (Article 5). And while the ultimate aim was to work 
towards the “independence” of the islands (Article 76-b), trusteeship over them could “not be 
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altered…or terminated without the consent of the Administering Authority” (Article 12).717 In 
other words, the US secured a blank cheque over the islands. 
The terms regarding the Mandated Islands in the peace treaty were phrased in accordance 
with UNSC Resolution 21. According to Article 6 of the 1947 draft treaty, Japan “renounces all 
rights and titles to the former Japanese Mandated Islands.”718 Since the trust territories were not 
really owned by anybody, the rightful owners of the islands were not defined. This term would 
remain unchanged and was ultimately adopted in the final peace treaty. Equally important, this 
set a precedent for the use of unspecified ownership for other controversial islands in subsequent 
years. 
As in the case of the Japanese Mandate Islands, the military – and particularly the Navy – 
also emphasized, even during the Pacific War, the strategic importance of securing US control 
over Okinawa for building bases there. However, the State Department opposed outright 
annexation, since it did not want to generate criticism that the US sought territorial 
aggrandizement.719 While no concrete agreement was reached between the military and civilian 
sector, the Ryukyus by the end of the war came under US military control and were practically 
treated as another country, separate from Japan. 720 Even after the war, the JCS lobbied for 
Okinawa to be brought under “exclusive US strategic control” (JCS 570/40, 23 October 1945).721 
However, the State Department remained cautious and once again stressed that the “Ryukyu 
Islands should be regarded as minor islands to be retained by Japan” (SWNCC 59/1, 24 June 
1946).722  
The State Department’s attitude was reflected in the 1947 draft peace treaty, which 
included the Ryukyus within Japan’s territorial limits.723 As already noted in the first chapter, 
MacArthur immediately protested against this, arguing that Okinawa was strategically important 
for the US and thus had to be retained under American control. Moreover, even certain members 
of the British Commonwealth, in particular Australia, supported the idea of placing the Ryukyus 
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under a trusteeship with the US as the sole authority. 724  The military branches of the US 
government too favored this level of control, possibly through a strategic trusteeship with the US 
as the administering authority. The State Department, however, continued to express reservations. 
Not only would the Soviet Union almost certainly veto such an arrangement, but also the whole 
concept of trusteeship – which was geared towards eventual “independence” – implied 
permanent separation from Japan.725  
However, on 5 November 1948, Truman approved NSC 13/1, which stated that the US 
should retain Okinawa and build bases there “on a long-term basis.”726 On 6 May 1949, a new 
draft, NSC 13/3, was approved by Truman. It stated that the official US policy was to retain 
Okinawa and maintain facilities there as long as the JCS deemed it necessary. Also, in order to 
legitimize American long-term control over the islands, it was stated that “international sanction” 
should be sought.727 The peace treaty was revised accordingly and, as mentioned in Chapter 2, 
the September 1949 draft peace treaty stated that the Ryukyu Islands would be placed under a 
UN trusteeship, although to whom the islands ultimately belonged was not specified. 
It is interesting to note that the ROC at one point demanded that the Ryukyu Islands be 
given to China. On 2 June 1948, John Leighton Stuart (US Ambassador to the ROC) informed 
Washington that the ROC Parliament had decided that the Japanese peace treaty should stipulate 
that the Ryukyu Islands would be “returned” to China.728 However, as explained in Chapter 4, 
many in the State Department by 1949 believed that the ROC would fall to the communists 
anytime; it thus did not make sense to entrust a strategically important island chain to a regime 
that might soon disappear. Furthermore, the State Department noted on 29 July 1949 that there 
was a possibility that the PRC might also claim ownership over the Ryukyus.729 Since the goal 
was to avoid the Ryukyus from falling to the communists, the best course of action was simply to 
secure the US control over the island rather than giving it to “China.” 
Meanwhile, Japan enthusiastically sought to maintain its sovereignty over the island 
chain. For instance, Ashida Hitoshi (Japanese Foreign Minister) on 6 June 1947 publicly stressed 
the “sentimental value” of Okinawa for Japan and expressed hope for its restoration. 
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Subsequently, Asakai Kōichirō (Director of General Affairs, Central Liaison Office) conferred 
with Atcheson on 3 July 1947 and passed on to him a study completed by the Foreign Ministry, 
which included a detailed overview of Okinawan history, religion and people in order to 
reinforce the call for its return. In addition, the “Ashida memorandum” – which contained nine 
essential requirements for the Japanese peace treaty – that was delivered to SCAP in July 1947 
implicitly demanded the return of Okinawa. Although the memorandum was rejected on the 
grounds that it was not appropriate for the vanquished to make demands on the victors, this must 
have sent a clear message to the US that Japan expected the Ryukyus to be returned, thus 
strengthening the wisdom of leaving their ownership unspecified. In this way, the US could 
retain its influence over the islands in a way that did not openly conflict with the Japanese claim 
of sovereignty. 
Although of a different nature, the Spratly and Paracel Islands – a group of islands 
located in the Pacific, surrounded by Malaysia, the PRC, the ROC, the Philippines and Vietnam 
– also met the same fate. The islands are, due to their strategic significance as maritime 
communications route, bound to cause territorial disputes. Even at the time of the Japanese peace 
treaty negotiations, China and France were arguing over territorial ownership. This dispute 
stretched back to the nineteenth century, when France began to assert its authority over Southeast 
Asia and eventually clashed with China, whose sailors had visited the islands for centuries. Amid 
the on-going controversy, the Japanese had taken over the islands by force during the Sino-
Japanese War.730 By the end of the war, with Japan driven out of the islands, the dispute between 
China and France re-emerged. 
Aware of this complex history, the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East 
(IDACFE) that was debating territorial questions for the peace treaty on 14 February and 25 
February 1946 agreed that the treaty should simply eliminate Japanese sovereignty over the 
islands and maintain the antebellum “status quo,” leaving the French and the Chinese to resolve 
their differences.731 Accordingly, the 1947 draft peace treaty was phrased in such a way as to 
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obligate Japan to renounce the islands without specifying ownership.732 This was maintained 
until the 29 December 1949 draft (Article 8).733 Interestingly, this term disappeared temporarily 
with the advent of Dulles, only to be revived when the French demanded the return of this clause 
in June 1951.  
It should be noted that the disposition of Antarctica was also discussed within the State 
Department in 1947. Japan had hitherto shown interest in the region, partly because of its 
whaling industry. However, the advent of Japanese whalers into the Antarctic region in the early 
twentieth century, combined with Japan’s consistent refusal to adhere to conservation protocols 
for whaling – as well as the military threat it posed during the war – caused considerable disquiet 
in Australia and New Zealand. After the war, the latter two countries tried to influence the US to 
prevent Japanese whalers from returning to the Antarctic.734 As explained in Chapter 9, the US 
refused to prohibit Japanese whaling activities after the war due to economic reasons. However, 
the State Department did obligate Japan to renounce “all territorial claims in the Antarctic” 
(Article 8).735 Since Antarctica was not owned by anybody, no ownership was specified. 
In sum, by the time the US first attempted to convene a Japanese peace conference, the 
draft treaty had adopted a formula of Japan’s renunciation of territorial sovereignty without 
specifying ownership for four island groups: the former Japanese Mandate Islands, Ryukyu 
Islands, the Spratly and Paracel Islands, and Antarctica. It would remain that way for these 
islands. This formula would later be applied to Taiwan and the Kuril Islands as well. It is to this 
question that we now turn. 
 
Detaching Taiwan from “China” 
 
According to the 1943 Cairo Declaration, “Formosa and the Pescadores shall be restored to the 
Republic of China.”736 This was reaffirmed in the 1945 Potsdam Declaration.737 Accordingly, the 
1947 draft peace treaty stipulated that Japan “cedes to China in full sovereignty the island of 
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Taiwan.” 738  Over time, however, this would change with the expulsion of the ROC from 
mainland China. 
As explained in Chapter 4, Acheson believed that the ROC was doomed and discreetly 
sought to facilitate its disappearance. Hence, placing Taiwan under the Chinese Nationalists was 
viewed as unwise. One must be careful to note, however, that while both Truman and Acheson 
took a realist approach and were willing to let the Chinese Nationalists run their course, neither 
of them felt happy to see the PRC consolidate control over the mainland or welcomed 
communist control of Taiwan.739 In fact, Taiwan had to be denied to the communists if possible. 
Although the State Department did not believe that communist control of Taiwan would 
critically threaten American security, this did not mean that the island’s strategic value was 
completely discounted. The Pentagon was especially vocal in this, arguing that communist 
control of Taiwan would have “serious” repercussions for US security; this was stressed multiple 
times, on 24 November 1948, 10 February 1949 and 17 August 1949.740 The State Department 
expressed its agreement twice on 14 January and 19 January 1949.741  
Additionally, the State Department was cautious about approaching the PRC. To recall, 
NSC 48/2 (30 December 1949) stated that the US would recognize the PRC only if it were 
“clearly in the United States interest to do so.” And even if the US recognized the PRC, this did 
not mean “approval” of the Communist regime.742 Hence, while the US was against placing 
Taiwan under the ROC, neither was it keen to see it under PRC control. 
Instead, the State Department entertained the idea of detaching Taiwan from “China” and 
establishing an autonomous Taiwanese state. This was evidenced in NSC 37/2, signed personally 
by Truman on 4 February 1949, which stated that the US should “discreetly” explore the 
possibility of supporting a “Formosan autonomous movement.”743 Of course, the prospect of an 
autonomous Taiwan was extremely dim, since the Taiwanese independence movement was too 
weak and Chiang’s regime too strong. 744  Also, to recall from Chapter 4, there existed a 
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formidable “China Lobby” that continued to enthusiastically support the ROC, which meant that 
Chiang was still a significant force to reckon with. Regardless, supporting the nascent idea of an 
independent Taiwan became official US government policy in early 1949. In light of this, it also 
did not make sense to place Taiwan under the jurisdiction of any particular government.745  
Also important to note is the fact that, as explained in Chapter 4, by the end of 1949 the 
possibility existed that “China” might not even be represented in the peace treaty. Taking this 
into account, the November 1949 draft peace treaty was premised on the idea that Taiwan should 
not be ceded to “China” if it did not sign the treaty.746 Hence, even before the treaty negotiations 
entered their formative phase, the State Department was becoming increasingly convinced of the 
wisdom of not defining the ownership of Taiwan. This idea was later passed on to Dulles. 
It should also be noted that Dulles – his ardent anti-communism and sympathy for the 
ROC notwithstanding – shared the idea of detaching Taiwan from China. In a letter he sent to 
Vandenberg on 6 January 1950, Dulles argued against allowing Taiwan to revert to China, since 
this would relegate the island into a “battleground between the Red regime and the Nationalist 
Army.” He further stated that the Formosans had a “distinctive economic, social and cultural life 
and for about two generations have had no political ties with China.” Additionally, he stressed 
that the opinion of the locals should be respected, rather than letting the big powers dictate the 
fate of the island. Dulles, therefore, argued that the final disposition of Taiwan should be 
determined by either the peace treaty or a UN trusteeship, rather than transferring it 
unconditionally to either China.747 
After the outbreak of the Korean War, preventing Taiwan from being transferred to the 
ROC became even more important. To elaborate, the US tried to localize the Korean conflict and 
stop any spill-over that could lead to a wider conflict.748 For this purpose, the US sent the 7th 
Fleet into the Taiwan Straits to prevent any further armed clashes between the Chinese 
Nationalists and Communists. 749  Dulles agreed with this policy. In fact, he had written to 
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Acheson on 18 May 1950, even before the outbreak of the Korean War, suggesting that the US 
should “neutralize Formosa, not permitting it either to be taken by the communists or to be used 
as a base of military operations against the mainland.”750 Certain Republican Senators (Taft, 
Millikin, Wherry, Bridges, Wiley and Smith) at a meeting with Dulles on 23 May 1950 also 
expressed concern about potential ROC military provocations against the mainland and wished 
to prevent this through the “neutralization” of Formosa.751  
This neutralization of Taiwan, in turn, made it even more important not to specify 
ownership of the island. Bluntly put, if Taiwan were given back to the ROC, then Chiang 
Kaishek would think that the island was his and that he could do whatever he pleased. Because 
the whole point was to discourage the ROC from taking hostile action against the PRC, Dulles 
wanted to make it clear to Chiang that Taiwan was not necessarily his possession and that he did 
not have a free hand, especially if it involved armed provocation against the mainland. It is a 
small wonder then that Dulles decided not to recognize Taiwan as being Chinese Nationalist 
territory in the Japanese peace treaty. Dulles had solid backing from the administration. Truman 
publicly made it clear in his 27 June 1950 statement that the future status of Taiwan would be 
decided by “a peace settlement with Japan, or consideration by the UN.”752  
Thus, by the time the US started to negotiate the Japanese peace treaty with other 
governments in September 1950, the idea of Taiwan’s reversion to either China was already 
ruled out. There was simply no merit to transferring the island’s sovereignty to any particular 
Chinese government; instead, there were multiple reasons for not defining the island’s ownership. 
As will be explained below, this in turn strengthened the case for leaving the ownership of the 
“Northern Territories” unspecified as well. 
 
The Emergence of the “Northern Territories” Question 
 
The “Northern Territories,” as they are termed in Japan, refer to four island groups that lie 
between Hokkaido and Kamchatka: Etorofu (Iturup), Kunashiri (Kunashir), Shikotan and 
Habomai. These islands are significant economically and strategically; they are an important 
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source of fish and minerals, and Russia maintains military bases there.753 Both Japan and Russia 
have unsurprisingly been claiming sovereignty over them for decades since the end of WWII.  
This on-going territorial dispute can be attributed to the fact that the ownership was 
intentionally left unspecified in the Japanese peace treaty. In order to understand why the 
ownership was never clarified, it is first necessary to examine historical developments before the 
end of WWII. The question of territorial ownership can be traced back to the nineteenth century, 
when Japan and Russia began to formally demarcate their territorial boundaries. Prior to this, 
these islands were inhabited by the Ainu people. The first agreement that sought to clarify the 
border was the 1855 Shimoda Treaty, which recognized Etorofu and the islands lying southward 
as being Japanese territories.754 The second agreement was the 1875 St. Petersburg Treaty, which 
recognized Japanese sovereignty over all of the Kuril Islands, in exchange for Russian 
sovereignty over the whole of Sakhalin. The next significant agreement was signed after the 
Russo-Japanese War. The Treaty of Portsmouth, signed in 1905, added South Sakhalin to 
Japan’s empire.755 Considering this historical development, it is fair to argue that the four islands 
(Northern Territories) were legally recognized as Japanese territory from the outset of Russo-
Japanese relations in the modern era. The only territory that can be considered to have been 
conquered through Japanese aggression was South Sakhalin. 
No further discussion of the four islands took place until 1943. When Stalin was 
consulted at the time of the Cairo Conference about the future of the Japanese Empire, he 
demanded that the “Kurile Islands” be “turned over” to the Soviet Union.756 These discussions 
culminated in the 1943 Cairo Declaration, which stated that Japan would be “expelled” from the 
territories that it had taken “by violence and greed.”757 This declaration did not specifically 
mention the Kuril Islands, but the Soviet Union would later invoke it to deny Japan’s sovereignty 
over the four islands. As the Allies continued to discuss postwar plans, Stalin, at the end of 1944, 
reiterated his desire to reclaim the Kuriles. Subsequently, the February 1945 Yalta agreement 
stated that the Soviet Union would enter the war against Japan “on condition” that the Kurile 
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Islands would be “handed over” to the Soviet Union.758 The last significant agreement was the 
July 1945 Potsdam Declaration, which limited Japan’s territory to “Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, 
Shikoku, and such minor islands as we [Allies] determine.”759  
It is important to note that these wartime agreements by no means refuted Japanese 
sovereignty over the four islands. In fact, the Yalta agreement stated that the islands would be 
“handed over,” not “returned,” to the Soviet Union, thus implying that Japan maintained rightful 
ownership over them. Additionally, when and how, and precisely which islands would be 
transferred to the Soviet Union were never clarified.760 This was an intriguing contrast to South 
Sakhalin, where Russian sovereignty was “violated by the treacherous attack of Japan in 1904” 
and thus would be “returned” to the Soviet Union.761 In short, Japan continued to be recognized 
as the rightful owner of the “Northern Territories” until the end of WWII. 
The question of territorial sovereignty became more complex towards the end of the war, 
as the Soviet Union began to occupy the islands. On 8 August 1945, the Soviet Union declared 
war on Japan and began to land forces in the Kuril island chain on 18 August 1945. By 5 
September 1945, it was in control of the four islands.762 The Soviet occupation of the Kurils was 
aided by the fact that General Order No.1 (Instruments for the Surrender of Japan) stipulated that 
the Japanese forces in the “Kurile Islands” should surrender to the Soviet Union.763 Soon after 
the war, the SCAP also issued a directive (SCAPIN 677) on 29 January 1946, which deprived 
Japan of all administrative rights in the “Kurile (Chishima) Islands, the Habomai (Hapomaze) 
island group…and Shikotan Island.”764 
Of course, with the arrival of the Soviets, the Japanese residents living in the four islands 
were expelled, during which they experienced theft, physical assault and the requisitioning of 
their property.765 Because of this wartime past, the Kuril Islands became tied to national prestige 
and security for both Japan and the Soviet Union, thus making it more important for both them to 
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legitimize their territorial claim. The loss of these islands was a reminder of defeat for Japan, 
while it was a recovery of lost prestige for the Soviet Union following the humiliation of the 
Russo-Japanese War. 
The Japanese government’s efforts to reclaim the four islands began soon after the end of 
the Pacific War. For instance, Ashida Hitoshi (Japan’s Foreign Minister at the time) on 7 June 
1947 publicly expressed the hope of recovering Japan’s sovereignty over the “small islands 
along the east coast of Hokkaido.”766 In addition, a short historical overview was drafted in 
November 1946, highlighting that Japan had been enjoying lawful ownership of the four islands 
– and later all the islands between Hokkaido and Kamchatka – through a series of agreements 
with Russia dating back to 1875. Records indicate that this paper was handed to the US 
sometime between 1946 and 1947, as the US drafters of 1947 peace treaty had this in hand.767  
The US criticized Ashida for making this statement, expressing its displeasure at a 
vanquished country having the temerity to tell the victors what to do.768 Internally, however, the 
US stance was gravitating towards Japan. This was first evident in the 1947 draft peace treaty. 
When the draft treaty was completed on 5 August 1947, the Northern Territories were not listed 
as being part of the Kurils that were to be relinquished by Japan. This interpretation was repeated 
in the 7 November 1947 draft.769 Hence, by the end of 1947, the State Department officials in 
charge of writing the peace treaty had adopted a position that the four islands should be retained 
by Japan. 
This policy reflected the fact that a number of State Department officials wished to 
acknowledge Japanese sovereignty over the four islands. Indeed, even during the war, the 
Country or Area Committee (CAC), an ad hoc organization tasked with developing plans for the 
postwar world, had contended on 28 December 1944 that the Northern Territories should be 
retained by Japan, arguing that the Shimoda Treaty and the St. Petersburg Treaty had recognized 
them as being Japan’s territory. The CAC also cited the importance of the islands for fishing, 
which was “essential” for Japan’s “diet” and “export trade.”770 After the war, Charles Bohlen 
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(State Department Counselor) on 12 August 1947 wrote to Lovett, recommending that while the 
US should honor the Yalta agreement, this ought to be done “orally” rather than in writing; as 
Hara Kimie argues, this indicated that the US did not intend to acknowledge the Soviet 
ownership of the Kuriles. 771  Additionally, on 14 October 1947, Kennan stated that the 
“southernmost islands of the Kurile archipelago would be retained by Japan,” making it clear 
that he did not favor Soviet possession of all the islands.772  
To recall, from 1947 onwards, the US increasingly emphasized the need to revive Japan’s 
economy and safeguard its security. Against this backdrop, the US continued to refine its 
argument to support Japan’s claims over the “Northern Territories.” When another draft treaty 
was developed on 8 January 1948, Hugh Borton noted that the Yalta agreement did not 
specifically define what was meant by the “Kuril islands” and opined that a “narrow 
interpretation” would enable Japan to retain the Northern Territories.773 Later on 23 March 1948 
Samuel Boggs (Special Adviser on Geography, Office of Intelligence Research) expressed 
similar opinion, adding that Shikotan and Habomai were “geographically” an “extension 
of…Hokkaido” and not part of the Kurils. It was “equally possible,” he continued, to consider 
Etorofu and Kunashiri as an “extension of Hokkaido.”774 
Meanwhile, on 9 November 1948, Sebald in a letter to Marshall (Secretary of State) 
expressed his concern that the Soviet Union could aid the communists in nearby Hokkaido in 
waging “intensive psychological warfare.” 775  A similar opinion had been expressed on 14 
September 1947 by Robert L. Eichelberger (Commanding General of Eighth US Army in Japan) 
to Suzuki Tadakatsu (Director of Yokohama Liaison Office).776 The implication was clear: the 
Soviet occupation of the Kurils posed a threat to both Japan and the US. This obviously made the 
Soviet retention of the disputed islands distasteful to the US. The US also realized that any 
formal acknowledgement of the Soviet ownership would be tantamount to assisting the 
communists. It therefore became paramount for the US to craft the peace treaty in a way that 
weakened the Soviet claim. 
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Against this backdrop, on 1 June 1949, Webb (Acting Secretary of State) informed the 
SCAP that there would be no final determination of Japan’s territorial sovereignty in the absence 
of a peace settlement and that the US should avoid any action that could weaken the Japanese 
claim to the islands in question.777 The fact that this statement was made by the Acting Secretary 
of State was a clear indicator that the State Department’s position had now transitioned to 
formally supporting Japan’s ownership of these islands. It also implied the US intention to 
weaken the Soviet claim. 
In the process of updating the draft peace treaty in late 1949, the State Department 
officials further clarified the US position regarding the Kurils question. It first noted the danger 
of explicitly supporting Japanese sovereignty over the Northern Territories. Although the US 
was sympathetic to the Japanese claim, this could not be made too apparent, since the Soviets 
might accuse the US of “bad faith.” Not only did the Yalta agreement promise the handing over 
of the Kuril Islands to the Soviet Union, but also Russian forces had been occupying the islands 
for since the end of the war “without challenge or objection by the US.” The US was also afraid 
that reversion of any parts of the Kuril Islands to Japan might endanger the plan to retain 
Okinawa under US control. 778 Secondly, while there was wide consensus that Shikotan and 
Habomai did not belong to the Kurils and thus were legitimately Japanese, unfortunately, the 
same could not be said about Etorofu and Kunashiri.779 The implication was that, in order to 
leave open the possibility of detaching all four islands from the Kurils, it was best not to define 
the Kurils too specifically. Thirdly, the State Department stated that if the Soviet Union did not 
sign the peace treaty, then there was no reason to obligate Japan to hand over the Kuril Islands. 
Instead, the disposition of the islands could be determined later by the states concerned, 
including the treaty’s signatories.780 This formula, in which the Soviet ownership of the Kurils 
was made contingent upon its participation in the peace treaty, would be later adopted by Dulles 
in 1950 and 1951. 
 
The Territorial Questions during the Early Phase of Shuttle Diplomacy 
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By the time Dulles took the reins of the Japanese peace treaty negotiations in mid-1950, the US 
had already applied the formula of unspecified ownership to the former Mandate Islands, 
Ryukyu Islands, Spratly and Paracel Islands and Antarctica. Taiwan and the Kuril Islands 
quickly followed suit. When the draft peace treaty was updated under Dulles’ leadership on 7 
August 1950, the terms for the Kuril Islands and Taiwan were amended so that their fate would 
be determined by the Big Four (Britain, China, the Soviet Union and the US). If this initiative 
failed, then the question would be referred to the UNGA for a decision.781 This was reiterated in 
the updated draft treaty and the seven points that were developed on 11 September 1950.782 As 
Hasegawa asserts, this was a clear departure from the Yalta agreement.783 Unlike the Yalta terms, 
which had promised to hand over the Kuril Islands to the Soviet Union, Dulles now implied that 
this might not happen. Meanwhile, Dulles also made it plain that Japan must “agree to U.N. 
trusteeship, with the U.S. as administering authority, of the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands.”784  
When the seven points were distributed to the FEC member states for review in late 1950, 
the Soviet Union went public on 20 November 1950 and denounced Dulles’ plans for going 
against the Yalta agreement. Moscow further argued that Dulles’ formula for Taiwan and the 
Ryukyu Islands violated both the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations; the Soviet Union demanded 
that Taiwan be restored to the PRC, while criticizing the trusteeship scheme over the Ryukyus as 
constituting “territorial expansion.”785 The Soviet position was echoed almost verbatim by the 
PRC in December 1950.786 India, whose response was delivered to Washington on 21 December 
1950, was largely in agreement with the Soviet and the PRC over the Kuril Islands and Taiwan. 
However, India endorsed the idea of a UN trusteeship over Okinawa, provided that the treaty 
clarified the island’s eventual reversion to Japan.787 India, PRC and the Soviet Union would 
repeat their positions in March and May 1951.788  
 
781 FRUS 1950, Vol. 6, 1268. 
782 Ibid., 1296-1303. 
783 Hasegawa, Northern Territories, 81-6. 
784 FRUS 1950, Vol. 6, 1296-1303. 
785 Bulletin 596 (4 December 1950), 881-2. 
786 Nishimura, San Francisco Peace Treaty, 72-4. 
787 India’s preliminary views on US memorandum on Japanese peace treaty, 21 December 1950, RG59, Entry A1 
1252, Lot 54D423, India, accessed via NIKH. 
788 Remarks of the Government of USSR on Matter of USA Draft Peace Treaty with Japan, 7 May 1951, RG59, A1 
1252, Lot 54D423, USSR (I), accessed via NIKH; Views of the Government of India on provisional draft of 
Japanese peace treaty prepared by the US Department of State on 28 March 1951, undated, RG59, Entry A1 1251, 
Lot 78D174, accessed via NIKH; Chou addresses note to Roschin stating China’s support for Russia on peace pace, 
26 May 1951, RG59, Entry A1 1252, Lot 54D423, China [January 6 - November 29, 1951], accessed via NIKH; 
206 
 
In response to the Soviet Union, the US went public on 28 December 1950 to defend its 
position regarding the territorial terms. The US argued that the disposition of Taiwan and the 
Kuril Islands – in compliance with the Cairo Declaration, Yalta agreement and Potsdam 
Declaration – were subject to a final peace settlement, where “all relevant factors should be 
considered.” Furthermore, since the UN Charter prevailed over “any other international 
agreement,” Article 77 of the UN Charter – which stipulated that a trusteeship system “shall 
apply” to the territories that may be “detached from enemy states as a result of the Second World 
War” – could not be ignored. Hence, UN involvement in the fate of the Kurils and Taiwan was 
justified. The US also argued that the trusteeship scheme for Okinawa was within the purview of 
the victors, since the Potsdam Declaration stated that Japan’s “minor islands” would be 
determined by Britain, China and the US. Again citing the UN Charter Article 77, the US also 
argued that the trusteeship scheme was not “territorial expansion.”789  
The response from the anti-communist bloc, which were received anywhere between 
October 1950 to March 1951, was varied. While there was unanimous endorsement of the UN 
trusteeship arrangement for the Ryukyus, there were conflicting opinions regarding the 
disposition of Kurils and Taiwan. Regarding the former, only the Philippines and the ROC 
agreed with Dulles. In contrast, Britain wished to clarify Soviet sovereignty over the Kurils, 
while Australia worried that Dulles’ approach would cause a permanent territorial dispute 
between Japan and the Soviet Union.790  
Meanwhile, all respondents had some qualms about Dulles’ approach to Taiwan. Britain 
expressed a preference for clarifying the island’s ownership, instead of “leaving the matter up in 
the air” as had been proposed. The Philippines, on the other hand, proposed UN trusteeship. 
Australia expressed “serious reservations” about the Chinese Nationalist claims over the island, 
as it was “very unhappy” to continue recognizing the ROC and was reluctant to strengthen that 
government’s standing by handing over Taiwan. Hence, it suggested that the “best solution” was 
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to require Japan to renounce title without indicating to whom sovereignty had been transferred. 
While insisting that Taiwan was “historically, ethnically, legally and in fact a part of Chinese 
territory,” the ROC also believed that a simple statement of Japan’s renunciation of its 
sovereignty over Taiwan would suffice.791 Similarly, Canada suggested that Japan should simply 
renounce its claims to both the Kurils and Taiwan, leaving the issue of their disposition to be 
settled “outside the treaty,” to which the US admitted that this course “might eventually have to 
be adopted.”792 
The question of territorial disposition was further complicated by Japan’s reaction. 
Yoshida sent Dulles an unsigned memorandum on 31 January 1951, demanding that the Ryukyus 
be returned to Japan as soon as the trusteeship was over and that the local islanders in the 
meantime should retain Japanese nationality.793 Furthermore, in an undated letter sent to Dulles 
during his trip to Tokyo, Kinoshita Tatsuo (Chairman of the Fisheries Committee of the Japanese 
House of Councilors) argued that the “islands” – which Kinoshita did not specify, but most likely 
referring to the Ryukyu and the Kuril Islands – were Japanese by “historical title” and “not by 
aggression” and thus should remain Japanese territory.794 Ino Dan (Liberal Party, Director of 
Japan-America Association) also sent Dulles a petition calling for the reversion of Habomai and 
Shikotan, arguing that they were not part of the Kuril chain.795 For Dulles, who kept insisting 
that the peace treaty should be acceptable to Japan, these demands could not be ignored. 
Fortunately for Dulles, the Japanese government on 16 March 1951 expressed agreement 
with the idea that the Soviet ownership of the Kuril Islands should be conditional on Russian 
participation in the peace treaty. However, in case the Soviet Union did not become party to the 
treaty, Japan “hoped” that any stipulation regarding the disposition of the Kuril Islands would be 
omitted. Japan also argued that what exactly constituted the Kuril Islands should be “defined by 
the powers concerned, including Japan.”796 This was very much in line with what Dulles thought, 
as he believed that the exact definition of the “Kurile Islands” should be arranged either 
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bilaterally between Japan and the Soviet Union or decided by the ICJ. 797  Dulles therefore 
informed Japan on 20 March 1951 that the Kurils would be left undefined, and that if the Soviet 
Union would “definitely” not sign the treaty, then the US would consider eliminating any 
reference to the islands from the treaty.798 
Subsequently, the updated draft treaty that was distributed to the FEC governments on 23 
March 1951 obligated Japan to “hand over to the Soviet Union the Kurile Islands” (Article 5).799 
An exact definition of what constituted these islands was again left unspecified. It appears that 
Dulles’ intention was to give a token concession to Britain and India by making Japan “hand 
over” the Kurils to the Soviet Union on one hand, while discreetly weakening the Soviet claim 
on the other and sowing the seeds of Russo-Japanese conflict by leaving the “Kurile islands” 
undefined. After all, as Hasegawa and Wada note, discord between the Soviet Union and Japan 
over the ownership of the islands was exactly what Dulles intended.800 Dulles also repeated that 
in case the Soviet Union refused to sign the treaty, the references to the Kurils might be 
eliminated.801 
Regarding Taiwan, the US accommodated the suggestions made by Australia, Canada 
and the ROC, and now left the final determination of the island unspecified. Japan was obligated 
simply to renounce “all rights, titles and claims” to Taiwan. 802  The idea of delegating the 
question of Taiwan to the UN was dropped. Dulles reasoned before the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee on 19 March 1951 that there was a “real possibility” that the UN would recommend 
turning the island over to the “Chinese Communists” and hence it was preferable to leave its 
status “undecided.” 803 Meanwhile, the terms regarding the UN trusteeship over the Ryukyu 
Islands were maintained, as this was one island chain that the US was not willing to give up and 
none of the friendly governments were opposed. 
On 31 March 1951, Dulles updated the public on the progress of the treaty’s development. 
Dulles emphasized that Japan would simply renounce its sovereignty over Taiwan, while 
agreeing to the UN trusteeship over Okinawa. And while the Kuril Islands were “allotted to 
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Russia at Yalta and are actually in Russia’s possession,” validation of the Soviet ownership 
would depend on the latter’s participation in the peace treaty.804 It is fair to argue that by March 
1951, all of the territorial terms were finalized, with the exception of the Kuril Islands. This 
would take another several weeks of discussion with other governments. 
 
The Final Revision and Uniform Application of Undefined Ownership 
 
For the next several months, Dulles tried to coordinate the different foreign responses to the 
March 1951 draft. The Chinese Nationalists sent its response on 24 April 1951, complaining that 
while the “Kurile Islands” were to be “handed over” to the Soviet Union, no equivalent provision 
was made for the ROC regarding Taiwan. The ROC re-emphasized that Taiwan was its rightful 
territory and demanded that there should be an express reversion. The only acceptable alternative 
was to state that Japan renounced its title and not mention ownership at all for both the Kuril 
Islands and Taiwan.805 These views were later repeated on 23 May and on 29 May 1951.806  
In response, the US decided to keep the terms on Taiwan unchanged, simply stating that 
Japan renounced the island but without mentioning its transfer to China. While the Cairo 
Declaration promised to restore Taiwan to China, “so many things have happened since that 
time.” Therefore, the Cairo Declaration should not be considered as binding and instead should 
be “definitely rejected.”807 At the same time, the ROC response seems to have convinced Dulles 
of the wisdom of the uniform application of undefined ownership to all of the controversial 
islands; indeed, the ROC proposal that there should be no mention of the ownership of either 
Taiwan or the Kurils was later (on 3 July 1951) cited by Dulles as being one of the reasons for 
leaving the ownership of the “Kurile Islands” unspecified. From this moment onwards, any 
deviation from “undefined ownership” for one particular island would necessitate change for all 
the others and thus had to be avoided.808 
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Meanwhile, New Zealand commented that, if the Soviet Union decided not to sign the 
treaty, Japan should simply renounce its title to the Kuril Islands without specifying their 
ownership. However, in case the Soviet Union did sign the treaty, the Soviet claims would be 
recognized, but even then “only if” it evacuated from Shikotan and the Habomai Islands. New 
Zealand’s formula essentially sought to weaken, if not forestall, the Soviet claim over the Kurils. 
This certainly was an encouragement for Dulles. New Zealand also secretly expressed the hope 
that Japan’s “irredentist” feelings would lead to bitter contention with the Soviet Union. The US 
perhaps gleefully noted that this would “not be regarded as...evil.”809  
Australia, whose response arrived on 25 May 1951, expressed its support for the US 
proposal to simply obligate Japan to renounce sovereignty over Taiwan. Furthermore, it stated 
that the rights of Japan should not be diminished or prejudiced in favor of a state that did not sign 
and ratify the treaty.810 Since Dulles was not expecting the Soviet Union to sign the peace treaty, 
it is likely that Australia’s response further convinced Dulles of the wisdom to simply eliminate 
any reference to the Soviet Union regarding the Kuril Islands. 
To recall, South Korea, one of the recipients of the March 1951 draft, responded on 26 
April 1951 with the demand that Tsushima be returned to Korea. Taking note of the fact that 
Japan was obligated to hand over the Kuril Islands to the Soviet Union, South Korea demanded 
“equality of treatment” and that Japan should accordingly “renounce all right, title and claim to 
the Islands of Tsushima and return them to the Republic of Korea.”811 The US responded that 
South Korea’s claims to Tsushima was “weak” and therefore rejected it (see Chapter 5).812 It is 
likely that South Korea’s response further discouraged the US from mentioning Soviet 
ownership of the Kuril islands. 
The Philippines, meanwhile, responded on 31 May 1951, agreeing with the idea that the 
Soviet claim to the Kurils should only be validated upon its participation in the peace treaty. The 
Philippines added that if the Soviet Union refused to sign, then the terms regarding the Kurils 
should be deleted, so as to ensure the “status of territories now under Soviet control would 
remain in doubt and a desire to recover them would remain in Japanese mind.” In short, the 
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Philippines also proposed driving a wedge between Japan and the Soviet Union over the Kuril 
Islands.813 This was exactly what Dulles had in mind. 
Perhaps the most urgent task for Dulles was to iron out differences with Britain, the most 
important partner in negotiating the Japanese peace treaty. As evidenced in its draft peace treaty 
of 7 April 1951, which was developed independently from the US, Britain still wished to 
obligate Japan to cede “in full sovereignty” the Kuril Islands to the Soviet Union and Taiwan to 
“China.” Interesting to note is that Britain included Shikotan and Habomai as being within 
Japan’s territorial limits; only the islands situated northwards from Kunashiri onwards were to be 
separated from Japan.814 On 5 June 1951, Dulles proposed to Kenneth Younger (the Acting 
Foreign Secretary) that the treaty should simply state that Japan would relinquish its title over the 
Kuril Islands and Taiwan, with no mention of who these islands now belonged to. Britain agreed. 
This “ambiguity” formula was later incorporated into the revised US-UK draft treaty of 14 June 
1951.815  
Britain had its own reasons for agreeing to the formula of ambiguous ownership, as 
revealed in a letter it sent to India in August 1951. To begin with, it argued that any reference to 
the transfer of Taiwan to “China” could lead to “serious legal as well as practical difficulties” to 
the point that “it would be impossible to reach agreement.” Britain also added that the PRC’s 
attitude was unfriendly, as it was hindering the Korean Armistice negotiations. Hence, there was 
no incentive to support the PRC. With regards to the Kuril Islands, Britain felt that there was no 
need to do any favors to the Soviet Union, as the latter’s conduct throughout the negotiations 
process had been obstructive. Britain even argued that it would be “understandable” to omit any 
statement of Japan’s renunciation of sovereignty over the Kuriles and simply allow “separate 
negotiation between Japan and the Soviet Union.” After all, the Kuril Islands “did not directly 
concern the other signatory powers.” However, in order not to ignore the Soviet interests and to 
honor the Yalta agreement, Britain thought that a simple acknowledgement of Japan’s 
renunciation of sovereignty over the islands was sufficient.816  
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The last significant meeting for Dulles was with the French government. On 11 June 
1951, when Dulles met with the French to discuss the Japanese peace treaty, Jean Chauvel 
(French Representative at the UN) suggested that Japan should simply renounce its rights over 
the Kuril Islands without specifying ownership. Dulles happily responded that he would 
“sympathetically consider this suggestion.”817 France also demanded that Japan should renounce 
any claim to the “two small partly submerged islands to the East of Hainan.” France was 
referring to the Spratly and Paracel islands that had disappeared from the treaty draft when 
Dulles took over the negotiation efforts. It is notable that France did not demand specifying 
French or Indochinese ownership, but simply Japan’s relinquishment. Dulles accepted this 
proposal and the Spratly and Paracel island chains were re-included in the treaty. 
According to the 14 June 1951 combined Anglo-American draft peace treaty, Article 2 
simply stipulated “Japan renounces all right, title and claim” to the Kuril Islands, Taiwan, the 
former Mandate Islands and Spratly Island and the Paracel Islands without any reference to 
ownership; in the case of the Mandate Islands, the UN trusteeship would apply in accordance 
with UNSC Resolution 21 (2 April 1947). Article 3 stated that Japan would concur to a UN 
trusteeship system for the Ryukyus. 818 This marked the end of the discussion regarding the 
territorial terms of the peace treaty. 
 
Conclusion and Commentary on Liancourt Rocks 
 
To conclude, the US adopted the formula of undefined ownership for the Mandate Islands, Kuril 
Islands, Okinawa, Taiwan, and the Spratly and Paracel Islands, as this was the most politically 
expedient method for safeguarding US security interests. It not only legitimated US control over 
the Mandate Islands and Okinawa, but also allowed Taiwan’s status to be ambivalent, thus in an 
abstract sense preventing it from falling to the communists or being used by the Nationalist 
Chinese to provoke armed conflict against the mainland. Meanwhile, it also allowed the US to 
challenge Soviet sovereignty over the Kuril Islands, while discreetly supporting the Japanese 
claim to the four southernmost islands (the Northern Territories). This solution was the product 
of intense negotiations with multiple governments spanning over several months. It was a very 
delicate formula, in which change to one island could lead to change in others and disturb the 
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whole balance. There was, though, a significant cost, as India (on 23 August 1951) refused to 
sign the Japanese peace treaty on the grounds that leaving the future of Taiwan and the Kurile 
Islands undecided was neither “just [n]or expedient.”819  
Before closing the chapter, there is one more island group that deserves attention: the 
Liancourt Rocks. Termed Tokdo in Korean and Takeshima in Japanese, these two rocks are 
situated between Korea and Japan. Since the end of the Pacific War, both countries have claimed 
sovereignty over them. The Liancourt Rocks issue has been fairly well-researched, and hence 
this chapter will not go into the details; instead, it examines the possibility that the fate of these 
rocks was also impacted by the formula of undefined ownership. 
To briefly overview the issue, soon after the war, the Japanese government 
enthusiastically lobbied the SCAP in order to secure ownership over the Liancourt Rocks. 
However, the Korean government was equally adamant about safeguarding its sovereignty over 
the island, since it was tied to national prestige and security. Not only did Korea believe that the 
Liancourt Rocks was historically Korean; it was also one of the first areas that Japan had taken 
over – for the purpose of keeping an eye on the Russians – before swallowing the whole 
peninsula. Within the US, Sebald and Rusk were ardent supporters of Japan’s point of view. 
However, Dulles had been one of the “midwives,” who helped create the South Korean 
government in 1948 as part of the US delegation for the UN Temporary Commission on Korea 
(UNTCOK) and he could not ignore Korea’s demands. The peace treaty went through a number 
of revisions, first stipulating the Liancourt Rocks as one of the islands to be relinquished by 
Japan, then recognizing it as Japanese territory in the 29 December 1949 draft, and then 
ultimately disappearing from the peace treaty entirely, leaving the dispute to be resolved between 
Korea and Japan. 
According to the existing findings by Hara Kimie and Chǒng Pyǒngjun, the absence of 
any terms governing the Liancourt Rocks in the peace treaty was due to three main factors. For 
one, Japan could depend on Sebald, who was very sympathetic to Japan and did not view Korea 
favorably. More importantly, amid the growing rivalry with the Soviet Union, the US wished to 
ignore technical details and sign the peace treaty as soon as possible. Finally, Korea made a 
major diplomatic blunder by packaging the demand for the Liancourt Rocks with a claim to 
P’arangdo (Socotra Rock), a small outcrop off the coast of Cheju Island (Quelpart) that is hardly 
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visible during high tide and thus not easily identifiable. The Koreans at the time were not able to 
give the exact coordinates for P’arangdo and thus failed to prove its location let alone its 
existence, which damaged the credibility of its demand.820 
It seems fair to argue, however, that concern that any final decision on the Liancourt 
Rocks could destroy the delicate balance of Article 2 also played an important role. If the 
ownership of the Liancourt Rocks were specified, then this could have led to a chain reaction, in 
which India, the ROC, the PRC and the Soviet Union would demand precise ownership of the 
Kuril Islands, Okinawa and Taiwan. In order to avoid this, not mentioning the Liancourt Rocks 
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Chapter 11. The San Francisco Peace Conference and Its Aftermath 
 
This final chapter examines the San Francisco peace conference, which took place between 4 
September 1951 and 8 September 1951. This is another aspect of the Japanese peace settlement 
that has been largely overlooked; only Van Aduard has made any effort to analyze the 
conference proceedings and narrate it as having been a trial of strength between the free world 
and the communist bloc.821 Perhaps this neglect is not surprising, since this conference was 
overwhelmingly a formality and did not resemble a “peace conference” in the traditional sense. 
There was no negotiation. Each participant simply commented on what it thought about the 
peace treaty. It therefore appears as if there is nothing significant to say about this conference, 
other than the fact that the treaty was signed. 
However, there was something more to this conference than simply signing the treaty. To 
begin with, fifty-one governments took part, making it one of the most truly international events 
in history. More importantly, it was a conference that marked a total diplomatic defeat for the 
communist participants – Czechoslovakia, Poland and the Soviet Union – as all the other 
governments rallied behind the US to express their support for the American-dictated peace. This 
fascinating episode remains sadly under-explored in the existing historiography. While Hosoya 
Chihiro, Hasegawa Tsuyoshi and Kimura Hiroshi have examined some parts of the conference, 
their narratives mainly limit themselves to the roles of the US and the Soviet Union; hence, what 
the Middle East and Latin America had to say about the treaty, for example, is totally 
neglected.822 Additionally, although Sparkman’s reminiscence of the Japanese peace treaty gives 
a meaningful sense of the Soviet Union’s isolation at the conference, it too ignores the roles 
played by the Middle East and Latin America.823 Even Van Aduard fails to give a comprehensive 
explanation of the part played by the different participants, as he only cites the presence of Cuba 
and the Dominican Republican. Taking this into account, this chapter pays attention to all the 
governments present at the conference and reconstructs the developments at San Francisco from 
a more international perspective. 
The second goal of the chapter is to understand why the conference did not break down. 
It is common knowledge that the Soviet Union sought to disrupt it but failed. As briefly 
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mentioned above, this was largely because the Soviets failed to rally any support from the other 
participants. Additionally, however, there was a procedural aspect. As Hasegawa Tsuyoshi, 
Kimura Hiroshi and Ronald McGlothlen point out, the US adopted a parliamentary procedure 
with which the Soviets were completely unfamiliar.824 However, these claims are not backed by 
a detailed explanation of what exactly this “parliamentary procedure” consisted of and how it 
deprived the Soviet Union of any meaningful diplomatic maneuver. And while Van Aduard 
correctly points out that the “Rules of Procedure” adopted at the conference prevented the Soviet 
Union from re-opening the treaty negotiations and torpedoing the peace conference, his findings 
have been forgotten and neglected over the years. 825  Hence, this chapter re-introduces Van 
Aduard’s long-forgotten finding and elaborates on certain actions that the US took prior to the 
conference – which even Van Aduard fails to mention, due to his lack of access to internal US 
records – and the “Rules of Procedure” that were adopted in the first plenary session. 
 
Pre-Conference Maneuvers to Prevent Further Negotiation 
 
To reiterate, the San Francisco peace conference was not convened to negotiate a peace treaty. 
To make sure that all the participants understood this, even before the peace conference, the US 
stressed that the conference was for signing the treaty alone. When the invitation to the San 
Francisco peace conference was presented to the Washington embassies of fifty-one 
governments on 20 July 1951, for example, the State Department orally informed each recipient 
that the conference was “for the purpose of signing” the treaty, not for negotiating.826 Accepting 
the invitation thus implied a tacit understanding that they would not try to amend the terms of the 
treaty. The same message was conveyed to the three Indochinese states that were belatedly 
invited in August 1951. 
Had the Soviet Union refused to attend, the conference might have been concluded much 
more smoothly and without clamor. However, on 12 August 1951, the Soviet Union accepted its 
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invitation. 827 This obviously raised concerns within the American government, since it was 
readily apparent that the Soviet Union, which had been opposing the American-led peace 
settlement, would cause difficulty at the conference.828 Perhaps as a preemptive action, the text 
of the proposed peace treaty was released to the public on 15 August 1951, giving a clear 
message that this draft was final. The next day, on 16 August 1951, the US also went public by 
acknowledging the Soviet acceptance of the invitation and reiterating that the San Francisco 
peace conference was for the “conclusion and signature” of the treaty and “not a conference to 
reopen negotiations on the terms of the peace.”829  
However, no matter how firm the US was with regards to the Soviet Union, it could not 
hope for success without the support of other governments. Thankfully for the US, as examined 
in the previous chapters, most of the principal negotiating states (FEC members) had been 
generally supportive throughout the negotiation process, thus enabling the US to craft the terms 
to its liking. There was also wide-spread disillusionment with the Soviet Union. Indeed, as soon 
as it became known that the Soviet Union would participate in the peace conference, most of the 
non-Soviet members of the FEC expressed their displeasure. Australia, Britain, France (and 
Vietnam), the Philippines and the Netherlands were all united in their cynicism that the Soviet 
Union wanted to cause trouble and disrupt the conference. The ROC too, although excluded from 
the conference, shared this sentiment.830 In the case of Japan, with the exception of the Japanese 
Communist Party and the left wing of the Japanese Socialist Party – both of which were now 
marginalized – there were expressions of concern from the government, parliament and the 
media that the Soviet Union might disrupt proceedings and delay the signing of the treaty.831 
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This prevalent anti-Soviet sentiment would manifest itself again at the conference itself, when it 
was expressed by the non-FEC governments as well. 
 
The San Francisco Peace Conference 
 
In order to understand why the San Francisco peace conference was a resounding defeat for the 
Soviet bloc, one must first examine the latter’s position when it accepted the invitation. As 
Kimura Hiroshi and Hasegawa Tsuyoshi point out, the main purpose of the Soviet Union was to 
undo the US-led peace settlement. If needed, the Soviet Union did not mind seeing the 
conference disintegrate. To elaborate, on 20 August 1951, the Soviet Politburo decided to make a 
number of demands at the conference, including: PRC participation, the withdrawal of all foreign, 
including US, troops from Japan, the prohibition of any US-Japan military alliance and the 
inclusion of demilitarization and democratization clauses in the peace treaty. Furthermore, the 
Soviet Union hoped to mobilize support from Burma, India and Indonesia to denounce the US-
led peace treaty, and at the same time, sought to lure the Philippines away by demanding better 
terms for reparations. If these tactics failed, then the Soviet Union would refuse to sign the treaty 
and publicly attack its terms.832  
Unfortunately for the Soviet Union, its hopes to garner support from the Asian states 
evaporated almost immediately, as Burma and India, the two most likely countries to side with it, 
declined to attend the conference.833 Also, as will be explained below, the Soviet Union failed to 
find a receptive audience among the other attendees at the peace conference, as those Asian 
governments that did participate either held grudges against it or simply welcomed the US-led 
peace settlement. Hence, the Soviet strategy to turn the Asians against the US failed.834  
Another important reason behind the Soviet failure to disrupt the conference was the 
shrewd procedural strategy employed by the US at the first plenary session to prevent any form 
of negotiation. At the first plenary session of the San Francisco peace conference (5 September 
1951), Acheson (the presiding officer and “temporary president” of the conference) once again 
stressed that the conference had been convened “for conclusion and signature” of the peace 
treaty and not for negotiation. Acheson then moved to formalize this by proposing, together with 
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Britain, the “Rules of Procedure.” There were two critical devices that were designed to enable 
the US to run the conference in the way it intended. The first was Article 1 of the “Rules of 
Procedure,” which stipulated that the conference was to be conducted “in accordance with the 
terms of the invitation” extended by the US.835 To recall, the invitation made it clear that the 
conference was for the signing of the treaty, not for negotiating; Article 1 would formalize this. 
Secondly, Article 3 empowered the “permanent President of the Conference,” who would 
be elected via a simple majority vote, to preside over “all meetings of the conference” and to 
decide on “all questions” raised during the conference; in short, the permanent president would 
determine what could be talked about at the conference. This was accompanied by Article 19, 
which entitled the permanent president to control the right of the delegations to speak at the 
conference; in short, he could either allow or prevent speech. 836 Hence, as long as the US 
secured the title of the “permanent President,” it could run the show as it liked. 
Not surprisingly, the Soviet bloc – consisting of Czechoslovakia, Poland and the Soviet 
Union – was unhappy with the proposed “Rules of Procedure” and sought to amend it. Poland 
immediately on 5 September 1951 suggested the establishment of a special ad hoc committee for 
the purpose of studying the “Rules of Procedure” and developing an alternative. This was 
opposed by Cuba and Dominican Republic, who wished to quickly adopt the “Rules of 
Procedure” and move on with the conference. When Acheson asked the representatives to vote 
on what they wished to do, the Polish proposal was rejected by 44 against and 3 for. In contrast, 
the Cuban-Dominican Republican proposal was supported by 38 countries and subsequently the 
“Rules of Procedure” was formally adopted by the vote of 48 for and 3 against.837  
This marked a diplomatic defeat for the Soviet bloc. Not only was the US able to 
formalize the idea that negotiations were not allowed at the conference, but also the Soviet Union 
was opposed by governments other than the US and Western Europe. It should also be noted that 
Article 7 of the “Rules of Procedure” strictly limited the states represented at San Francisco to 
those invited by the US. Simply put, no additional governments would be invited to the 
conference, thus preventing the Soviet Union from inviting the PRC. When the Soviet Union still 
insisted on inviting the PRC, Acheson put the question before the entire conference, and the 
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former was publicly shamed when its proposal to discuss this invitation was voted down with 46 
governments opposing it.838  
Soon after the “Rules of Procedure” was adopted, Acheson was elected the permanent 
president by a vote of 43 out of 51 votes.839 The US was thus able to secure a blank cheque on 
how to run the conference and defeat the Soviet Union. And as the conference unfolded, it 
became increasingly clear that the Soviet bloc was almost entirely isolated, as virtually all other 
governments supported the US. 
At the conference, the communist bloc deplored the fact that the treaty was negotiated via 
“shuttle diplomacy” instead of the Council of Foreign Ministers, calling it a violation of the 
Potsdam Agreement. The Soviet bloc also denounced the economic terms of the treaty as 
ensuring an American monopoly that was designed to subordinate Japan into a “slavery-like 
dependence” on the West. Worse still, it was as an instrument that sought to subordinate the 
former allies to a “Pax Americana in the Far East.” Furthermore, the Soviet Union pointed out 
that the peace treaty ignored the legitimate claims of states that had suffered from Japan’s 
aggression and lacked the remedies required to rectify the latter’s past wrongdoings. Lastly, it 
denounced the “aggressive military alliance” between Japan and the US as not only constituting 
a continuation of the occupation, but also endangering the security of the Soviet Union and the 
PRC.840 In short, the peace treaty prepared by the US was unacceptable. 
Accordingly, the Soviet bloc demanded a number of revisions to the peace treaty. The 
Soviet bloc first insisted that the PRC had to be invited to the conference, arguing that all of its 
former belligerents must be represented. Secondly, regarding territorial disposition, Taiwan 
should revert back to the PRC and Soviet ownership of the Kuril Islands should be made explicit 
per the Cairo Declaration and Yalta Agreement. Thirdly, Okinawa should be returned to Japan 
rather than being turned into an American “colony.” Fourthly, there should be a demilitarization 
clause to prevent the re-emergence of Japanese expansionism; this was accompanied by a 
demand that the democratization clause should be revived to forestall resurgence of a “Fascist” 
Japan. Fifthly, it demanded that all foreign troops be withdrawn from Japan. Finally, the Soviet 
bloc argued that the reparations clause must be amended, so that the “amount and the sources” of 
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reparations to be paid would be determined by the PRC, Indonesia, the Philippines and 
Burma.841  
This Soviet rhetoric was obviously meant to appeal to the former victims of Japan’s 
aggression, especially the Asian countries. Unfortunately for the Soviet Union, nobody at the 
conference was receptive to its propaganda. Instead, the very Asian countries that the Soviet bloc 
intended to lure were either apathetic or outright hostile. Ceylon, for instance, attacked the Soviet 
Union for trying to exclude “not only Ceylon, but even India and Indonesia and Burma and the 
Philippines” from the treaty negotiations by insisting that the decision-making power be limited 
to the Big Four. Ceylon further denounced the Soviet attempt to re-open negotiations of the 
treaty terms as simply delaying the peace progress. Ceylon also argued that if the Soviet Union 
insisted on the return of the Ryukyus, then it should also be willing to return South Sakhalin and 
the Kuril Islands to Japan. Pakistan also supported the US, arguing that the peace treaty, despite 
its “imperfections,” was nevertheless a “good treaty” that would eradicate the seeds of another 
war, and expressing its willingness to sign it.842  
The Philippines and Vietnam were the two most likely apostates, as they were not 
particularly happy with the reparations clause. However, the Philippines made it clear that it did 
not wish to torpedo the treaty, while Vietnam was all too happy that it had been invited to sign 
the treaty. Cambodia, while stressing the importance of reparations, endorsed the peace treaty 
and expressed its willingness to sign it. Laos, even though it also suffered from Japan’s 
aggression, did not even bring up the question of reparations and simply expressed its “full 
approval” of the treaty and willingness to sign it. Indonesia simply expressed the hope that it 
could arrange a satisfactory reparations agreement with Japan and did not expressly denounce 
the treaty. In short, none of the Asian states lent a sympathetic ear to the Soviet bloc. 
The three communist participants also had to bear vicious verbal assault or pro-American 
remarks from the other delegates. To begin with, the FEC member states were all united against 
the Soviet Union. Not only did they expressly endorse the US-led peace treaty, but also, in the 
case of the British Commonwealth, unleashed bitter accusations against the Soviet Union. 
Australia ridiculed the Soviet Union for its obsession with a punitive treaty when it had only 
fought Japan for a few days, while the countries that had fought the hardest were willing to 
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commit to a generous peace. Furthermore, Australia argued that the Soviet Union had no right to 
talk about reparations, since the whole reparations scheme had been impaired due to the Soviet 
“looting” of Manchuria after the war. Australia also demanded to know why the Soviet Union 
insisted on democracy and human rights in Japan, when these very values were being denied 
within the communist bloc.843 New Zealand joined the accusation, pointing out that the Soviet 
Union had failed to repatriate its Japanese POWs, while Canada argued that the exclusion of the 
PRC was its own doing for committing “aggression” in Korea.844  
As the co-sponsor of the treaty and the conference, Britain also defended the treaty by 
rebutting the Soviet accusations. While regretting the absence of China, Britain argued that the 
question of Chinese representation would have unduly delayed the Japanese peace settlement. 
Britain also stated that the territorial provisions, contrary to Soviet contention, were based on 
wartime agreements. In the case of Okinawa, Britain pointed out that the treaty did not remove 
Japanese sovereignty. Meanwhile, it noted that the US-Japan security arrangement was necessary 
to protect the latter as an unarmed country from external threats. Regarding Japan’s 
remilitarization, Britain argued that the former’s inherent right of self-defense was recognized by 
the UN Charter. Britain also complained that the communist bloc was hypocritical for being so 
concerned about Japan’s possible re-emergence as a threat, when communist aggression was 
taking place in Malaya, Korea and Indochina.845  
The other members of the FEC – France, the Netherlands and the Philippines – all 
expressed agreement with the treaty terms, albeit with reservations in the case of the Netherlands 
and the Philippines.846 But perhaps there was nothing surprising with the fact that the non-Soviet 
members of the FEC were united in their support for the US-led Japanese peace settlement. What 
was truly notable about the San Francisco peace conference was the fact that other governments 
were equally supportive of the US, with many expressing anti-Soviet statements. 
In the case of Europe, Greece and Luxembourg fully endorsed the treaty. While Belgium 
and Norway expressed certain reservations – over future Japanese commercial competition and 
whaling activities, respectively – they nevertheless supported the treaty. In the case of the 
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African participants – Ethiopia, Liberia and South Africa – they all gave their blessing without 
expressing any reservations. The Middle East was divided between those who expressed full 
support of the treaty and those who supported it with reservations. Egypt, while expressing 
support for the treaty, made three important reservations: it expressed displeasure that foreign 
troops would be stationed in Japan, reflecting its own bitterness about the British troop presence 
on its own soil; it also believed that the final territorial disposition must be adjudicated by the 
UNGA based on the opinions of the locals; and it wished to withhold extending MFN treatment 
to Japan. Lebanon, Iraq, Syria and Saudi Arabia subscribed to this view. On the other hand, Iran 
and Turkey fully endorsed the treaty and expressed their willingness to sign it.847 
The responses of certain Latin American governments were equally intriguing. The most 
notable enthusiast was El Salvador. The Salvadoran delegation expressed “great pleasure” in 
signing the peace treaty. Additionally, it opposed Taiwan reverting back to the PRC, arguing that 
this would lead to “bloody resistance” on the island and threaten the peace of Korea and Japan. 
El Salvador also challenged the legitimacy of Soviet ownership of the Kuril Islands, arguing that 
the de facto occupation did not mean de jure ownership; El Salvador formally proposed that the 
final disposition of the Kuril Islands must be determined in accordance with local opinion. 
Meanwhile, Cuba disagreed with the Soviet Union that the US-led peace settlement would lead 
to a resurgence of Japanese militarism, arguing that Japan was already democratic and its future 
ties to the UN were a sufficient safeguard against any future threat. Nicaragua also defended the 
treaty, while denouncing the Soviet demand to invite the PRC, an aggressor in the Korean War. 
The rest of the Latin American states – Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay 
and Venezuela – all agreed with the terms of the peace treaty, its imperfections notwithstanding, 
and expressed their willingness to sign.848  
The Japanese delegation was the last to speak at the conference. Japan expressed its hope 
that many countries would sign the treaty, so that it could recover diplomatic relations with them. 
Regarding some of the controversial treaty terms, Japan sided with the US, and welcomed the 
UN trusteeship over Okinawa and the security alliance with the US. Japan also stressed its view 
that Habomai and Shikotan were not part of the Kuril Islands and that the Soviet Union was 
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occupying them illegally; it further added that Etorofu and Kunashiri had always been Japanese. 
With regards to reparations, Japan simply stated that it would “carry them out,” hoping to 
assuage some of the Asian states.849 
To conclude, the Soviet bloc was completely isolated at the San Francisco peace 
conference, as all the other participants rallied behind the US. Although certain governments 
expressed reservations, they nevertheless supported the US-led Japanese peace settlement. Most 
notably, Soviet hopes to lure certain governments away were completely dashed. The final blow 
to the Soviet Union was the fact that the peace treaty was subsequently signed on 8 September 
1951 by all the participants, with the sole exception of Czechoslovakia, Poland and the Soviet 
Union. 
Perhaps the Soviet refusal to sign the treaty was a foregone conclusion, since it thought 
that there was nothing to be gained from signing. Unfortunately, as both Kimura Hiroshi and 
Hasegawa Tsuyoshi observe, this was a big mistake. By not signing the treaty, the Soviet Union 
not only excluded itself from all of the benefits of the treaty, but it also weakened its position 




The San Francisco peace conference was a clear and a humiliating defeat for the Soviet bloc. 
This owed to the fact that the US employed clever procedural tactics to forestall any attempts 
from the conference participants, especially the Soviet Union and its satellites, from re-opening 
the treaty to negotiation. At the same time, there already existed a prevalent feeling of animosity 
among the principal negotiating powers against the Soviet Union. This, combined with the fact 
that India and Burma – the two potential governments that could have sided with the Soviet 
Union – declined to attend the conference, greatly weakened any prospect of successful Soviet 
maneuvers against the US-led peace settlement. At the conference itself, it became clear that 
none of the participants – except Czechoslovakia and Poland – were sympathetic to the Soviet 
Union; instead, they all expressed support and signed the treaty. 
Meanwhile, the US congratulated itself for developing a treaty that purportedly served 
the interests of the international community and Japan. In his welcoming speech on the first day 
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of the conference (4 September 1951), Truman celebrated the agreement that his government had 
created as being a “good treaty” that sought to prevent another war and contribute to 
international peace. It was a treaty of “reconciliation, which looks to the future, not the past.”851  
At the second plenary session (5 September 1951), Dulles further elaborated on the 
specifics of the treaty. He explained that the treaty took a non-punitive approach, in order to 
break the “vicious cycle of war-victory-peace-war.” Hence, the treaty imposed no discrimination 
or limitation upon Japan’s economy. He also defended the liberal reparations terms, arguing that 
harsh reparations would have crippled Japan’s economy, led to bitterness and paved the way for 
further aggression. He also added that the US should not be made to indirectly finance for 
Japan’s reparations payments. In addition, he defended the absence of any democratization and 
demilitarization clauses, arguing that these should be left to Japan to implement voluntarily, 
rather than through compulsion.852  
At the same time, Dulles justified the security provisions as being necessary, as Japan 
was still disarmed and would not be able to maintain its independence when confronted with an 
external threat. Hence, the treaty acknowledged Japan’s inherent right to self-defense under the 
UN, while the US had responded positively to its request to enter into a bilateral security 
arrangement. Dulles also stressed that the treaty (Article 5-a-ii) would prevent Japan from re-
emerging as a threat by obligating it to observe the terms of the UN Charter, namely that Japan 
would “refrain...from the threat or use of force” against any state.853  
Regarding the territorial terms, Dulles claimed that they conformed with both the 
wartime agreements and the surrender terms in that they limited Japan’s sovereignty to the four 
main islands and minor islands as to be determined by the Allies. Regarding the “Kuril Islands,” 
Dulles suggested that any dispute about what this term entailed should be referred to the 
International Court of Justice.854 With regards to the Ryukyus, Dulles explained that the UN 
trusteeship was a compromise that sought to bridge the gap between those Allies who had urged 
outright renunciation of Japan’s sovereignty over the islands and others who supported their 
restoration. He stressed that Japan still retained “residual sovereignty” over the islands.855 
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Regarding the thorny question of Chinese representation, Dulles argued that the whole 
question could have led to a prolonged discussion and jeopardized the whole peace settlement. 
The best option, therefore, was to exclude China altogether. However, this did not mean that 
China’s interests were being overlooked, as Article 26 of the treaty gave the latter the right to 
conclude a peace treaty with Japan.856 China (in the form of the ROC) would indeed sign a 
separate peace treaty later in 1952. 
Hence, although not a perfect treaty, the US justified the agreement as a “good” one that 
served the interests of Japan as well as those of the international community. However, the treaty 
was more complicated than that. To begin with, for a treaty that addressed a war in Asia, the 
participants were overwhelmingly non-Asian. In fact, the treaty resembled a pact between Japan 
and the Americas, a prospect that Dulles had desperately tried to avoid. Moreover, besides 
Australia, Britain, France, the Netherlands and the US, these non-Asian states had not been 
directly involved in the Pacific War. Also, one could not miss the irony that for a treaty that 
purported to serve the interest of the international community, it failed to enlist the support of 
three major countries, two of whom were former Allies: India, PRC and the Soviet Union. To 
recall, India believed that the territorial terms infringed Japans’ sovereignty over the Ryukyus 
and went against the legitimate interests of the communist governments over Taiwan and the 
Kurils. India also expressed displeasure at Article 6 of the treaty, which provided for the 
stationing of the US troops in Japan, arguing that this represented the imposition of a foreign 
presence on Japan.857 As for the latter two communist states, there was no merit for them in 
signing a treaty that was designed to undermine their interests. The absence of Burma, the largest 
of the mainland Southeast Asian country that refused to sign the treaty on the grounds of 
unacceptable reparations clause, also could not go unnoticed.  
The interests of nearly one-third of humanity were thus passed over in the treaty, which 
immediately raised the question of how representative the Japanese peace settlement was in 
terms of reflecting the interests of major stakeholders. One could certainly debate if India and the 
Soviet Union deserved to be represented in the Japanese peace treaty. After all, India was never 
occupied by Japan and the damage it experienced was dwarfed in comparison to other countries, 
such as China, while the Soviet Union only entered the war a week before its end. However, 
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similar doubts could be raised about the Latin American states, whose contribution was relatively 
non-existent, but who were still recognized as parties to the treaty. One could also point out that 
the PRC was not even a country during the war and hence its right to sign the treaty was 
questionable from a legal point of view. However, the fact that Indochina was able to sign the 
treaty makes the credibility of this argument dubious. The treaty, therefore, was a partisan one 
that lacked the legitimacy in the eyes of many. And as explained in the next chapter, the treaty 









This study has attempted to construct a fuller and more international narrative of how the 
Japanese peace treaty was negotiated. To recap, the US first made an attempt to convene a peace 
conference for Japan in 1947. Unfortunately, this initiative failed for two reasons. First, there 
was a procedural dispute between the Soviet Union, backed by the ROC, and the US, supported 
by all the other FEC members. While the former wanted the Big Four to negotiate the treaty with 
veto rights, the latter wished to consult all members of the FEC with a simple two-thirds majority 
voting procedure. Secondly, with the escalating rivalry between the US and the Soviet Union, the 
spirit of wartime cooperation that used to underpin US foreign policy had by 1947 yielded to an 
increasingly confrontational attitude. Against this backdrop, the US by early 1948 temporarily 
abandoned the plan for a peace settlement and instead started focusing on Japan’s economic 
reconstruction. 
Thereafter, the Japanese peace settlement entered a dormant phase, which lasted roughly 
between 1948 and 1949. While there were no official negotiations during this period, there were 
nevertheless important developments that would later affect the peace treaty. To begin with, the 
US continued to refine the terms it envisioned for the treaty. During that process, a new lenient 
peace treaty emerged, which was intended to avoid imposing any harsh economic or political 
terms on Japan and was geared towards containing the Soviet Union. This was a drastic 
transformation that contrasted sharply with the draft treaty that was developed in 1947. 
Additionally, a plan for negotiating the treaty via “diplomatic channels” (or “shuttle diplomacy”) 
rather than through traditional means emerged. Thus, by March 1950 the idea of a peace 
conference in a traditional sense had been abandoned. All the while, the US hid its reluctance to 
move forward with the treaty by placing the blame on the Soviet Union for insisting on following 
the Big Four route for the Japanese peace settlement and marginalizing the majority of FEC 
members. 
The peace settlement started to regain momentum in 1949, as Acheson, the newly 
appointed Secretary of State, began to pay more attention to Japan. However, whereas the State 
Department wished to push forward with the Japanese peace settlement, the Defense Department 
opposed it. The tug-of-war between the two departments continued for months and was only 
229 
 
resolved after the outbreak of the Korean War, which dramatically increased the need to return 
Japan to self-sufficiency, both economically and militarily. As a compromise solution, Acheson 
agreed to sign a parallel bilateral security treaty that would allow the US to station its troops 
throughout Japan; only with this assurance did the Pentagon finally agree to engage in formal 
peace treaty discussions. 
Subsequently, the US moved quickly to consult other governments and negotiate the 
terms of the peace treaty, first with the FEC member states and later with Burma, Ceylon, 
Indonesia, Pakistan and South Korea. Most importantly, the US also conferred with its former 
enemy, Japan. Between late 1950 and mid-1951, which can be described as the formative months, 
Dulles, who was appointed to lead the negotiations, worked vigorously to convince the non-
communist governments to rally behind the US-led peace settlement, while also mustering 
congressional support to facilitate its ratification. He shrewdly employed a mixture of appealing 
to anti-communist camaraderie, stressing the importance of rebuilding Japan’s economy so as to 
lift the burden of financial support from the US and promising security guarantees to those 
countries concerned about Japan’s potential re-emergence as a threat. Although the Soviet Union 
was consulted out of formality, the US never made a whole-hearted effort to listen seriously to 
what it had to say. After ten months of patient and delicate diplomatic maneuvers, Dulles finally 
had a complete peace treaty by 13 August 1951. 
In order to make sure that the treaty was signed without any revisions, the US sent the 
invitation to the San Francisco peace conference on the condition that the participants did not 
reopen the treaty for negotiation. At the peace conference, which lasted for five days between 4 
September and 8 September 1951, the US successfully adopted a procedure that not only blocked 
any attempt to amend the peace treaty, but also allowed it to run the conference to its liking. This 
conference proved to be a humiliating defeat for the Soviet Union. The communists were neither 
able to make any changes to the peace treaty nor disrupt the conference. More importantly, the 
Soviet bloc was completely cornered, as all other governments were united in support of the US. 
Not surprisingly, the three communist participants – Czechoslovakia, Poland and the Soviet 
Union – refused to sign the treaty. The remaining 48 nations and Japan, on the other hand, signed 
the peace treaty on 8 September 1951, subsequently ratified it in the coming years, thereby 
terminating the state of war, both factually and legally. 
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As Miller and Schonberger point out, the Japanese peace treaty was largely tailored to 
America’s needs and interests, firmly anchoring Japan to the West and being premised on a 
future rapid buildup of the latter’s economy and armed forces for the purpose of combating the 
Soviet Union.858 The fact that the US crafted the treaty to serve its own interests is not surprising. 
After all, safeguarding national interests is what governments do. Additionally, Dulles firmly 
believed that what was good for the US must be good for the rest of the world. Hence, while 
Dulles was ready to listen sympathetically to other governments, what ultimately mattered was 
that the treaty conformed to American interests, because a good treaty for the US must also be a 
good treaty for all other governments.859 
One problem with this assessment, however, is that it neglects the fact that the peace 
treaty was an international instrument that was negotiated between multiple governments. Hence, 
when evaluating this treaty, simply asking what it meant for the US is not enough. One must also 
ask what the peace treaty meant for other countries as well.  
Certainly, the treaty had some merits for other governments. Although not exactly in the 
form or amount they envisioned, the FEC members – other than India and the Soviet Union – 
had some share of the cake. For instance, Australia, New Zealand and the Philippines were able 
to obtain a security guarantee. In the case of the latter, it also secured entitlement for reparations; 
the alternative would have been not receiving any. In addition, thanks to the Philippines, 
Indonesia (1957) and Vietnam (1953) were also able to sign reparations agreements with Japan. 
Even Burma, which refused to sign the treaty and later entered into a separate peace agreement 
on 25 September 1954, was able to sign a reparations agreement with Japan in 1955. 860 
Furthermore, Article 14 – which was premised on the tacit understanding that Japan would repay 
the initial American aid provided during the early phase of the occupation – was later used by the 
US to create a counterpart fund in Japan and steer the latter to assist with the economic 
development of Southeast Asia and Korea.861 Britain and the Netherlands were granted limited 
compensation rights for their former military POWs, while Canada was able to secure a tripartite 
fisheries agreement with Japan and the US. The ROC, as will be explained below, was able to 
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sign a separate peace treaty and, as a result, eventually obtained Japan’s recognition as the 
legitimate representation of China. 
Such merits notwithstanding, it is doubtful whether the peace treaty can be considered as 
a success on all fronts for all of the concerned Powers. During the negotiations, many 
governments had been clearly frustrated with the way in which the treaty was developing. What 
resulted from the peace treaty was equally controversial. For Japan, its diplomatic maneuvers 
were seriously proscribed, especially in its dealings with the communist bloc. Most troubling for 
many other governments was that the peace treaty, as Hosoya notes, was less about a “postwar 
settlement” than about “Cold War politics.” 862  In other words, in the name of combating 
communism, a number of questions about Japan’s past were either ignored or inadequately 
addressed. Consequently, the peace treaty bequeathed an extremely delicate regional order, 
which was replete with potential conflicts, some of which emerged early while many others 
remained sealed during the Cold War but then surfaced following the collapse of the Soviet 
Union.  
This troubled legacy can partly be attributed to the US, which sought to convince the 
other interested countries to look to the future rather than the past in an effort to quickly 
conclude a non-punitive peace and build Japan as an anti-communist bastion. Nevertheless, it 
would be wrong to simply frame the treaty as an American-dictated peace that ignored the 
opinions of others. Rather, the peace treaty was a multilateral construct that involved more than 
thirteen different countries. And in the process of coordinating and resolving disagreements with 
those governments, the US did not get all that it wished for, as exemplified by the fact that it 
could not invite the ROC – and to lesser extent South Korea – to San Francisco and had to give 
up no-reparations formula. But more importantly, the lesson here is that the various controversies 
that exist today in Asia-Pacific can be and ought to be understood from a broader and more novel 
point of view. Due to its complexity and scope, this necessitates an in-depth discussion.  
 
The Troubled Legacy of the San Francisco Peace Treaty 
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As Nishimura, Swenson-Wright and Chŏng note, the peace treaty was negotiated not simply 
between the US and the other victors, but also between the US and Japan.863 Certainly, the US 
and Japan were not equals and the latter was not in a position to force its desiderata on the US. 
Nonetheless, there was serious dialogue between the US and Japan, and the former made real 
efforts to accommodate the wishes of the latter. Hence, for instance, against the wishes of some 
of the Allies, no restrictions were imposed on Japan’s shipping and shipbuilding capacity, and 
almost no restrictions applied to its deep-sea fishing activities. Yoshida and his cabinet were also 
able to achieve two of Japan’s most important goals: independence and putting rearmament on 
hold to concentrate on economic development.  
Nevertheless, not everybody in Japan was satisfied. As Igarashi points out, during the 
negotiations there was an ongoing battle between what could be called the pro-Western faction 
and the neutralists. The former wished to align Japan with the US and were willing to agree to a 
“partial peace” that excluded the communist and neutralist blocs. The latter preferred an “overall 
peace” with all the nations concerned and sought to avoid siding with any particular bloc. 
Eventually, the pro-Western faction won the battle, and even today Japan’s pro-American stance 
is very apparent.864 The Japanese peace treaty was therefore a disappointment for those who 
wanted a neutral Japan.  
Of course, some conservatives also had qualms about it. Indeed, when the treaty was put 
before the Diet for ratification, there were 63 abstentions from the ruling Liberal Party and 14 
abstentions from the Democratic Party; also 3 of the Democratic Party members voted against it. 
The conservatives were particularly unhappy about the fact that Japanese sovereignty over the 
Ryukyus was left ambiguous; in fact, all members across the political spectrum unanimously 
expressed regret about this.865 Yet, Japan could take solace from the fact that the treaty did not 
deny Japan’s sovereignty over the Ryukyus. 
High-seas fisheries was another area that left a tricky legacy for Japan. As explained in 
Chapter 9, in order to ensure speedy conclusion of peace, Dulles isolated the specific questions 
pertaining to Japan’s postwar fisheries from the peace treaty. This was premised on the condition 
that Japan refrained from fishing in certain areas of the high seas, until it signed conservation 
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agreements with the concerned governments. Although self-imposed and temporary, this was 
nevertheless a form of economic restriction that could have been avoided had it not been for the 
vicious attacks by the formidable American West Coast fishing interests. The subsequent 
developments were equally complex. The trilateral fishing agreement signed between Canada, 
Japan and the US on 9 May 1952 reaffirmed the principle of the freedom of the seas and was 
intended to set a favorable precedent for Japan’s subsequent agreements with other governments. 
Nevertheless, this did not mean Japan could fish wherever it wished.866 Japan agreed to “abstain” 
from catching halibut, herring and salmon from the Bering Sea area (more precisely, the areas 
beyond line of meridian 175° West Longitude).867  
Japan also entered into a fisheries agreement with the PRC. Perhaps because of the 
Japanese material assistance to the UN war effort in Korea, the PRC seized a total of 158 
Japanese fishing vessels operating in the East China Sea and Yellow Sea and detained a total of 
1,909 fishermen between 1950 and 1954. Unsurprisingly, the Japanese fishing companies 
appealed to their government to seek the repatriation of these vessels and their crews and to 
ensure safe access to these fishing grounds. Subsequently, an agreement was concluded on 15 
April 1955 between Beijing and Tokyo to regulate fishing activities in the East China Sea and 
Yellow Sea; perhaps fortunately for Japan, this agreement was also premised on mare 
liberum.868 A similar development took place with the Soviet Union. On 20 March 1956, the so-
called “Bulganin Line” was proclaimed by Moscow, covering the Sea of Okhotsk and waters 
stretching from Kamchatka to the Kuril Islands, on the reasoning that unregulated Japanese 
fishing could otherwise threaten maritime resources. The establishment of the Bulganin Line 
meant that Japan had to obtain Soviet approval to catch fish in these areas and the Japanese 
fishing interest was happy. Subsequently, Tokyo and Moscow negotiated and signed a fishing 
agreement on 15 May 1956. This fishing agreement was also premised on the principle of mare 
liberum, more so than the 1952 trilateral agreement, as it did not even adopt an abstention 
clause.869  
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South Korea’s case was more unique, as here the attempt to ensure Japan free access to 
the high seas backfired. To recall, South Korea demanded that the MacArthur Line be 
maintained in the post-treaty era, in order to protect its fishing interests from the more advanced 
Japanese fishing vessels. When the US rejected this plea, South Korea declared its own 
conservation zone along the eastern coast on 18 January 1952. Conventionally called the “Rhee 
Line” (or “Peace Line”), this was meant to substitute the “MacArthur Line” and protect Korean 
fishing interests. Thereafter, over 300 Japanese fishing vessels were captured and over 4,000 
Japanese fishermen were detained in Korea, causing outrage in Japan. Not surprisingly, Japan 
and South Korea started to negotiate. However, unlike in the Chinese and Soviet cases, Japan 
had to wait for more than a decade until an agreement was signed. It was only with the 
normalization of relations in 1965 that a fishing agreement was signed and the Rhee Line 
officially lifted. This agreement was different from the aforementioned ones in that the two 
countries mutually recognized that their territorial waters extended 12 miles from the coast, 
reflecting the growing challenge to the traditional three-mile rule under mare liberum.870  
In sum, on one hand, the peace treaty gave Japan relative freedom to fish in all high seas. 
While the treaty did create momentum for Japan to sign a series of fisheries agreements in the 
subsequent years, these agreements were premised on mare liberum and did not significantly 
threaten Japan’s high seas fisheries. It was not until 1982 when the UN Convention on the Law 
of the Sea – which recognized a country’s Exclusive Economic Zone to up to 200 miles – was 
signed (effective in November 1994) that Japan’s maritime freedom was seriously challenged. 
On the other hand, the San Francisco peace treaty embittered other countries, as it seemed 
indifferent to their concerns about Japan’s fishing activities, as exemplified in South Korea’s 
reaction. While this study cannot go much into detail, Indonesia and the Philippines were also 
unhappy about the prospect of unrestrained Japanese fishing off their coasts. In other words, the 
Japanese peace settlement left a complex and contentious legacy in high seas fisheries. 
Meanwhile, there were other, more concerning, aspects of the treaty that seriously 
undermined Japan’s sovereignty. To reiterate, Japan’s relations with the Soviet bloc were 
strained for decades. This first became clear when Japan attempted to restore diplomatic relations 
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with the Soviet Union. In trying to normalize relations with the Soviet Union in 1956, Japan 
entertained the idea of relinquishing its claim over some of the “Northern Territories” to Moscow. 
Not only did this amount to formally recognizing Soviet sovereignty over some of those islands, 
but also clarifying Japanese sovereignty over certain areas that had been left intentionally vague. 
This threatened to destroy the delicate balance achieved through the ambiguity formula (Article 
2); also concerning was that once Japan reclaimed some of those islands, there was a real 
possibility that Japan might demand the same about the Ryukyus, which could endanger the US 
control of Okinawa. Hence, the US sought to frustrate Tokyo’s plan, arguing that it would 
equally demand any territorial concession that might be extended to the Soviet Union and 
threatening to annex Okinawa. Consequently, the “Northern Territories” question had to be 
sidelined and no peace treaty was signed. Instead, Japan had to content itself with a Joint 
Declaration that simply ended the state of war and reopened diplomatic exchanges with 
Moscow.871 
Sadly, there still is no peace treaty between Japan and Russia, as they continue to 
disagree on the Kuril question. While the US certainly shares the blame for hindering Japan’s 
earlier efforts to establish peace with the Soviet Union, it is also important to note that the Kuril 
conundrum was collectively made. As explained in Chapter 10, all FEC members made some 
contribution to leaving the ownership of the Kurils unclear. Hence, as unrelated as it may seem, 
Japan and Russia are not able to sign a peace treaty because of Canada, which first suggested the 
ambiguity formula, and Australia also cannot escape responsibility, since it supported the 
retention of US troops in Okinawa. The point here is not to blame any country; it is to highlight 
that the territorial disagreement between Japan and Russia had multilateral origins.  
Japan also had to wait until 1972 to normalize relations with the PRC, even though there 
were many elements in the former, especially businesses, which wanted to improve relations 
with the mainland. This was partly because the peace treaty steered Japan in this direction. To 
recall, only the US and the Philippines wished to invite the ROC to the San Francisco peace 
conference, while all other FEC members believed that the PRC should be represented. 
Regardless of this overwhelming support for the PRC, the US prevented the PRC representation 
by demanding that Japan should be able to choose with which China it wished to sign a separate 
peace treaty at a later date. Of course, this was a nominal freedom, as the US had no intention of 
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allowing it to establish formal diplomatic ties with the PRC. The peace treaty, in other words, 
was premised on the idea that Japan would sign a peace treaty with the Nationalist Chinese and 
not the Communists. Yoshida himself was firmly resolved against signing a peace treaty with the 
PRC, thus making Japan’s alignment with the ROC a foregone conclusion. However, it would be 
naïve to assume that there was no US pressure. Indeed, regardless of Yoshida’s openly anti-
communist attitude, Dulles was concerned about Yoshida’s possible apostasy – especially as the 
latter at the Diet hearing on 23 October 1951 had hinted at the possibility of setting up an 
overseas liaison office in Shanghai – and pressed for a written assurance that Japan would not 
enter into official relations with mainland China. Yoshida faithfully complied and Japan 
subsequently signed a peace treaty with the ROC on 28 April 1952, essentially recognizing that 
government as the legitimate representation of “China,” which in turn became a nuisance for 
Japan’s later attempts to normalize relations with the PRC. At the same time, whatever limited 
trade relations that Japan enjoyed with the PRC during this period were seriously handicapped, 
as these transactions had to be strictly private with no implications of government involvement. 
Furthermore, as part of the pro-American camp, Japan had to comply with the directives from 
the CoCom (Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls) and CHINCOM (China 
Command), which greatly restricted tradable goods.872 
This episode, together with Japan’s troubled relationship with the Soviet Union (Russia), 
challenges the notion of a lenient peace. Few will dispute that the peace treaty was generous and 
highly favorable to Japan, as it discarded any draconian military or economic restrictions and 
was geared towards reconciliation rather than punishment. Yet, the peace treaty hampered 
Japan’s ability to engage with the Soviet bloc. On the one hand, this is not surprising, as the 
overarching principle of the treaty was to combat communism. On the other hand, the fact that 
Japan’s foreign policy was restricted should surely lead to the conclusion that the peace treaty 
should not be interpreted as being entirely lenient. This certainly does not mean that the treaty 
was punitive. At the same time, however, it is an oversimplification to unconditionally eulogize 
the treaty as being benevolent. 
 
872 Inoue, The Political History of Sino-Japanese Normalization, 29, 108-536; Hosoya Chihiro, “From the Yoshida 
Letter to the Nixon Shock,” in The United States and Japan in the Postwar World, Akira Iriye and Warren I. Cohen 




The peace treaty left an equally complex legacy for the other countries, especially China, 
one of the most unfortunate characters in this story. To recall, both the PRC and ROC were 
excluded from the peace treaty – not by their own will, but rather by outside powers – which was 
deeply humiliating for both Chinas. What followed was no less encouraging. In accordance with 
Article 26 of the San Francisco peace treaty, coupled with pressure from Dulles and Yoshida’s 
own anti-communist conviction, Japan chose to negotiate a peace treaty with the ROC, which 
culminated in the Treaty of Taipei. This treaty developed in a way that was contrary to what the 
ROC had hoped. Most notably, the ROC wanted to ensure that the treaty was premised on the 
assumption that the ROC was the legitimate government of China and that its jurisdiction 
therefore extended to the Chinese mainland. However, the Americans, British and the Japanese 
were against this idea. Consequently, the issue of whether the ROC represented the entire 
Chinese nation or simply Taiwan was left unclear. Furthermore, Taipei’s effort to sign a treaty 
that was substantially on equal terms with that signed in San Francisco was frustrated, as Japan 
wished to avoid adopting any terms that might implicate or aid the Chinese Nationalist claims 
over the mainland and the US remained reluctant to intervene on the ROC’s behalf. Hence, the 
ROC had to settle for much less than the San Francisco peace treaty, forgoing its demands for 
MFN treatment and reparations.873  
The San Francisco peace treaty was thus a troubling experience for the Chinese 
Nationalists. Not only was the ROC treated like a disposable asset for the Japanese peace 
settlement, but also during the subsequent bilateral negotiations, Japan (the former vanquished) 
was able to press the ROC (the former Ally and a victor) to make major concessions that 
compromised its prestige and sovereignty. The ROC was thus a victor in name only, and who 
really emerged from the war as a victor became questionable. Of course, the ROC was not an 
innocent victim and shared the blame for its own misfortune. After all, its political ineptitude 
was what had led to its downfall on the mainland in the first place, which in turn significantly 
curtailed its diplomatic standing. Also important to note is the fact that the settlement did not 
leave the ROC totally empty-handed; as mentioned above, Japan by signing a peace treaty with 
the ROC essentially recognized the Chinese Nationalists as the legitimate government of 
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China.874 Equally important is to recall that this Chinese misfortune – which may seem like a 
problem simply between the two Chinas, Japan and the US – had a more multilateral dimension. 
As explained in Chapter 4, the ROC was excluded from the San Francisco peace treaty, because 
all FEC members (the principal parties to the treaty) except the Philippines and the US opposed 
its representation.  
The PRC did not fare any better. Unlike the ROC, the PRC was ignored during the peace 
treaty negotiations. Furthermore, the PRC’s prospects for establishing formal relations with 
Japan were effectively ended when the latter signed a peace treaty with the ROC, recognizing the 
Chinese Nationalists as the legitimate government of China. It had to wait two decades before 
finally normalizing relations with Japan. And by the time the PRC and Japan were working to 
formalize relations, the former’s freedom to maneuver was greatly restricted, as it could not 
ignore the already-existing framework: the San Francisco peace treaty and the Treaty of Taipei. 
This was unfortunate, as the PRC was being constrained by agreements that it neither took part 
in nor approved. More importantly, it inhibited the PRC’s ability to demand indemnification 
from Japan.  
The PRC, “in the interest of the friendship” with Japan, renounced its “demand for war 
reparations” when it normalized relations with Japan on 29 September 1972. The peace treaty 
later signed between Japan and the PRC on 12 August 1978 did not even mention reparations. 
While Japan formally stated that it was “keenly conscious” of the “responsibility for the serious 
damage that Japan caused in the past to the Chinese people through war and deeply reproaches 
itself,” it accepted neither any responsibility for reparations nor promised any other concrete 
actions to rectify the past.875 This was another legacy of the San Francisco peace treaty. To recall, 
the reparations clause did not make it clear if Japan accepted its responsibility to indemnify the 
Allied victims and, furthermore, the ROC had already renounced its reparations demands. Hence, 
there was no legal basis under the San Francisco treaty for the PRC to obligate Japan to accept 
the responsibility for the wartime damage. Consequently, the issue of the wartime past was left 
largely unsettled for both Chinas. 
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Of course, the PRC also played a role in leaving the past unsettled, as it prioritized 
promptly normalizing relations with Japan above anything else due to its continuing animosity 
towards the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the PRC was more interested in delegitimizing the ROC 
rather than gaining reparations. Indeed, at a meeting with Tanaka Kakuei (Japanese Prime 
Minister) on 25 September 1975, Zhou Enlai (PRC Premier) recognized the “hardships that 
reparation causes” and expressed willingness to renounce it. However, Zhou did make an issue 
out of Japan’s argument that since the ROC renounced reparations, the PRC should do 
likewise.876 In other words, the problem for the PRC was not reparations itself, but rather the 
idea that its rival regime’s (ROC’s) decisions should necessarily dictate PRC’s behavior.877 Only 
in the mid-1990s, more than two decades after normalizing relations with Japan, did the PRC 
government respond to the surging public anger towards Japan’s past atrocities, such as the 
Nanjing massacre, and its present insensitivity to Chinese grievances by recognizing individual 
rights to claim compensation from Japan and erecting memorials in remembrance of wartime 
victims.878 
Nevertheless, there is no denying that the San Francisco peace treaty – and the fact that 
the PRC was excluded from it – acted as a legal constraint on how far the PRC could require 
Japan to redress its past. Again, it is important to note that this had an international dimension. 
Had the Allies been more forceful in demanding reparations, the treaty might have adopted a 
more forceful indemnification responsibility for Japan. Instead, the Philippines engaged in a lone 
battle to convince the US to move away from the no-reparations formula, while other Western 
Allies were either indifferent to or willing to comply with the US demands to minimize the 
economic burden on Japan. 
The Japanese peace settlement also placed South Korea in a tricky situation in its 
relations with Japan. To recall, South Korea was excluded from the treaty and subsequently had 
to negotiate directly with Tokyo to normalize relations. The normalization talks were fraught 
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with numerous controversies. For one thing, Seoul was in an extremely weak bargaining position, 
as the country was devastated by the war with the communist north, while Japan had already 
emerged from the ashes of conflict and was on the path of rapid economic growth. 
Unsurprisingly, South Korea had to settle for much less than it wished for, fueling widespread 
and at times violent demonstrations by Korean public. It was amid this inauspicious atmosphere 
that the “Treaty on Basic Relations between Republic of Korea and Japan” was signed on 22 
June 1965. 
One of the most controversial aspects of the “Basic Relations Treaty” that fueled public 
outrage was Article 2, which stated that the 1910 annexation treaty was “already null and 
void.”879 This wording essentially allowed South Korea and Japan to interpret the legality (or 
illegality) of the annexation to their own convenience. Whereas Korea maintains that Japan’s 
annexation of Korea was illegitimate from the beginning, Japan claims that it was valid up until 
the latter’s defeat in 1945.880 This conflicting interpretation owes to the fact that the annexation 
treaty was never formally repealed. South Korea was thus forced into a lonely battle to 
delegitimize it. Whatever the case, the sheer fact that the normalization treaty gave Japan pretext 
to claim the annexation as having been legal was a significant blow to South Korea’s pride. 
Furthermore, while Japan paid some $600 million to South Korea as part of a “claims” 
dispute, this money was never labelled “reparations” or “restitution.” Instead, Japan argued that 
this was a gift to celebrate Korea’s independence and to foster the new bilateral economic 
partnership.881 The premise was that there was no wrongful past to be compensated for between 
the two countries. Japan maintains this position today and it is a source of continuing bitterness 
in Korea. Japan was also able to get South Korea to agree that the “problem concerning property, 
rights and interests…and concerning claims” was “settled completely and finally.”882 Japan takes 
this literally and argues accordingly that there are no issues left unresolved between the two 
countries. 
Throughout the Cold War, South Korea was careful not to make an issue out of Japan’s 
past, and instead focused on developing the economy and staying vigilant against the communist 
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threat. However, with the end of the US-Soviet rivalry and democratization of Korea, the South 
Korean public’s anger against its own government and Japan in handling the questions of the 
past became explosive. Perhaps in response to this formidable public outcry that has been 
increasing in intensity from the 1990s onwards, the South Korean Supreme Court in October 
2018 finally ruled that the 1965 “claims” settlement had not properly addressed the problems of 
Japan’s “illegitimate” colonial past and ordered the Korean branch of Nippon Steel (successor of 
Yawata Steel) to pay indemnification.883 While this is a major victory for the former wartime 
victims, it has come at the significant cost of seriously damaging bilateral relations with Japan. 
Important to remember is that while the “history issues” between Korea and Japan are 
often framed as a “bilateral” problem, examining the San Francisco peace treaty reveals them to 
be actually multilateral. One of the reasons that Korea-Japan relations became so acrimonious is 
arguably that Korea was excluded from the peace treaty. Had South Korea signed the 1951 treaty, 
it theoretically would have been recognized as a belligerent and entitled to war reparations. 
Although the US in all likelihood would have blocked Korea from demanding an indemnity and 
the latter would have given in, there is a difference between giving up one’s rights voluntarily 
and being deprived them altogether. South Korea’s case belongs to the latter scenario, 
contributing to the feeling that it had not been properly heard and that there still is a wrongful 
past to be settled. The exclusion of the South Korea, meanwhile, was an international decision 
that involved Britain, Japan, South Korea and the US. It is also worth noting that South Korea’s 
case is not exceptional in a sense that the Chinese and the Europeans (British, Dutch and the 
French) also had qualms about Japan’s wartime past. In short, Korea’s “history issue” cannot be 
isolated from this broader issue of Japan’s unsettled past with other countries. 
The postwar disposition of Japan’s former territories also caused considerable 
antagonism between Japan and her neighbors. As explained in Chapter 10, the ownership of a 
number of controversial island territories was left unresolved in the peace treaty. Consequently, 
Japan and its neighbors still wrestle with some bitter disputes. The Kuril Islands dispute, as 
mentioned above, continues to be a thorny issue between Japan and Russia, as each continues to 
claim its sovereign rights over them, and this has prevented the two countries from signing a 
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peace treaty until today.884 Japan also continues to wrestle with South Korea over the Liancourt 
Rocks. South Korea has effectively occupied the islands since the end of the war, while the 
former has persistently demanded that the issue be brought before the ICJ. While it may seem 
comical that two uninhabitable rocks could cause outrage, this issue is taken seriously in both 
countries. Indeed, 22 February is celebrated as “Takeshima Day” in Shimane Prefecture to 
commemorate Japan’s sovereignty over the Liancourt Rocks, while some Koreans in recent 
years have been changing their permanent address in their official registry to “Tokdo.”  
Japan is also embroiled in another territorial dispute with “China” over a chain of islands 
called Senkaku/Diaoyutai, with the former claiming the islands to be an extension of the 
Ryukyus and the latter claiming it to be part of Taiwan. The dispute began in the early 1970s 
after oil deposits were found near the islands; the seas surrounding the islands are also rich 
fisheries and an important maritime navigation route. Not surprisingly, Japan, PRC and ROC 
have claimed sovereign rights over them. It has also taken on a military dimension as the PRC, in 
an effort to strengthen its sovereignty over the area, has declared an Air Defense Identification 
Zone over the waters surrounding the islands, thus obligating any commercial aircraft entering 
that zone to notify Beijing. This zone overlaps with that of Japan. Both countries also have 
military vessels patrolling the area, further escalating tensions and raising concerns about a 
potential armed clash.885  
Although Japan is not involved, the South China Seas disputes involving the Spratly and 
Paracel islands also continue between Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, the PRC, the ROC and 
Vietnam. The tension has been gradually escalating since the 1960s and have become more 
serious in recent years, as China (PRC) appears to be militarizing the area and the US is 
beginning to become more assertive in opposing the Chinese actions. While the PRC claims that 
Chinese sovereignty over the islands stretch back for many centuries, this is not shared by other 
governments, including the US, which recently denounced the PRC claims over the islands as 
having “no legal grounds.”886 
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It is important to remember that all members of the FEC, not simply the US, contributed 
to the formation of the territorial clauses of the Japanese peace treaty and thus to the on-going 
territorial disputes. The implication is that while these territorial disputes (except South China 
Seas) may appear to be a bilateral problem, they have multilateral origins. Hence, for instance, 
the dispute over the Liancourt Rocks is also an American creation. After all, its ownership was 
left unspecified partly because it wished to secure control over the Mandate Islands and the 
Ryukyus. Likewise, France cannot escape the South China Seas disputes, as it was the main 
force behind reviving the terms on Spratly and Paracel Islands and leaving their ownership 
ambiguous. Similarly, Australia is indirectly involved in the origins of the Senkaku dispute, as it 
contributed to leaving the ownership of the Ryukyus and Taiwan undefined; according to this 
formula, whether the Senkaku belongs to the Ryukyus or Taiwan, it is ultimately unclear who 
owns any of them. The lesson here is that territorial disputes in Asia-Pacific would require a 




The various controversies aside, the Japanese peace treaty was a landmark in postwar world 
history. Its legacies still reverberate today. The treaty is also a reminder that postwar Japan 
cannot be isolated from the broader world. Developments in Japan impacted the region 
surrounding it, as well as those far away; the same was true the other way around, as various 
developments outside Japan affected the country in profound ways. This is still true. This 
valuable lesson should not be forgotten for all those who care about Japan and the region. This is 
especially important, as scholars have recently begun to raise the possibility of creating a post-
San Francisco system order. In other words, will the San Francisco system be replaced by 
something else? If so, what kind of regional order will this be and when will this happen? This is 
no simple question, as there are too many factors – which are often too unpredictable – that 
affect the world we live in. But facing this uncertain future, it is always useful to keep in mind 
that any questions involving Japan require a broad lens and the ability to analyze the situation 









TREATY OF PEACE WITH JAPAN 
 
Whereas the Allied Powers and Japan are resolved that henceforth their relations shall be those 
of nations which, as sovereign equals, cooperate in friendly association to promote their common 
welfare and to maintain international peace and security, and are therefore desirous of 
concluding a Treaty of Peace which will settle questions still outstanding as a result of the 
existence of a state of war between them; 
 
Whereas Japan for its part declares its intention to apply for membership in the United Nations 
and in all circumstances to conform to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations; to 
strive to realize the objectives of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; to seek to create 
within Japan conditions of stability and well-being as defined in Articles 55 and 56 of the 
Charter of the United Nations and already initiated by post-surrender Japanese legislation; and in 
public and private trade and commerce to conform to internationally accepted fair practices; 
 
Whereas the Allied Powers welcome the intentions of Japan set out in the foregoing paragraph; 
 
The Allied Powers and Japan have therefore determined to conclude the present Treaty of Peace, 
and have accordingly appointed the undersigned Plenipotentiaries, who, after presentation of 
their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed on the following provisions: 
 
CHAPTER I: PEACE 
 
Article 1 
(a) The state of war between Japan and each of the Allied Powers is terminated as from the date 
on which the present Treaty comes into force between Japan and the Allied Power concerned 
as provided for in Article 23. 
(b) The Allied Powers recognize the full sovereignty of the Japanese people over Japan and its 
territorial waters. 
  
CHAPTER II: TERRITORY 
 
Article 2 
(a) Japan recognizing the independence of Korea, renounces all right, title and claim to Korea, 
including the islands of Quelpart, Port Hamilton and Dagelet. 
(b) Japan renounces all right, title and claim to Formosa and the Pescadores. 
(c) Japan renounces all right, title and claim to the Kurile Islands, and to that portion of Sakhalin 
and the islands adjacent to it over which Japan acquired sovereignty as a consequence of the 
Treaty of Portsmouth of 5 September 1905. 
(d) Japan renounces all right, title and claim in connection with the League of Nations Mandate 
System, and accepts the action of the United Nations Security Council of 2 April 1947, 
extending the trusteeship system to the Pacific Islands formerly under mandate to Japan. 
(e) Japan renounces all claim to any right or title to or interest in connection with any part of the 
Antarctic area, whether deriving from the activities of Japanese nationals or otherwise. 
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(f) Japan renounces all right, title and claim to the Spratly Islands and to the Paracel Islands. 
 
Article 3 
Japan will concur in any proposal of the United States to the United Nations to place under its 
trusteeship system, with the United States as the sole administering authority, Nansei Shoto 
south of 29° north latitude (including the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands), Nanpo Shoto 
south of Sofu Gan (including the Bonin Islands, Rosario Island and the Volcano Islands) and 
Parece Vela and Marcus Island. Pending the making of such a proposal and affirmative action 
thereon, the United States will have the right to exercise all and any powers of administration, 




(a) Subject to the provisions of paragraph (b) of this Article, the disposition of property of Japan 
and of its nationals in the areas referred to in Article 2, and their claims, including debts, 
against the authorities presently administering such areas and the residents (including 
juridical persons) thereof, and the disposition in Japan of property of such authorities and 
residents, and of claims, including debts, of such authorities and residents against Japan and 
its nationals, shall be the subject of special arrangements between Japan and such authorities. 
The property of any of the Allied Powers or its nationals in the areas referred to in Article 2 
shall, insofar as this has not already been done, be returned by the administering authority in 
the condition in which it now exists. (The term nationals whenever used in the present Treaty 
includes juridical persons.) 
(b) Japan recognizes the validity of dispositions of property of Japan and Japanese nationals 
made by or pursuant to directives of the United States Military Government in any of the 
areas referred to in Articles 2 and 3. 
(c) Japanese owned submarine cables connection Japan with territory removed from Japanese 
control pursuant to the present Treaty shall be equally divided, Japan retaining the Japanese 
terminal and adjoining half of the cable, and the detached territory the remainder of the cable 
and connecting terminal facilities. 
 
CHAPTER III: SECURITY 
 
Article 5 
(a) Japan accepts the obligations set forth in Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations, and in 
particular the obligations 
(i) to settle its international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international 
peace and security, and justice, are not endangered; 
(ii) to refrain in its international relations from the threat or use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of any State or in any other manner 
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations; 
(iii) to give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the 
Charter and to refrain from giving assistance to any State against which the United 
Nations may take preventive or enforcement action. 
(b) The Allied Powers confirm that they will be guided by the principles of Article 2 of the 
Charter of the United Nations in their relations with Japan. 
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(c) The Allied Powers for their part recognize that Japan as a sovereign nation possesses the 
inherent right of individual or collective self-defense referred to in Article 51 of the Charter 




(a) All occupation forces of the Allied Powers shall be withdrawn from Japan as soon as 
possible after the coming into force of the present Treaty, and in any case not later than 90 
days thereafter. Nothing in this provision shall, however, prevent the stationing or retention 
of foreign armed forces in Japanese territory under or in consequence of any bilateral or 
multilateral agreements which have been or may be made between one or more of the Allied 
Powers, on the one hand, and Japan on the other. 
(b) The provisions of Article 9 of the Potsdam Proclamation of 26 July 1945, dealing with the 
return of Japanese military forces to their homes, to the extent not already completed, will be 
carried out. 
(c) All Japanese property for which compensation has not already been paid, which was supplied 
for the use of the occupation forces and which remains in the possession of those forces at 
the time of the coming into force of the present Treaty, shall be returned to the Japanese 
Government within the same 90 days unless other arrangements are made by mutual 
agreement. 
  
CHAPTER IV: POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CLAUSES 
 
Article 7 
(a) Each of the Allied Powers, within one year after the present Treaty has come into force 
between it and Japan, will notify Japan which of its prewar bilateral treaties or conventions 
with Japan it wishes to continue in force or revive, and any treaties or conventions so notified 
shall continue in force or by revived subject only to such amendments as may be necessary to 
ensure conformity with the present Treaty. The treaties and conventions so notified shall be 
considered as having been continued in force or revived three months after the date of 
notification and shall be registered with the Secretariat of the United Nations. All such 
treaties and conventions as to which Japan is not so notified shall be regarded as abrogated. 
(b) Any notification made under paragraph (a) of this Article may except from the operation or 
revival of a treaty or convention any territory for the international relations of which the 
notifying Power is responsible, until three months after the date on which notice is given to 
Japan that such exception shall cease to apply. 
  
Article 8 
(a) Japan will recognize the full force of all treaties now or hereafter concluded by the Allied 
Powers for terminating the state of war initiated on 1 September 1939, as well as any other 
arrangements by the Allied Powers for or in connection with the restoration of peace. Japan 
also accepts the arrangements made for terminating the former League of Nations and 
Permanent Court of International Justice. 
(b) Japan renounces all such rights and interests as it may derive from being a signatory power of 
the Conventions of St. Germain-en-Laye of 10 September 1919, and the Straits Agreement of 
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Montreux of 20 July 1936, and from Article 16 of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey signed at 
Lausanne on 24 July 1923. 
(c) Japan renounces all rights, title and interests acquired under, and is discharged from all 
obligations resulting from, the Agreement between Germany and the Creditor Powers of 20 
January 1930 and its Annexes, including the Trust Agreement, dated 17 May 1930, the 
Convention of 20 January 1930, respecting the Bank for International Settlements; and the 
Statutes of the Bank for International Settlements. Japan will notify to the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs in Paris within six months of the first coming into force of the present Treaty 
its renunciation of the rights, title and interests referred to in this paragraph. 
 
Article 9 
Japan will enter promptly into negotiations with the Allied Powers so desiring for the conclusion 
of bilateral and multilateral agreements providing for the regulation or limitation of fishing and 
the conservation and development of fisheries on the high seas. 
 
Article 10 
Japan renounces all special rights and interests in China, including all benefits and privileges 
resulting from the provisions of the final Protocol signed at Peking on 7 September 1901, and all 
annexes, notes and documents supplementary thereto, and agrees to the abrogation in respect to 
Japan of the said protocol, annexes, notes and documents. 
 
Article 11 
Japan accepts the judgments of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East and of other 
Allied War Crimes Courts both within and outside Japan, and will carry out the sentences 
imposed thereby upon Japanese nationals imprisoned in Japan. The power to grant clemency, to 
reduce sentences and to parole with respect to such prisoners may not be exercised except on the 
decision of the Government or Governments which imposed the sentence in each instance, and 
on recommendation of Japan. In the case of persons sentenced by the International Military 
Tribunal for the Far East, such power may not be exercised except on the decision of a majority 
of the Governments represented on the Tribunal, and on the recommendation of Japan. 
 
Article 12 
(a) Japan declares its readiness promptly to enter into negotiations for the conclusion with each 
of the Allied Powers of treaties or agreements to place their trading, maritime and other 
commercial relations on a stable and friendly basis. 
(b) Pending the conclusion of the relevant treaty or agreement, Japan will, during a period of four 
years from the first coming into force of the present Treaty 
(1) accord to each of the Allied Powers, its nationals, products and vessels 
(i) most-favored-nation treatment with respect to customs duties, charges, restrictions and 
other regulations on or in connection with the importation and exportation of goods; 
(ii) national treatment with respect to shipping, navigation and imported goods, and with 
respect to natural and juridical persons and their interests - such treatment to include 
all matters pertaining to the levying and collection of taxes, access to the courts, the 
making and performance of contracts, rights to property (tangible and intangible), 
participating in juridical entities constituted under Japanese law, and generally the 
conduct of all kinds of business and professional activities; 
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(2) ensure that external purchases and sales of Japanese state trading enterprises shall be 
based solely on commercial considerations. 
(c) In respect to any matter, however, Japan shall be obliged to accord to an Allied Power 
national treatment, or most-favored-nation treatment, only to the extent that the Allied Power 
concerned accords Japan national treatment or most-favored-nation treatment, as the case 
may be, in respect of the same matter. The reciprocity envisaged in the foregoing sentence 
shall be determined, in the case of products, vessels and juridical entities of, and persons 
domiciled in, any non-metropolitan territory of an Allied Power, and in the case of juridical 
entities of, and persons domiciled in, any state or province of an Allied Power having a 
federal government, by reference to the treatment accorded to Japan in such territory, state or 
province. 
(d) In the application of this Article, a discriminatory measure shall not be considered to derogate 
from the grant of national or most-favored-nation treatment, as the case may be, if such 
measure is based on an exception customarily provided for in the commercial treaties of the 
party applying it, or on the need to safeguard that party's external financial position or 
balance of payments (except in respect to shipping and navigation), or on the need to 
maintain its essential security interests, and provided such measure is proportionate to the 
circumstances and not applied in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner. 
(e) Japan's obligations under this Article shall not be affected by the exercise of any Allied rights 
under Article 14 of the present Treaty; nor shall the provisions of this Article be understood 
as limiting the undertakings assumed by Japan by virtue of Article 15 of the Treaty. 
 
Article 13 
(a) Japan will enter into negotiations with any of the Allied Powers, promptly upon the request of 
such Power or Powers, for the conclusion of bilateral or multilateral agreements relating to 
international civil air transport. 
(b) Pending the conclusion of such agreement or agreements, Japan will, during a period of four 
years from the first coming into force of the present Treaty, extend to such Power treatment 
not less favorable with respect to air-traffic rights and privileges than those exercised by any 
such Powers at the date of such coming into force, and will accord complete equality of 
opportunity in respect to the operation and development of air services. 
(c) Pending its becoming a party to the Convention on International Civil Aviation in accordance 
with Article 93 thereof, Japan will give effect to the provisions of that Convention applicable 
to the international navigation of aircraft, and will give effect to the standards, practices and 
procedures adopted as annexes to the Convention in accordance with the terms of the 
Convention. 
  
CHAPTER V: CLAIMS AND PROPERTY 
 
Article 14 
(a) It is recognized that Japan should pay reparations to the Allied Powers for the damage and 
suffering caused by it during the war. Nevertheless it is also recognized that the resources of 
Japan are not presently sufficient, if it is to maintain a viable economy, to make complete 




1. Japan will promptly enter into negotiations with Allied Powers so desiring, whose present 
territories were occupied by Japanese forces and damaged by Japan, with a view to 
assisting to compensate those countries for the cost of repairing the damage done, by 
making available the services of the Japanese people in production, salvaging and other 
work for the Allied Powers in question. Such arrangements shall avoid the imposition of 
additional liabilities on other Allied Powers, and, where the manufacturing of raw 
materials is called for, they shall be supplied by the Allied Powers in question, so as not to 
throw any foreign exchange burden upon Japan. 
2. (I) Subject to the provisions of subparagraph (II) below, each of the Allied Powers shall 
have the right to seize, retain, liquidate or otherwise dispose of all property, rights and 
interests of 
(a) Japan and Japanese nationals, 
(b) persons acting for or on behalf of Japan or Japanese nationals, and 
(c) entities owned or controlled by Japan or Japanese nationals, which on the first coming 
into force of the present Treaty were subject to its jurisdiction. The property, rights 
and interests specified in this subparagraph shall include those now blocked, vested or 
in the possession or under the control of enemy property authorities of Allied Powers, 
which belong to, or were held or managed on behalf of, any of the persons or entities 
mentioned in (a), (b) or (c) above at the time such assets came under the controls of 
such authorities. 
(II) The following shall be excepted from the right specified in subparagraph (I) above: 
(i) property of Japanese natural persons who during the war resided with the 
permission of the Government concerned in the territory of one of the Allied 
Powers, other than territory occupied by Japan, except property subjected to 
restrictions during the war and not released from such restrictions as of the date of 
the first coming into force of the present Treaty; 
(ii) all real property, furniture and fixtures owned by the Government of Japan and 
used for diplomatic or consular purposes, and all personal furniture and furnishings 
and other private property not of an investment nature which was normally 
necessary for the carrying out of diplomatic and consular functions, owned by 
Japanese diplomatic and consular personnel; 
(iii) property belonging to religious bodies or private charitable institutions and used 
exclusively for religious or charitable purposes; 
(iv) property, rights and interests which have come within its jurisdiction in 
consequence of the resumption of trade and financial relations subsequent to 2 
September 1945, between the country concerned and Japan, except such as have 
resulted from transactions contrary to the laws of the Allied Power concerned; 
(v) obligations of Japan or Japanese nationals, any right, title or interest in tangible 
property located in Japan, interests in enterprises organized under the laws of 
Japan, or any paper evidence thereof; provided that this exception shall only apply 
to obligations of Japan and its nationals expressed in Japanese currency. 
(III) Property referred to in exceptions (i) through (v) above shall be returned subject to 
reasonable expenses for its preservation and administration. If any such property has 
been liquidated the proceeds shall be returned instead. 
(IV) The right to seize, retain, liquidate or otherwise dispose of property as provided in 
subparagraph (I) above shall be exercised in accordance with the laws of the Allied 
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Power concerned, and the owner shall have only such rights as may be given him by 
those laws. 
(V) The Allied Powers agree to deal with Japanese trademarks and literary and artistic 
property rights on a basis as favorable to Japan as circumstances ruling in each 
country will permit. 
(b) Except as otherwise provided in the present Treaty, the Allied Powers waive all reparations 
claims of the Allied Powers, other claims of the Allied Powers and their nationals arising out 
of any actions taken by Japan and its nationals in the course of the prosecution of the war, 
and claims of the Allied Powers for direct military costs of occupation. 
  
Article 15 
(a) Upon application made within nine months of the coming into force of the present Treaty 
between Japan and the Allied Power concerned, Japan will, within six months of the date of 
such application, return the property, tangible and intangible, and all rights or interests of any 
kind in Japan of each Allied Power and its nationals which was within Japan at any time 
between 7 December 1941 and 2 September 1945, unless the owner has freely disposed 
thereof without duress or fraud. Such property shall be returned free of all encumbrances and 
charges to which it may have become subject because of the war, and without any charges 
for its return. Property whose return is not applied for by or on behalf of the owner or by his 
Government within the prescribed period may be disposed of by the Japanese Government as 
it may determine. In cases where such property was within Japan on 7 December 1941, and 
cannot be returned or has suffered injury or damage as a result of the war, compensation will 
be made on terms not less favorable than the terms provided in the draft Allied Powers 
Property Compensation Law approved by the Japanese Cabinet on 13 July 1951. 
(b) With respect to industrial property rights impaired during the war, Japan will continue to 
accord to the Allied Powers and their nationals benefits no less than those heretofore 
accorded by Cabinet Orders No. 309 effective 1 September 1949, No. 12 effective 28 
January 1950, and No. 9 effective 1 February 1950, all as now amended, provided such 
nationals have applied for such benefits within the time limits prescribed therein. 
(c) (i) Japan acknowledges that the literary and artistic property rights which existed in Japan on 
6 December 1941, in respect to the published and unpublished works of the Allied Powers 
and their nationals have continued in force since that date, and recognizes those rights 
which have arisen, or but for the war would have arisen, in Japan since that date, by the 
operation of any conventions and agreements to which Japan was a party on that date, 
irrespective of whether or not such conventions or agreements were abrogated or 
suspended upon or since the outbreak of war by the domestic law of Japan or of the Allied 
Power concerned. 
(ii) Without the need for application by the proprietor of the right and without the payment of 
any fee or compliance with any other formality, the period from 7 December 1941 until 
the coming into force of the present Treaty between Japan and the Allied Power concerned 
shall be excluded from the running of the normal term of such rights; and such period, 
with an additional period of six months, shall be excluded from the time within which a 





As an expression of its desire to indemnify those members of the armed forces of the Allied 
Powers who suffered undue hardships while prisoners of war of Japan, Japan will transfer its 
assets and those of its nationals in countries which were neutral during the war, or which were at 
war with any of the Allied Powers, or, at its option, the equivalent of such assets, to the 
International Committee of the Red Cross which shall liquidate such assets and distribute the 
resultant fund to appropriate national agencies, for the benefit of former prisoners of war and 
their families on such basis as it may determine to be equitable. The categories of assets 
described in Article 14(a)2(II)(ii) through (v) of the present Treaty shall be excepted from 
transfer, as well as assets of Japanese natural persons not residents of Japan on the first coming 
into force of the Treaty. It is equally understood that the transfer provision of this Article has no 
application to the 19,770 shares in the Bank for International Settlements presently owned by 
Japanese financial institutions. 
 
Article 17 
(a) Upon the request of any of the Allied Powers, the Japanese Government shall review and 
revise in conformity with international law any decision or order of the Japanese Prize Courts 
in cases involving ownership rights of nationals of that Allied Power and shall supply copies 
of all documents comprising the records of these cases, including the decisions taken and 
orders issued. In any case in which such review or revision shows that restoration is due, the 
provisions of Article 15 shall apply to the property concerned. 
(b) The Japanese Government shall take the necessary measures to enable nationals of any of the 
Allied Powers at any time within one year from the coming into force of the present Treaty 
between Japan and the Allied Power concerned to submit to the appropriate Japanese 
authorities for review any judgment given by a Japanese court between 7 December 1941 and 
such coming into force, in any proceedings in which any such national was unable to make 
adequate presentation of his case either as plaintiff or defendant. The Japanese Government 
shall provide that, where the national has suffered injury by reason of any such judgment, he 
shall be restored in the position in which he was before the judgment was given or shall be 
afforded such relief as may be just and equitable in the circumstances. 
 
Article 18 
(a) It is recognized that the intervention of the state of war has not affected the obligation to pay 
pecuniary debts arising out of obligations and contracts (including those in respect of bonds) 
which existed and rights which were acquired before the existence of a state of war, and 
which are due by the Government or nationals of Japan to the Government or nationals of 
one of the Allied Powers, or are due by the Government or nationals of one of the Allied 
Powers to the Government or nationals of Japan. The intervention of a state of war shall 
equally not be regarded as affecting the obligation to consider on their merits claims for loss 
or damage to property or for personal injury or death which arose before the existence of a 
state of war, and which may be presented or re-presented by the Government of one of the 
Allied Powers to the Government of Japan, or by the Government of Japan to any of the 
Governments of the Allied Powers. The provisions of this paragraph are without prejudice to 
the rights conferred by Article 14. 
(b) Japan affirms its liability for the prewar external debt of the Japanese State and for debts of 
corporate bodies subsequently declared to be liabilities of the Japanese State, and expresses 
its intention to enter into negotiations at an early date with its creditors with respect to the 
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resumption of payments on those debts; to encourage negotiations in respect to other prewar 
claims and obligations; and to facilitate the transfer of sums accordingly. 
 
Article 19 
(a) Japan waives all claims of Japan and its nationals against the Allied Powers and their 
nationals arising out of the war or out of actions taken because of the existence of a state of 
war, and waives all claims arising from the presence, operations or actions of forces or 
authorities of any of the Allied Powers in Japanese territory prior to the coming into force of 
the present Treaty. 
(b) The foregoing waiver includes any claims arising out of actions taken by any of the Allied 
Powers with respect to Japanese ships between 1 September 1939 and the coming into force 
of the present Treaty, as well as any claims and debts arising in respect to Japanese prisoners 
of war and civilian internees in the hands of the Allied Powers, but does not include Japanese 
claims specifically recognized in the laws of any Allied Power enacted since 2 September 
1945. 
(c) Subject to reciprocal renunciation, the Japanese Government also renounces all claims 
(including debts) against Germany and German nationals on behalf of the Japanese 
Government and Japanese nationals, including intergovernmental claims and claims for loss 
or damage sustained during the war, but excepting (a) claims in respect of contracts entered 
into and rights acquired before 1 September 1939, and (b) claims arising out of trade and 
financial relations between Japan and Germany after 2 September 1945. Such renunciation 
shall not prejudice actions taken in accordance with Articles 16 and 20 of the present Treaty. 
(d) Japan recognizes the validity of all acts and omissions done during the period of occupation 
under or in consequence of directives of the occupation authorities or authorized by Japanese 
law at that time, and will take no action subjecting Allied nationals to civil or criminal 
liability arising out of such acts or omissions. 
 
Article 20 
Japan will take all necessary measures to ensure such disposition of German assets in Japan as 
has been or may be determined by those powers entitled under the Protocol of the proceedings of 
the Berlin Conference of 1945 to dispose of those assets, and pending the final disposition of 
such assets will be responsible for the conservation and administration thereof. 
 
Article 21 
Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 25 of the present Treaty, China shall be entitled to the 
benefits of Articles 10 and 14(a)2; and Korea to the benefits of Articles 2, 4, 9 and 12 of the 
present Treaty. 
  
CHAPTER VI: SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES 
 
Article 22 
If in the opinion of any Party to the present Treaty there has arisen a dispute concerning the 
interpretation or execution of the Treaty, which is not settled by reference to a special claims 
tribunal or by other agreed means, the dispute shall, at the request of any party thereto, be 
referred for decision to the International Court of Justice. Japan and those Allied Powers which 
are not already parties to the Statute of the International Court of Justice will deposit with the 
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Registrar of the Court, at the time of their respective ratifications of the present Treaty, and in 
conformity with the resolution of the United Nations Security Council, dated 15 October 1946, a 
general declaration accepting the jurisdiction, without special agreement, of the Court generally 
in respect to all disputes of the character referred to in this Article. 
  
CHAPTER VII: FINAL CLAUSES 
 
Article 23 
(a) The present Treaty shall be ratified by the States which sign it, including Japan, and will 
come into force for all the States which have then ratified it, when instruments of ratification 
have been deposited by Japan and by a majority, including the United States of America as 
the principal occupying Power, of the following States, namely Australia, Canada, Ceylon, 
France, Indonesia, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Republic of 
the Philippines, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United 
States of America. The present Treaty shall come into force of each State which subsequently 
ratifies it, on the date of the deposit of its instrument of ratification. 
(b) If the Treaty has not come into force within nine months after the date of the deposit of 
Japan's ratification, any State which has ratified it may bring the Treaty into force between 
itself and Japan by a notification to that effect given to the Governments of Japan and the 




All instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Government of the United States of 
America which will notify all the signatory States of each such deposit, of the date of the coming 
into force of the Treaty under paragraph (a) of Article 23, and of any notifications made under 
paragraph (b) of Article 23. 
 
Article 25 
For the purposes of the present Treaty the Allied Powers shall be the States at war with Japan, or 
any State which previously formed a part of the territory of a State named in Article 23, provided 
that in each case the State concerned has signed and ratified the Treaty. Subject to the provisions 
of Article 21, the present Treaty shall not confer any rights, titles or benefits on any State which 
is not an Allied Power as herein defined; nor shall any right, title or interest of Japan be deemed 
to be diminished or prejudiced by any provision of the Treaty in favour of a State which is not an 
Allied Power as so defined. 
 
Article 26 
Japan will be prepared to conclude with any State which signed or adhered to the United Nations 
Declaration of 1 January 1942, and which is at war with Japan, or with any State which 
previously formed a part of the territory of a State named in Article 23, which is not a signatory 
of the present Treaty, a bilateral Treaty of Peace on the same or substantially the same terms as 
are provided for in the present Treaty, but this obligation on the part of Japan will expire three 
years after the first coming into force of the present Treaty. Should Japan make a peace 
settlement or war claims settlement with any State granting that State greater advantages than 
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those provided by the present Treaty, those same advantages shall be extended to the parties to 
the present Treaty. 
 
Article 27 
The present Treaty shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of 
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